Sunday, December 10, 2017

Twenty-One Million Unemployed or Underemployed in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming below Trend Worldwide, Job Creation, Cyclically Stagnating Real Wages, Cyclically Stagnating Real Disposable Income, Financial Repression, United States International Trade, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk: Part II

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Twenty-One Million Unemployed or Underemployed in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming below Trend Worldwide, Job Creation, Cyclically Stagnating Real Wages, Cyclically Stagnating Real Disposable Income, Financial Repression, United States International Trade, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017

I Twenty-One Million Unemployed or Underemployed

IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation

IA2 Number of People in Job Stress

IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment

IA4 Job Creation

IB Stagnating Real Wages

II Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IB1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IB2 Financial Repression

IIB United States International Trade

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

II IB Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides important revisions and enhancements of data on personal income and outlays since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). There are waves of changes in personal income and expenditures in Table IB-1 that correspond somewhat to inflation waves observed worldwide (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html) because of the influence through price indexes. There are wide fluctuations in Nov and Dec 2012 by the rush to realize income of all forms in anticipation of tax increases beginning in Jan 2013. There is major distortion in Jan 2013 because of higher contributions in payrolls to government social insurance that caused sharp reduction in personal income and disposable personal income. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) explains as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January [2013] changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December [2012] in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

The BEA provides the annual update of the national income and product account (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with_30.html): “Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts

The estimates released today reflect the results of the annual update of the national income and

product accounts (NIPAs) in conjunction with preliminary estimates for June 2017. The update covers the most recent 3 years and the first 5 months of 2017. For more information, see information on the “2017 Annual Update” on BEA’s website. Additionally, the August Survey of Current Business will contain an article that describes the results in detail.”

In the first wave in Jan-Apr 2011 with relaxed risk aversion, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 7.7 percent, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 5.2 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 5.9 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) rose at annual equivalent 1.5 percent. In the second wave in May-Aug 2011 under risk aversion, NPI rose at annual equivalent 4.9 percent, NPDI at 4.9 percent and NPCE at 3.7 percent. RDPI increased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 0.9 percent annual equivalent. With mixed shocks of risk aversion in the third wave from Sep to Dec 2011, NPI rose at 2.4 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 2.4 percent and NPCE at 2.1 percent. RDPI increased at 1.5 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 1.5 percent annual equivalent. In the fourth wave from Jan to Mar 2012, NPI increased at 8.3 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 9.6 percent and NPCE at 4.3 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) is more dynamic in the revisions, growing at 4.9 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 2.1 percent. The policy of repressing savings with zero interest rates stimulated growth of nominal consumption (NPCE) at the annual equivalent rate of 4.3 percent and real consumption (RPCE) at 2.1 percent. In the fifth wave in Apr-Jul 2012, NPI increased at annual equivalent 1.2 percent, NDPI at 1.2 percent and RDPI at 0.9 percent. Financial repression failed to stimulate consumption with NPCE growing at 1.2 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 0.9 percent. In the sixth wave in Aug-Oct 2012, in another wave of carry trades into commodity futures, NPI increased at 8.3 percent annual equivalent and NDPI increased at 7.9 percent while real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent. NPCE increased at 4.1 percent and RPCE changed at 0.0 percent. Data for Nov-Dec 2012 have illusory increases: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). In the seventh wave, anticipations of tax increases in Jan 2013 caused exceptional income gains that increased personal income to annual equivalent 25.3 percent in Nov-Dec 2012, nominal disposable income at 25.3 percent and real disposable personal income at 26.0 percent with likely effects on nominal personal consumption that increased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption at 3.0 percent with subdued prices. The numbers in parentheses show that without the exceptional effects NDPI (nominal disposable personal income) increased at 5.5 percent and RDPI (real disposable personal income) at 8.7 percent. In the eighth wave, nominal personal income fell 5.2 percent in Jan 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 47.3 percent; nominal disposable personal income fell 6.1 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 53.0 percent; real disposable income fell 6.2 percent or at the annual rate of decline of 53.6 percent; nominal personal consumption expenditures increased 0.3 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 3.7 percent; and real personal consumption expenditures increased 0.2 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent. The savings rate fell significantly from 11.0 percent in Dec 2012 to 4.9 percent in Jan 2013. The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as follows (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf 3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income -- increased $126.7 billion in January, compared with an increase of $6.3 billion in December. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.8 billion to January. As noted above, employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, so the total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.8 billion”

Further explanation is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9 billion. The January change in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates. Excluding these special factors and others, which are discussed more fully below, DPI increased $46.8 billion in February, or 0.4 percent, after increasing $15.8 billion, or 0.1 percent, in January.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf). In the ninth wave in Feb-Mar 2013, nominal personal income increased at 3.0 percent and nominal disposable income at 2.4 percent annual equivalent, while real disposable income increased at 0.6 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures grew at 1.8 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 0.0 percent annual equivalent. The savings rate collapsed from 7.8 percent in Oct 2012, 8.8 percent in Nov 2012 and 11.0 percent in Dec 2012 to 4.9 percent in Jan 2013, 4.7 percent in Feb 2013 and 4.8 percent in Mar 2013. In the tenth wave from Apr to Sep 2013, personal income grew at 4.1 percent annual equivalent, nominal disposable income increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 2.8 percent. Real disposable income grew at 2.6 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 2.0 percent. In the eleventh wave, nominal personal income fell at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Oct 2013, nominal disposable income at 1.2 percent and real disposable income at 3.5 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 2.4 percent. In the twelfth wave, nominal personal income increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2013, nominal disposable income at 4.9 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 8.7 percent. Real disposable income increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 6.2 percent. In the thirteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2013 and nominal disposable income at 3.7 percent while real disposable income increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent and 0.0 percent for real personal consumption expenditures. In the fourteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 8.3 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Mar 2014, nominal disposable income at 8.3 percent and nominal consumption expenditures at 5.3 percent. Real disposable personal income increased at 6.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.2 percent. In the fifteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.9 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014 and nominal disposable income at 5.9 percent. Real disposable income increased at 4.7 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014. Nominal personal consumption increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014 and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.9 percent. In the sixteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.5 percent annual equivalent in Sep-Dec 2014, nominal disposable income at 5.2 percent and nominal personal consumption at 3.3 percent. Real disposable income increased at 6.2 percent in Sep-Dec 2014 and real personal consumption expenditure at 4.0 percent. In the seventeenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.3 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2015 and nominal disposable income increased at 2.4 percent while nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. Real disposable income increased at 4.3 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.7 percent. In the eighteenth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 5.3 percent and nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) increased at 5.3 percent annual equivalent in Mar-Jun 2015. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 3.7 percent. Nominal consumption expenditures (NPCE) increased at 6.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) increased at 4.1 percent. In the nineteenth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 2.8 percent in Jun-Aug 2015 and nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 2.8 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 1.6 percent, nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 3.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) at 2.4 percent. In the twentieth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 3.0 percent annual equivalent in Sep-Dec 2015, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 2.8 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 4.5 percent. Real disposable personal income grew at 2.4 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.0 percent. In the twenty-first wave, nominal personal income fell at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2016. Nominal disposable personal income changed at 0.0 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.4 percent. Real disposable personal income decreased at 1.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.8 percent. In the twenty-second wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.5 percent in Mar-Apr 2016. Nominal disposable income increased at 4.9 percent and real disposable income grew at 2.4 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures grew at 5.5 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.0 percent. In the twenty-third wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.7 percent in May-Jul 2016 and nominal disposable income at 3.7 percent while nominal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent. Real disposable income increased at 1.6 percent and real consumption expenditures at 3.2 percent. In the twenty-fourth wave, nominal personal income increased at 0.8 percent in Aug-Oct 2016 and nominal disposable income at 0.4 percent while nominal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. Real disposable income decreased at 1.6 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.8 percent. In the twenty-fifth wave, nominal personal income changed at 0.0 percent and nominal disposable income increased at 0.6 percent in Nov-Dec 2016. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. Real personal disposable income decreased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.3 percent. In the twenty-sixth wave, nominal personal income increased at annual equivalent 8.7 percent in Jan-Feb 2017, nominal disposable income at 8.7 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 2.4 percent. Real disposable income increased at 5.5 percent and real personal consumption expenditures fell at 0.6 percent. In the twenty-seventh wave, nominal personal income increased at 2.4 percent in Mar-May 2017 and nominal disposable income at 3.7 percent while nominal personal consumption increased at 4.1 percent. Real disposable income increased at 3.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.5 percent. In the twenty-eighth wave, nominal personal income changed at 0.0 percent in Jun 2017 and nominal disposable income changed at 0.0 percent while nominal personal consumption increased at 1.2 percent. Real disposable income decreased at 1.2 percent and real consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. In the twenty-ninth wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.0 percent in Jul-Aug 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 1.8 percent. Real disposable income changed at 0.0 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.8 percent. In the thirtieth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.9 percent in Sep-Oct 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 5.5 percent. Real disposable income increased at 1.8 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 7.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent.

The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to 2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of expansion after recessions. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 33 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2017. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IIIQ2017 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2017/pdf/gdp3q17_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[($14,745.9/$14,355.6) -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2017 would have accumulated to 33.4 percent. GDP in IIIQ2017 would be $19,999.1 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2829.4 billion than actual $17,169.7 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 21.4 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.6 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IIIQ2017 is 14.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $17,169.7 billion in IIIQ2017 or 14.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.4 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Oct 1919 to Oct 2017. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2393 in Dec 2007 to 146.1374 in Oct 2017. The actual index NSA in Oct 2017 is 106.1414, which is 27.4 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Oct 2017. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 132.7816 in Oct 2017. The output of manufacturing at 106.1414 in Oct 2017 is 20.1 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table IB-1, US, Percentage Change from Prior Month Seasonally Adjusted of Personal Income, Disposable Income and Personal Consumption Expenditures %

NPI

NDPI

RDPI

NPCE

RPCE

Oct 2017

0.4

0.5

0.3

0.3

0.1

Sep

0.4

0.4

0.0

0.9

0.5

AE ∆% Sep-Oct

4.9

5.5

1.8

7.4

3.7

Aug

0.2

0.1

-0.1

0.2

0.0

Jul

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.4

0.3

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

3.0

1.8

0.0

3.7

1.8

Jun

0.0

0.0

-0.1

0.1

0.1

AE ∆% Jun

0.0

0.0

-1.2

1.2

1.2

May

0.2

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.3

Apr

0.1

0.2

-0.1

0.3

0.1

Mar

0.3

0.3

0.5

0.5

0.7

AE ∆% Mar-May

2.4

3.7

3.2

4.1

4.5

Feb

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.1

0.0

Jan

0.9

0.9

0.5

0.3

-0.1

AE ∆% Jan-Feb

8.7

8.7

5.5

2.4

-0.6

Dec 2016

0.1

0.0

-0.2

0.5

0.4

Nov

-0.1

-0.1

-0.2

0.3

0.3

AE ∆% Nov-Dec

0.0

0.6

-2.4

4.9

4.3

Oct

0.0

0.0

-0.2

0.3

0.1

Sep

0.1

0.1

-0.1

0.6

0.5

Aug

0.1

0.0

-0.1

0.3

0.1

AE ∆% Aug-Oct

0.8

0.4

-1.6

4.9

2.8

Jul

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.3

0.2

Jun

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.5

0.4

May

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.4

0.2

AE ∆% May-Jul

3.7

3.7

1.6

3.7

3.2

Apr

0.6

0.5

0.2

0.8

0.5

Mar

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0

AE ∆% Mar-Apr

5.5

4.9

2.4

5.5

3.0

Feb

-0.2

-0.1

-0.1

0.4

0.4

Jan

-0.2

0.1

-0.1

0.0

-0.1

AE ∆% Jan-Feb

-2.4

0.0

-1.2

2.4

1.8

2015

Dec

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.3

0.3

Nov

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.3

Oct

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.1

0.1

Sep

0.2

0.2

0.3

0.3

0.3

AE ∆% Sep-Dec

3.0

2.8

2.4

4.5

3.0

Aug

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

Jul

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.3

Jun

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.2

0.0

AE ∆% Jun-Aug

2.8

2.8

1.6

3.7

2.4

May

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.6

0.4

Apr

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.2

0.1

Mar

0.1

0.1

-0.1

0.7

0.5

AE ∆% Mar-Jun

5.3

5.3

3.7

6.2

4.1

Feb

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

Jan

0.2

-0.1

0.3

-0.1

0.4

AE ∆% Jan-Feb

4.3

2.4

4.3

1.2

3.7

2014

Dec

0.3

0.3

0.5

0.0

0.2

Nov

0.5

0.5

0.6

0.4

0.5

Oct

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

Sep

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.0

AE ∆% Sep-Dec

5.5

5.2

6.2

3.3

4.0

Aug

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.7

0.7

Jul

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.3

0.2

Jun

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.4

May

0.4

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

Apr

0.4

0.5

0.3

0.3

0.1

AE ∆% Apr-Aug

5.9

5.9

4.7

4.9

3.9

Mar

0.7

0.8

0.6

0.7

0.6

Feb

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

Jan

0.6

0.5

0.3

0.1

-0.2

AE ∆% Jan-Mar

8.3

8.3

6.2

5.3

3.2

2013

Dec

0.4

0.3

0.1

0.2

0.0

AE ∆% Dec

4.9

3.7

1.2

2.4

0.0

Nov

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.7

0.5

AE ∆% Nov

6.2

4.9

3.7

8.7

6.2

Oct

-0.1

-0.1

-0.3

0.4

0.2

AE ∆% Oct

-1.2

-1.2

-3.5

4.9

2.4

Sep

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.5

0.4

Aug

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

Jul

0.0

0.0

-0.1

0.2

0.1

Jun

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.4

0.2

May

0.7

0.6

0.6

0.2

0.2

Apr

0.1

0.0

0.0

-0.1

0.0

AE ∆% Apr-Sep

4.1

3.7

2.6

2.8

2.0

Mar

0.1

0.0

0.1

-0.2

-0.1

Feb

0.4

0.4

0.0

0.5

0.1

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

3.0

2.4

0.6

1.8

0.0

Jan

-5.2

-6.1 (0.1)a

-6.2

0.3

0.2

AE ∆% Jan

-47.3

-53.0 (3.7)a

-53.6

3.7

2.4

2012

∆% Jan-Dec 2012***

8.5

8.6

6.8

3.3

2.3

Dec

2.6

2.6 (0.3)*

2.6 (0.5)*

0.2

0.2

Nov

1.2

1.2 (0.6)*

1.3 (0.9)*

0.2

0.3

AE ∆% Nov-Dec

25.3

25.3 (5.5)*

26.0 (8.7)*

2.4

3.0

Oct

0.9

0.9

0.6

0.1

-0.2

Sep

0.9

0.8

0.5

0.7

0.4

Aug

0.2

0.2

-0.2

0.2

-0.2

AE ∆% Aug-Oct

8.3

7.9

3.7

4.1

0.0

Jul

-0.2

-0.2

-0.3

0.3

0.3

Jun

0.2

0.2

0.2

-0.1

-0.1

May

0.0

0.0

0.1

-0.1

0.0

Apr

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.1

AE ∆% Apr-Jul

1.2

1.2

0.9

1.2

0.9

Mar

0.5

0.5

0.3

0.1

-0.1

Feb

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4

Jan

0.7

1.0

0.7

0.7

0.4

AE ∆% Jan-Mar

8.3

9.6

4.9

4.3

2.1

2011

∆% Jan-Dec 2011*

5.1

4.1

1.6

3.7

1.8

Dec

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.0

0.0

Nov

0.0

0.0

-0.1

0.0

-0.1

Oct

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.3

0.3

Sep

-0.1

-0.1

-0.3

0.4

0.3

AE ∆% Sep-Dec

2.4

2.4

1.5

2.1

1.5

Aug

0.2

0.2

-0.1

0.2

-0.1

Jul

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.5

0.3

Jun

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.2

0.2

May

0.3

0.3

-0.1

0.3

-0.1

AE ∆% May-Aug

4.9

4.9

1.8

3.7

0.9

Apr

0.2

0.2

-0.3

0.4

0.0

Mar

0.2

0.2

-0.1

0.7

0.3

Feb

0.5

0.6

0.3

0.4

0.1

Jan

1.6

0.7

0.5

0.4

0.1

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

7.7

5.2

1.2

5.9

1.5

2010

∆% Jan-Dec 2010**

5.2

4.3

2.9

4.4

2.9

Dec

0.9

0.9

0.7

0.3

0.1

Nov

0.5

0.5

0.3

0.5

0.4

Oct

0.5

0.5

0.2

0.7

0.5

IVQ2010∆%

1.9

1.9

1.2

1.5

1.0

IVQ2010 AE ∆%

7.9

7.9

4.9

6.2

4.1

Notes: *Excluding exceptional income gains in Nov and Dec 2012 because of anticipated tax increases in Jan 2013 ((page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). a Excluding employee contributions for government social insurance (pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf )Excluding NPI: current dollars personal income; NDPI: current dollars disposable personal income; RDPI: chained (2005) dollars DPI; NPCE: current dollars personal consumption expenditures; RPCE: chained (2005) dollars PCE; AE: annual equivalent; IVQ2010: fourth quarter 2010; A: annual equivalent

Percentage change month to month seasonally adjusted

*∆% Dec 2011/Dec 2010 **∆% Dec 2010/Dec 2009 *** ∆% Dec 2012/Dec 2011

Source: US Bureau of Economic http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IB-2 provides 12-month rates of growth of real disposable personal income (RDPI), real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE), real personal consumption expenditures in goods (RPCEG), real personal consumption expenditures in durable goods (RPCEGD) and real personal consumption expenditures of services (RPCES). The rates of growth of real disposable income decline in the final quarter of 2013 because of the increases in the last two months of 2012 in anticipation of the tax increases of the “fiscal cliff” episode. The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf).

The 12-month rate of increase of real disposable income fell to minus 1.3 percent in Oct 2013 and minus 2.4 percent in Nov 2013 partly because of the much higher level in late 2012 in anticipation of incomes to avoid increases in taxes in 2013. Real disposable income fell 4.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 primarily because of the much higher level in late 2012 in anticipation of income to avoid increases in taxes in 2013. Real disposable income increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014, partly because of the low level in Jan 2013 after anticipation of incomes in late 2012 in avoiding the fiscal cliff episode. Real disposable income increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2017.

RPCE growth decelerated less sharply from close to 3 percent in IVQ2010 to 2.6 percent in Oct 2017. Subdued growth of RPCE could affect revenues of business. Growth rates of personal consumption have weakened. Goods and especially durable goods have been driving growth of PCE as shown by the much higher 12-month rates of growth of real goods PCE (RPCEG) and durable goods real PCE (RPCEGD) than services real PCE (RPCES). Growth of consumption of goods and, in particular, of consumer durable goods drives the faster expansion of the economy while growth of consumption of services is much more moderate. The 12-month rates of growth of RPCEGD have fallen from around 10 percent and even higher in several months from Sep 2010 to Feb 2011 to the range of 5.6 to 7.7 percent from Oct 2016 to Oct 2017. RPCEG growth rates have fallen from around 5 percent late in 2010 and early Jan-Feb 2011 to the range of 3.1 to 4.3 percent from Oct 2016 to Oct 2017. In Oct 2017, RPCEG increased 3.9 percent in 12 months and RPCEGD 5.8 percent while RPCES increased 2.0 percent. There are limits to sustained growth based on financial repression in an environment of weak labor markets and real labor remuneration.

Table IB-2, Real Disposable Personal Income and Real Personal Consumption Expenditures

Percentage Change from the Same Month a Year Earlier %

RDPI

RPCE

RPCEG

RPCEGD

RPCES

2017

Oct

1.6

2.6

3.9

5.8

2.0

Sep

1.1

2.6

4.0

7.0

1.9

Aug

1.0

2.6

3.6

5.6

2.1

Jul

1.0

2.7

3.5

5.8

2.3

Jun

1.1

2.6

3.1

6.1

2.3

May

1.3

2.8

3.7

6.6

2.4

Apr

1.0

2.8

3.6

6.7

2.4

Mar

1.3

3.2

4.0

6.9

2.9

Feb

0.9

2.5

3.1

6.3

2.2

Jan

0.5

2.9

3.8

6.9

2.4

2016

Dec

0.0

2.9

3.9

7.3

2.4

Nov

0.3

2.8

3.7

5.9

2.4

Oct

0.5

2.8

4.3

7.7

2.1

Sep

1.1

2.8

3.5

6.1

2.5

Aug

1.4

2.7

3.2

4.6

2.4

Jul

1.8

2.8

3.8

6.4

2.4

Jun

1.6

3.0

4.2

5.6

2.4

May

1.6

2.6

3.4

3.7

2.2

Apr

1.9

2.7

3.8

4.6

2.2

Mar

2.3

2.3

2.8

3.5

2.1

Feb

1.9

2.8

4.3

5.9

2.1

Jan

2.4

2.6

3.3

4.6

2.2

2015

Dec

2.8

3.1

4.2

6.5

2.5

Nov

3.2

2.9

3.8

6.2

2.5

Oct

3.7

3.1

3.9

6.5

2.7

Sep

3.9

3.7

5.1

7.9

3.0

Aug

3.9

3.3

4.1

6.5

3.0

Jul

4.2

3.8

4.9

7.8

3.3

Jun

4.3

3.7

4.5

7.0

3.4

May

4.7

4.1

5.2

8.8

3.6

Apr

4.7

3.9

4.5

8.5

3.6

Mar

4.4

3.9

4.9

8.0

3.4

Feb

5.1

4.0

4.5

8.4

3.7

Jan

5.3

4.2

6.0

11.5

3.3

2014

Dec

5.3

3.7

4.9

9.6

3.1

Nov

4.9

3.5

4.7

8.5

2.9

Oct

4.6

3.6

4.4

7.9

3.1

Sep

3.7

3.2

3.8

7.8

2.8

Aug

3.7

3.5

5.2

8.7

2.7

Jul

3.5

2.9

3.7

6.9

2.4

Jun

3.3

2.8

3.9

7.2

2.2

May

3.0

2.6

3.7

7.3

2.1

Apr

3.3

2.6

4.0

6.2

1.9

Mar

3.0

2.5

4.2

7.9

1.7

Feb

2.5

1.9

2.3

3.3

1.6

Jan

1.9

1.6

1.4

1.3

1.7

2013

Dec

-4.8

1.9

2.9

3.1

1.4

Nov

-2.4

2.2

3.8

5.8

1.3

Oct

-1.3

1.9

3.7

6.8

1.0

Sep

-0.5

1.5

2.9

4.5

0.8

Aug

-0.3

1.5

2.8

6.6

0.9

Jul

-0.8

1.3

3.4

6.9

0.2

Jun

-1.0

1.5

3.5

7.5

0.5

May

-1.0

1.2

3.0

6.5

0.3

Apr

-1.5

1.0

2.5

6.1

0.2

Mar

-1.2

1.1

2.4

5.6

0.5

Feb

-1.1

1.1

3.0

7.2

0.1

Jan

-0.5

1.4

3.4

7.8

0.3

2012

Dec

6.8

1.6

3.6

8.7

0.6

Nov

4.9

1.4

2.8

7.7

0.7

Oct

3.4

1.0

1.9

5.2

0.5

Sep

2.9

1.4

3.4

8.5

0.4

Aug

2.1

1.3

3.4

8.5

0.3

Jul

2.2

1.4

2.8

7.5

0.7

Jun

2.9

1.4

2.5

8.3

0.8

May

3.1

1.7

3.1

7.9

1.0

Apr

3.0

1.6

2.5

7.0

1.2

Mar

2.4

1.4

2.3

5.9

1.0

Feb

2.0

1.8

2.5

7.1

1.5

Jan

1.8

1.5

1.9

5.9

1.3

Dec 2011

1.6

1.2

1.4

5.0

1.1

Dec 2010

2.9

2.9

4.7

8.4

2.1

Notes: RDPI: real disposable personal income; RPCE: real personal consumption expenditures (PCE); RPCEG: real PCE goods; RPCEGD: RPCEG durable goods; RPCES: RPCE services

Numbers are percentage changes from the same month a year earlier

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-1 shows US real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) between 1999 and 2017. There is an evident drop in RPCE during the global recession in 2007 to 2009 but the slope is flatter during the current recovery than in the period before 2007.

Chart IB-1, US, Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1999-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Percent changes from the prior period in seasonally adjusted annual equivalent quarterly rates (SAAR) of real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) are in Chart IB-2 from 1995 to 2017. The average rate could be visualized as a horizontal line. Although there are not yet sufficient observations, it appears from Chart IB-2 that the average rate of growth of RPCE was higher before the recession than during the past thirty-one quarters of expansion that began in IIIQ2009.

Chart IB-2, Percent Change from Prior Period in Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1995-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Personal income and its disposition are in Table IB-3. The latest estimates and revisions have changed movements in eight forms. (1) Increase in Oct 2017 of personal income by $65.1 billion or 0.4 percent and increase of disposable income of $66.1 billion or 0.5 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 0.3 percent. (2) Increase of personal income of $247.8 billion or 1.6 percent from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 and increase of disposable income of $243.3 billion or 1.8 percent. Wages and salaries increased $64.5 billion or 0.8 percent. (3) Increase of personal income of $575.6 billion from Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 or 3.8 percent and increase of disposable income of $443.7 billion or 3.3 percent. Wages and salaries increased $369.9 billion or 4.8 percent. (4) Increase of personal income of $910.0 billion from Dec 2013 to Dec 2014 or 6.4 percent while disposable income increased $781.5 billion or 6.2 percent. Wages and salaries increased $419.7 billion or 5.8 percent. (5) Decrease of personal income of $329.0 billion from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 or by 2.2 percent and decrease of disposable income of $442.5 billion or by 3.4 percent. Wages and salaries increased $60.7 billion from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 or by 0.8 percent. Large part of these declines occurred because of the comparison of high levels in late 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in 2013. (6) In 2012, personal income increased $1150.5 billion or 8.5 percent while wages and salaries increased 7.5 percent and disposable income 8.6 percent. Significant part of these gains occurred in Dec 2012 in anticipation of incomes because of tax increases beginning in Jan 2013. (7) Increase of $656.0 billion of personal income in 2011 or by 5.1 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 2.7 percent and disposable income of 4.1 percent. (8) Increase of the rate of savings as percent of disposable income from 5.9 percent in Dec 2010 to 6.4 percent in Dec 2011 and 11.0 percent in Dec 2012, decreasing to 4.7 percent in Dec 2013. The savings rate increased to 6.1 percent in Dec 2014, decreasing to 5.8 percent in Dec 2015, 3.2 percent in Dec 2016, 3.0 percent in Sep 2017 and 3.2 percent in Oct 2017.

Table IB-3, US, Personal Income and its Disposition, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates USD Billions

Personal
Income

Wages &
Salaries

Personal
Taxes

DPI

Savings
Rate %

Oct 2017

16,574.6

8,427.7

2,061.3

14,513.3

3.2

Sep 2017

16,509.5

8,401.7

2,062.3

14,447.2

3.0

Change Sep 2017/     

Aug 2017

65.1 ∆% 0.4

26.0 ∆%

0.3

-1.0 ∆% 0.0

66.1 ∆% 0.5

Dec 2016

16,027.3

8,099.4

1,982.5

14,044.8

3.2

Dec 2015

15,779.5

8,034.9

1,978.0

13,801.5

5.8

Change Dec 2016/     

Dec 2015

247.8 ∆% 1.6

64.5 ∆% 0.8

4.5 ∆% 0.2

243.3 ∆% 1.8

Dec 2015

15,779.5

8,034.9

1,978.0

13,801.5

5.8

Change Dec 2015/Dec 2014

575.6 ∆%

3.8

369.9 ∆%

4.8

131.9 ∆%

7.1

443.7 ∆%

3.3

Dec 2014

15,203.9

7,665.0

1,846.1

13,357.8

6.1

Change Dec 2014/Dec 2013

910.0 ∆% 6.4

419.7 ∆% 5.8

128.5 ∆% 7.5

781.5 ∆% 6.2

Dec 2013

14,293.9

7,245.3

1,717.6

12,576.3

4.7

Dec 2012

14,622.9

7,184.6

1,604.1

13,018.8

11.0

Change Dec 2013/ Dec 2012

-329.0 ∆% -2.2

60.7 ∆% 0.8

113.5 ∆%

7.3

-442.5 ∆% -3.4

Change Dec 2012/ Dec 2011

1150.5 ∆% 8.5

501.7 ∆% 7.5

120.3 ∆% 8.1

1030.2 ∆% 8.6

Dec 2011

13,472.4

6,682.9

1,483.8

11,988.6

6.4

Dec 2010

12,816.4

6,506.0

1,301.9

11,514.5

5.9

Change Dec 2011/ Dec 2010

656.0 ∆%

5.1

176.9  ∆% 2.7

181.9     ∆% 14.0

474.1    ∆% 4.1

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides a wealth of revisions and enhancements of US personal income and outlays since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Table IB-4 provides growth rates of real disposable income and real disposable income per capita in the long-term and selected periods. Real disposable income consists of after-tax income adjusted for inflation. Real disposable income per capita is income per person after taxes and inflation. There is remarkable long-term trend of growth of real disposable income of 3.2 percent per year on average from 1929 to 2016 and 2.0 percent in real disposable income per capita. Real disposable income increased at the average yearly rate of 3.7 percent from 1947 to 1999 and real disposable income per capita at 2.3 percent. These rates of increase broadly accompany rates of growth of GDP. Institutional arrangements in the United States provided the environment for growth of output and income after taxes, inflation and population growth. There is significant break of growth by much lower 2.4 percent for real disposable income on average from 1999 to 2016 and 1.5 percent in real disposable per capita income. Real disposable income grew at 3.5 percent from 1980 to 1989 and real disposable per capita income at 2.6 percent. In contrast, real disposable income grew at only 1.8 percent on average from 2006 to 2016 and real disposable income per capita at 1.0 percent. Real disposable income grew at 1.7 percent from 2007 to 2016 and real disposable income per capita at 0.9 percent. The United States has interrupted its long-term and cyclical dynamism of output, income and employment growth. Recovery of this dynamism could prove to be a major challenge. Cyclical uncommonly slow growth explains weakness in the current whole cycle instead of the allegation of secular stagnation.

Table IB-4, Average Annual Growth Rates of Real Disposable Income (RDPI) and Real Disposable Income per Capita (RDPIPC), Percent per Year 

RDPI Average ∆%

     1929-2016

3.2

     1947-1999

3.7

     1999-2016

2.4

     1999-2006

3.2

     1980-1989

3.5

     2006-2016

1.8

2007-2016

1.7

RDPIPC Average ∆%

     1929-2016

2.0

     1947-1999

2.3

     1999-2016

1.5

     1999-2006

2.2

     1980-1989

2.6

     2006-2016

1.0

2007-2016

0.9

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-3 provides personal income in the US between 1980 and 1990. These data are not adjusted for inflation that was still high in the 1980s in the exit from the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html). Personal income grew steadily during the 1980s after recovery from two recessions from Jan IQ1980 to Jul IIIQ1980 and from Jul IIIQ1981 to Nov IVQ1982. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IB-3, US, Personal Income, Billion Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 1980-1990

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

A different evolution of personal income is shown in Chart IB-4. Personal income also fell during the recession from Dec IVQ2007 to Jun IIQ2009 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). Growth of personal income during the expansion has been tepid even with the new revisions. In IVQ2012, nominal disposable personal income grew at the SAAR of 13.3 percent and real disposable personal income at 10.9 percent (Table 2.1 http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The BEA explains as follows: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf). The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3): “The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf).

In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 11.0 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 11.9 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 15.9 percent (Table 14 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2016/pdf/pi0616.pdf).The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

In IIIQ2014, personal income grew at 5.9 percent, nominal disposable income at 5.5 percent and real disposable personal income at 4.2 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IVQ2014, personal income grew at 6.1 percent in nominal terms while nominal disposable income grew at 5.7 percent in nominal terms and at 5.9 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 4.1 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 2.6 percent and at 4.3 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 5.7 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 5.6 percent and real disposable income grew at 3.8 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IIIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 2.9 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 3.2 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.8 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IVQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 3.7 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 3.1 percent and real disposable income at 2.9 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IQ2016, personal income fell at 0.5 percent and fell at 2.1 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 0.9 percent and real disposable income grew at 0.2 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0817.pdf). In IIQ2016, personal income grew at 4.1 percent and at 2.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 4.0 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.9 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IIIQ2016, personal income grew at 3.0 percent and at 1.3 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 2.5 percent and real disposable income grew at 0.7 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IVQ2016, nominal personal income fell at 0.1 percent, decreasing at 2.6 percent excluding current transfers while disposable income grew at 0.1 percent and real disposable income decreased at 1.8 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 5.6 percent and 3.4 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 5.2 percent and real disposable income at 2.9 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 2.3 percent and 2.4 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.0 percent and real disposable income at 2.7 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IIIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 2.8 percent and at 1.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 2.0 percent and real disposable personal income grew at 0.5 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf).

Chart IB-4, US, Personal Income, Current Billions of Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 2007-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Real or inflation-adjusted disposable personal income is in Chart IB-5 from 1980 to 1990. Real disposable income after allowing for taxes and inflation grew steadily at high rates during the entire decade. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IB-5, US, Real Disposable Income, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1980-1990

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-6 provides real disposable income from 2007 to 2017. In IVQ2012, nominal disposable personal income grew at the SAAR of 13.3 percent and real disposable personal income at 10.9 percent (Table 2.1 http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The BEA explains as follows: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf). The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3): “The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf). In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 11.0 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 11.9 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 15.9 percent (Table 14 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2016/pdf/pi0616.pdf).The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

In IIIQ2014, personal income grew at 5.9 percent, nominal disposable income at 5.5 percent and real disposable personal income at 4.2 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IVQ2014, personal income grew at 6.1 percent in nominal terms while nominal disposable income grew at 5.7 percent in nominal terms and at 5.9 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 4.1 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 2.6 percent and at 4.3 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 5.7 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 5.6 percent and real disposable income grew at 3.8 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IIIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 2.9 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 3.2 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.8 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IVQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 3.7 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 3.1 percent and real disposable income at 2.9 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IQ2016, personal income fell at 0.5 percent and fell at 2.1 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 0.9 percent and real disposable income grew at 0.2 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0817.pdf). In IIQ2016, personal income grew at 4.1 percent and at 2.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 4.0 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.9 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IIIQ2016, personal income grew at 3.0 percent and at 1.3 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 2.5 percent and real disposable income grew at 0.7 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IVQ2016, nominal personal income fell at 0.1 percent, decreasing at 2.6 percent excluding current transfers while disposable income grew at 0.1 percent and real disposable income decreased at 1.8 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 5.6 percent and 3.4 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 5.2 percent and real disposable income at 2.9 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 2.3 percent and 2.4 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.0 percent and real disposable income at 2.7 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IIIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 2.8 percent and at 1.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 2.0 percent and real disposable personal income grew at 0.5 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf).

Chart IB-6, US, Real Disposable Income, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 2007-2017

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-7 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income from the preceding period at seasonally adjusted annual rates from 1980 to 1990. Rates of changes were high during the decade with few negative changes. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IB-7, US, Real Disposable Income Percentage Change from Preceding Period at Quarterly Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates, 1980-1990

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-8 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income from the preceding period at seasonally adjusted annual rates from 2007 to 2017. There has been a period of positive rates followed by decline of rates and then negative and low rates in 2011. Recovery in 2012 has not reproduced the dynamism of the brief early phase of expansion. In IVQ2012, nominal disposable personal income grew at the SAAR of 13.3 percent and real disposable personal income at 10.9 percent (Table 2.1 http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The BEA explains as follows: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf). The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3): “The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf). In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 11.0 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 11.9 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 15.9 percent (Table 14 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2016/pdf/pi0616.pdf).The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

In IIIQ2014, personal income grew at 5.9 percent, nominal disposable income at 5.5 percent and real disposable personal income at 4.2 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IVQ2014, personal income grew at 6.1 percent in nominal terms while nominal disposable income grew at 5.7 percent in nominal terms and at 5.9 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 4.1 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 2.6 percent and at 4.3 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 5.7 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 5.6 percent and real disposable income grew at 3.8 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IIIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 2.9 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 3.2 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.8 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IVQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 3.7 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 3.1 percent and real disposable income at 2.9 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0617.pdf). In IQ2016, personal income fell at 0.5 percent and fell at 2.1 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 0.9 percent and real disposable income grew at 0.2 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi0817.pdf). In IIQ2016, personal income grew at 4.1 percent and at 2.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 4.0 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.9 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IIIQ2016, personal income grew at 3.0 percent and at 1.3 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 2.5 percent and real disposable income grew at 0.7 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IVQ2016, nominal personal income fell at 0.1 percent, decreasing at 2.6 percent excluding current transfers while disposable income grew at 0.1 percent and real disposable income decreased at 1.8 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 5.6 percent and 3.4 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 5.2 percent and real disposable income at 2.9 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 2.3 percent and 2.4 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.0 percent and real disposable income at 2.7 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). In IIIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 2.8 percent and at 1.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 2.0 percent and real disposable personal income grew at 0.5 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf).

Chart, IB-8, US, Real Disposable Income, Percentage Change from Preceding Period at Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates, 2007-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates US personal income in Oct 2017 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate of $16,574.6 billion, as shown in Table IB-3 above (see Table 1 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). The major portion of personal income is compensation of employees of $10,399.5 billion, or 62.7 percent of the total. Wages and salaries are $8,427.7 billion, of which $7,057.2 billion by private industries and supplements to wages and salaries of $1,971.8 billion (contributions to social insurance are $615.6 billion). In Apr 1991 (at the comparable month after the 33rd quarter of cyclical expansion), US personal income was $5,017.8 billion at SAAR (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Compensation of employees was $3,409.6 billion, or 68.0 percent of the total. Wages and salaries were $2,784.9 billion of which $2,239.1 billion by private industries. Supplements to wages and salaries were $624.6 billion with employer contributions to pension and insurance funds of $412.0 billion and $212.7 billion to government social insurance. Chart IB-9 provides US wages and salaries by private industries in the 1980s and 1990. Growth was robust after the interruption of the recessions. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IB-9, US, Wages and Salaries, Private Industries, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates Billions of Dollars, 1980-1990

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates US personal income in Oct 2017 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate of $16,574.6 billion, as shown in Table IB-3 above (see Table 1 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf). The major portion of personal income is compensation of employees of $10,399.5 billion, or 62.7 percent of the total. Wages and salaries are $8,427.7 billion, of which $7,057.2 billion by private industries and supplements to wages and salaries of $1,971.8 billion (contributions to social insurance are $615.6 billion). Growth was mediocre in the weak expansion phase after IIIQ2009.

Chart IB-10, US, Wage and Salary Disbursement, Private Industries, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-11 provides finer detail with monthly wages and salaries of private industries from 2007 to 2017. Anticipations of income in late 2012 to avoid tax increases in 2013 cloud comparisons.

Chart IB-11, US, Wages and Salaries, Private Industries, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-12 provides monthly real disposable personal income per capita from 1980 to 1990. This is the ultimate measure of wellbeing in receiving income by obtaining the value per inhabitant. The measure cannot adjust for the distribution of income. Real disposable income per capita grew rapidly during the expansion after 1983 and continued growing during the rest of the decade. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IB-12, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Chained 2009 Dollars 1980-1990

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IB-5 provides the comparison between the cycle of the 1980s and the current cycle. Real per capita disposable income (RDPI-PC) increased 25.2 percent from Dec 1979 to Apr 1991. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). In the comparable period in the current cycle from Dec 2007 to Oct 2017, real per capita disposable income increased 9.5 percent.

Table IB-5, Percentage Changes of Real Disposable Personal Income Per Capita

Month

RDPI-PC ∆% 12/79

RDPI-PC ∆% YOY

Month

RDPI-PC ∆% 12/07

RDPI-PC ∆% YOY

11/1982

2.4

0.7

6/2009

-0.6

-2.4

12/1982

2.9

1.3

9/2009

-1.3

-0.6

12/1983

7.8

4.8

6/2010

-0.4

0.2

12/1987

20.4

2.7

6/2014

4.2

2.5

1/1988

20.6

2.6

7/2014

4.4

2.7

2/1988

21.2

2.6

8/2014

4.8

3.0

3/1988

21.6

2.9

9/2014

5.0

3.0

4/1988

21.9

7.4

10/2014

5.5

3.8

5/1988

22.0

3.3

11/2014

6.1

4.1

6/1988

22.3

3.9

12/2014

6.5

4.5

7/1988

22.7

4.0

1/2015

6.8

4.6

8/1988

23.0

3.8

2/2015

7.1

4.3

9/1988

23.1

4.0

3/2015

7.0

3.6

10/1988

23.6

3.9

4/2015

7.6

3.9

11/1988

23.6

3.5

5/2015

7.9

3.9

12/1988

24.2

3.2

6/2015

8.0

3.6

1/1989

24.7

3.4

7/2015

7.9

3.4

2/1989

25.0

3.2

8/2015

8.1

3.1

3/1989

25.6

3.3

9/2015

8.3

3.1

4/1989

24.8

2.4

10/2015

8.7

3.0

5/1989

24.1

1.8

11/2015

8.7

2.4

6/1989

24.4

1.6

12/2015

8.7

2.1

7/1989

24.7

1.6

1/2016

8.6

1.7

8/1989

24.9

1.6

2/2016

8.5

1.2

9/1989

25.1

1.7

3/2016

8.7

1.5

10/1989

25.6

1.6

4/2016

8.9

1.2

11/1989

25.6

1.6

5/2016

8.9

0.9

12/1989

25.6

1.1

6/2016

9.0

0.9

1/1990

26.3

1.3

7/2016

9.1

1.1

2/1990

26.5

1.2

8/2016

8.9

0.7

3/1990

26.4

0.6

9/2016

8.7

0.4

4/1990

27.0

1.7

10/216

8.5

-0.2

5/1990

26.6

1.9

11/2016

8.2

-0.4

6/1990

26.7

1.9

12/2016

8.0

-0.7

7/1990

27.0

1.8

1/2017

8.4

-0.2

8/1990

26.1

0.9

2/2017

8.7

0.2

9/1990

25.9

0.6

3/2017

9.3

0.6

10/1990

24.8

-0.7

4/2017

9.1

0.3

11/1990

24.7

-0.8

5/2017

9.5

0.6

12/1990

25.2

-0.3

06/2017

9.4

0.4

1/1991

24.7

-1.2

07/2017

9.4

0.3

2/1991

24.8

-1.4

08/2017

9.3

0.4

3/1991

24.9

-1.2

09/2017

9.2

0.4

4/1991

25.2

-1,4

10/2017

9.5

0.9

RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income; RDPI-PC, Real Disposable Personal Income Per Capita

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

National Bureau of Economic Research

http://www.nber.org/cycles.html

Chart IB-13 provides monthly real disposable personal income per capita from 2007 to 2017. There was initial recovery from the drop during the global recession followed by relative cyclical weakness.

Chart IB-13, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Chained 2009 Dollars 2007-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IB-6 provides data for analysis of the current cycle. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased 17.9 percent from Dec 2007 to Oct 2017 (column RDPI ∆% 12/07). In the same period, real disposable income per capita increased 9.5 percent (column RDPI-PC ∆% 12/07). The annual equivalent rate of increase of real disposable income per capita is 0.9 percent, only a fraction of 2.0 percent on average from 1929 to 2016, and 1.7 percent for real disposable income, much lower than 3.2 percent on average from 1929 to 2016.

Table IB-6, Percentage Changes of Real Disposable Personal Income and Real Disposable Personal Income Per Capita

Month

RDPI
∆% 12/07

RDPI ∆% Month

RDPI ∆% YOY

RDPI-PC ∆% 12/07

RDPI-PC ∆% Month

RDPI-PC ∆% YOY

6/09

0.8

-1.7

-1.5

-0.6

-1.8

-2.4

9/09

0.3

0.1

0.3

-1.3

0.1

-0.6

6/10

1.8

0.0

1.0

-0.4

0.0

0.2

12/10

3.3

0.7

2.9

0.7

0.6

2.1

6/11

4.1

0.4

2.3

1.2

0.4

1.5

12/11

5.0

0.8

1.6

1.6

0.7

0.8

6/12

7.2

0.2

2.9

3.4

0.2

2.2

10/12

7.9

0.6

3.4

3.7

0.5

2.7

11/12

9.3

1.3

4.9

5.1

1.3

4.1

12/12

12.1

2.6

6.8

7.7

2.6

6.1

6/13

6.2

0.2

-1.0

1.7

0.2

-1.6

12/13

6.8

0.1

-4.8

1.9

0.1

-5.4

1/14

7.1

0.3

1.9

2.1

0.2

1.2

2/14

7.8

0.6

2.5

2.7

0.6

1.8

3/14

8.4

0.6

3.0

3.3

0.5

2.3

4/14

8.7

0.3

3.3

3.5

0.2

2.5

5/14

9.1

0.4

3.0

3.8

0.3

2.3

6/14

9.6

0.5

3.3

4.2

0.4

2.5

7/14

9.8

0.2

3.5

4.4

0.1

2.7

8/14

10.4

0.5

3.7

4.8

0.5

3.0

9/14

10.7

0.3

3.7

5.0

0.2

3.0

10/14

11.3

0.6

4.6

5.5

0.5

3.8

11/14

11.9

0.6

4.9

6.1

0.5

4.1

12/14

12.5

0.5

5.3

6.5

0.4

4.5

1/15

12.8

0.3

5.3

6.8

0.3

4.6

2/15

13.3

0.4

5.1

7.1

0.3

4.3

3/15

13.2

-0.1

4.4

7.0

-0.1

3.6

4/15

13.8

0.6

4.7

7.6

0.5

3.9

5/15

14.2

0.4

4.7

7.9

0.3

3.9

6/15

14.4

0.1

4.3

8.0

0.1

3.6

7/15

14.4

0.0

4.2

7.9

-0.1

3.4

8/15

14.7

0.3

3.9

8.1

0.2

3.1

9/15

15.0

0.3

3.9

8.3

0.2

3.1

10/15

15.5

0.4

3.7

8.7

0.4

3.0

11/15

15.5

0.0

3.2

8.7

0.0

2.4

12/15

15.6

0.1

2.8

8.7

0.1

2.1

1/16

15.5

-0.1

2.4

8.6

-0.1

1.7

2/16

15.5

-0.1

1.9

8.5

-0.1

1.2

3/16

15.7

0.2

2.3

8.7

0.2

1.5

4/16

16.0

0.2

1.9

8.9

0.2

1.2

5/16

16.1

0.1

1.6

8.9

0.1

0.9

6/16

16.3

0.1

1.6

9.0

0.1

0.9

7/16

16.4

0.2

1.8

9.1

0.1

1.1

8/16

16.3

-0.1

1.4

8.9

-0.2

0.7

9/16

16.2

-0.1

1.1

8.7

-0.1

0.4

10/16

16.0

-0.2

0.5

8.5

-0.3

-0.2

11/16

15.8

-0.2

0.3

8.2

-0.2

-0.4

12/16

15.6

-0.2

0.0

8.0

-0.2

-0.7

1/17

16.1

0.5

0.5

8.4

0.4

-0.2

2/17

16.5

0.4

0.9

8.7

0.3

0.2

3/17

17.2

0.5

1.3

9.3

0.5

0.6

4/17

17.1

-0.1

1.0

9.1

-0.1

0.3

5/17

17.6

0.4

1.3

9.5

0.4

0.6

06/17

17.5

-0.1

1.1

9.4

-0.1

0.4

07/17

17.6

0.1

1.0

9.4

0.0

0.3

08/17

17.5

-0.1

1.0

9.3

-0.1

0.4

09/17

17.5

0.0

1.1

9.2

-0.1

0.4

10/17

17.9

0.3

1.6

9.5

0.3

0.9

RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income; RDPI-PC, Real Disposable Personal Income Per Capita

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis  http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

National Bureau of Economic Research

http://www.nber.org/cycles.html

IA2 Financial Repression. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1974) argue that legal restrictions on financial institutions can be detrimental to economic development. “Financial repression” is the term used in the economic literature for these restrictions (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 81-6; for historical analysis see the landmark exhaustive research by Summerhill (2015) and earlier research by Pelaez (1975)). Theory and evidence support the role of financial institutions in efficiency and growth (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 22-6, Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 37-44). Excessive official regulation frustrates financial development required for growth (Haber 2011). Emphasis on disclosure can reduce bank fragility and corruption, empowering investors to enforce sound governance (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2006). Banking was important in facilitating economic growth in historical periods (Cameron 1961, 1967, 1972; Cameron et al. 1992). Banking is also important currently because small- and medium-size business may have no other form of financing than banks in contrast with many options for larger and more mature companies that have access to capital markets. Calomiris and Haber (2014) find that broad voting rights and institutions restricting coalitions of bankers and populists ensure stable banking systems and access to credit. Summerhill (2015) contributes momentous solid facts and analysis with an ideal method combining economic theory, econometrics, international comparisons, data reconstruction and exhaustive archival research. Summerhill (2015) finds that Brazil committed to service of sovereign foreign and internal debt. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Brazil generated primary fiscal surpluses during most of the Empire until 1889 (Summerhill 2015, 37-8, Figure 2.1). Econometric tests by Summerhill (2015, 19-44) show that Brazil’s sovereign debt was sustainable. Sovereign credibility in the North-Weingast (1989) sense spread to financial development that provided the capital for modernization in England and parts of Europe (see Cameron 1961, 1967). Summerhill (2015, 3,194-6, Figure 7.1) finds that “Brazil’s annual cost of capital in London fell from a peak of 13.9 percent in 1829 to only 5.12 percent in 1889. Average rates on secured loans in the private sector in Rio, however, remained well above 12 percent through 1850.” Financial development would have financed diversification of economic activities, increasing productivity and wages and ensuring economic growth. Brazil restricted creation of limited liability enterprises (Summerhill 2015, 151-82) that prevented raising capital with issue of stocks and corporate bonds. Cameron (1961) analyzed how the industrial revolution in England spread to France and then to the rest of Europe. The Société Générale de Crédit Mobilier of Émile and Isaac Péreire provided the “mobilization of credit” for the new economic activities (Cameron 1961). Summerhill (2015, 151-9) provides facts and analysis demonstrating that regulation prevented the creation of a similar vehicle for financing modernization by Irineu Evangelista de Souza, the legendary Visconde de Mauá. Regulation also prevented the use of negotiable bearing notes of the Caisse Générale of Jacques Lafitte (Cameron 1961, 118-9). The government also restricted establishment and independent operation of banks (Summerhill 2015, 183-214). Summerhill (2005, 198-9) measures concentration in banking that provided economic rents or a social loss. The facts and analysis of Summerhill (2015) provide convincing evidence in support of the economic theory of regulation, which postulates that regulated entities capture the process of regulation to promote their self-interest. There appears to be a case that excessively centralized government can result in regulation favoring private instead of public interests with adverse effects on economic activity. The contribution of Summerhill (2015) explains why Brazil did not benefit from trade as an engine of growth—as did regions of recent settlement in the vision of nineteenth-century trade and development of Ragnar Nurkse (1959)—partly because of restrictions on financing and incorporation. Interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans have been commonly used. Professor Rondo E. Cameron, in his memorable A Concise Economic History of the World (Cameron 1989, 307-8), finds that “from a broad spectrum of possible forms of interaction between the financial sector and other sectors of the economy that requires its services, one can isolate three type-cases: (1) that in which the financial sector plays a positive, growth-inducing role; (2) that in which the financial sector is essentially neutral or merely permissive; and (3) that in which inadequate finance restricts or hinders industrial and commercial development.” Summerhill (1985) proves exhaustively that Brazil failed to modernize earlier because of the restrictions of an inadequate institutional financial arrangement plagued by regulatory capture for self-interest. The Banking Act of 1933 imposed prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and ceilings on interest rates on time deposits. These measures were justified by arguments that the banking panic of the 1930s was caused by competitive rates on bank deposits that led banks to engage in high-risk loans (Friedman, 1970, 18; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 74-5). The objective of policy was to prevent unsound loans in banks. Savings and loan institutions complained of unfair competition from commercial banks that led to continuing controls with the objective of directing savings toward residential construction. Friedman (1970, 15) argues that controls were passive during periods when rates implied on demand deposit were zero or lower and when Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits were above market rates on time deposits. The Great Inflation or stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s changed the relevance of Regulation Q.

Most regulatory actions trigger compensatory measures by the private sector that result in outcomes that are different from those intended by regulation (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Banks offered services to their customers and loans at rates lower than market rates to compensate for the prohibition to pay interest on demand deposits (Friedman 1970, 24). The prohibition of interest on demand deposits was eventually lifted in recent times. In the second half of the 1960s, already in the beginning of the Great Inflation (DeLong 1997), market rates rose above the ceilings of Regulation Q because of higher inflation. Nobody desires savings allocated to time or savings deposits that pay less than expected inflation. This is a fact currently with near zero interest rates, 1 to 1¼ percent, and consumer price inflation of 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2017 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/) but rising during waves of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html). Funding problems motivated compensatory measures by banks. Money-center banks developed the large certificate of deposit (CD) to accommodate increasing volumes of loan demand by customers. As Friedman (1970, 25) finds:

“Large negotiable CD’s were particularly hard hit by the interest rate ceiling because they are deposits of financially sophisticated individuals and institutions who have many alternatives. As already noted, they declined from a peak of $24 billion in mid-December, 1968, to less than $12 billion in early October, 1969.”

Banks created different liabilities to compensate for the decline in CDs. As Friedman (1970, 25; 1969) explains:

“The most important single replacement was almost surely ‘liabilities of US banks to foreign branches.’ Prevented from paying a market interest rate on liabilities of home offices in the United States (except to foreign official institutions that are exempt from Regulation Q), the major US banks discovered that they could do so by using the Euro-dollar market. Their European branches could accept time deposits, either on book account or as negotiable CD’s at whatever rate was required to attract them and match them on the asset side of their balance sheet with ‘due from head office.’ The head office could substitute the liability ‘due to foreign branches’ for the liability ‘due on CDs.”

Friedman (1970, 26-7) predicted the future:

“The banks have been forced into costly structural readjustments, the European banking system has been given an unnecessary competitive advantage, and London has been artificially strengthened as a financial center at the expense of New York.”

In short, Depression regulation exported the US financial system to London and offshore centers. What is vividly relevant currently from this experience is the argument by Friedman (1970, 27) that the controls affected the most people with lower incomes and wealth who were forced into accepting controlled-rates on their savings that were lower than those that would be obtained under freer markets. As Friedman (1970, 27) argues:

“These are the people who have the fewest alternative ways to invest their limited assets and are least sophisticated about the alternatives.”

Chart IB-14 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides quarterly savings as percent of disposable income or the US savings rate from 1980 to 2017. There was a long-term downward sloping trend from 12 percent in the early 1980s to 1.9 percent in Jul 2005. The savings rate then rose during the contraction and in the expansion. In 2011 and into 2012 the savings rate declined as consumption is financed with savings in part because of the disincentive or frustration of receiving a few pennies for every $10,000 of deposits in a bank. The savings rate increased in the final segment of Chart IB-14 in 2012 because of the “fiscal cliff” episode followed by another decline because of the pain of the opportunity cost of zero remuneration for hard-earned savings. There are multiple recent oscillations during expectations of increase or “liftoff” of the fed funds rate in the United States followed by “shallow” or uncertain monetary policy with increase in policy interest rates and reduction of the balance sheet of the Fed.

Chart IB-14, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Quarterly, 1980-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-14A provides the US personal savings rate, or personal savings as percent of disposable personal income, on an annual basis from 1929 to 2016. The US savings rate shows decline from around 10 percent in the 1960s to around 5 percent currently.

Chart IB-14A, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Annual, 1929-2016

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IB-7 provides personal savings as percent of disposable income and annual change of real disposable personal income in selected years since 1930. Savings fell from 4.4 percent of disposable personal income in 1930 to minus 0.8 percent in 1933 while real disposable income contracted 6.3 percent in 1930 and 2.9 percent in 1933. Savings as percent of disposable personal income swelled during World War II to 27.9 percent in 1944 with increase of real disposable income of 3.1 percent. Savings as percent of personal disposable income fell steadily over decades from 11.5 percent in 1982 to 2.6 percent in 2005. Savings as percent of disposable personal income was 5.0 percent in 2013 while real disposable income fell 1.4 percent. The savings rate was 5.7 percent of GDP in 2014 with growth of real disposable income of 3.6 percent. The savings rate was 6.1 percent in 2015 with growth of real disposable income of 4.2 percent. The savings rate stood at 4.9 percent in 2016 with growth of real disposable income at 1.4 percent. The average ratio of savings as percent of disposable income fell from 9.3 percent in 1980 to 1989 to 5.5 percent on average from 2007 to 2016. Real disposable income grew on average at 3.2 percent from 1980 to 1989 and at 1.8 percent on average from 2007 to 2016.

Table IB-7, US, Personal Savings as Percent of Disposable Personal Income, Annual, Selected Years 1929-1913

Personal Savings as Percent of Disposable Personal Income

Annual Change of Real Disposable Personal Income

1930

4.4

-6.3

1933

-0.8

-2.9

1944

27.9

3.1

1947

6.3

-4.1

1954

10.3

1.4

1958

11.4

1.1

1960

10.0

2.6

1970

12.6

4.6

1975

13.0

2.5

1982

11.5

2.1

1989

7.8

3.0

1992

8.9

4.3

2002

5.0

3.1

2003

4.8

2.7

2004

4.5

3.6

2005

2.6

1.5

2006

3.3

4.0

2007

2.9

2.1

2008

4.9

1.5

2009

6.1

-0.4

2010

5.6

1.0

2011

6.0

2.5

2012

7.6

3.2

2013

5.0

-1.4

2014

5.7

3.6

2015

6.1

4.2

2016

4.9

1.4

Average Savings Ratio

1980-1989

9.3

2007-2016

5.5

Average Yearly ∆% Real Disposable Income

1980-1989

3.2

2007-2016

1.8

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-15 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides personal savings as percent of personal disposable income, or savings ratio, from Jan 2007 to Sep 2017.

Chart IB-15, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Income, Monthly 2007-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The uncertainties caused by the global recession resulted in sharp increase in the savings ratio that peaked at 7.9 percent in May 2008 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The second peak occurred at 8.1 percent in May 2009. There was another rising trend until 5.9 percent in Jun 2010 and then steady downward trend until 5.6 percent in Nov 2011. This was followed by an upward trend with 7.6 percent in Jun 2012 but decline to 7.1 percent in Aug 2012 followed by jump to 11.0 percent in Dec 2012. Swelling realization of income in Oct-Dec 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in Jan 2013 caused the jump of the savings rate to 11.0 percent in Dec 2012. The BEA explains as “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). There was a reverse effect in Jan 2013 with decline of the savings rate to 4.9 percent. Real disposable personal income fell 6.2 percent and real disposable per capita income fell from $38,659 in Dec 2012 to $36,235 in Jan 2013 or by 6.3 percent (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), which is explained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9 billion.”

Table IB-8, US, Savings Ratio and Real Disposable Income, % and ∆%

Personal Saving as % Disposable Income

RDPI ∆% 12/07

RDPI ∆% Month

RDPI ∆% YOY

May 2008

7.9

5.1

4.8

5.7

May 2009

8.1

2.5

1.6

-2.5

Jun 2010

5.9

1.8

0.0

1.0

Nov 2011

5.6

4.2

-0.1

1.5

Jun 2012

7.6

7.2

0.2

2.9

Aug 2012

7.1

6.7

-0.2

2.1

Dec 2012

11.0

12.1

2.6

6.8

Jan 2013

4.9

5.2

-6.2

-0.5

Feb 2013

4.7

5.1

0.0

-1.1

Mar 2013

4.8

5.2

0.1

-1.2

Apr 2013

4.9

5.3

0.0

-1.5

May 2013

5.3

5.9

0.6

-1.0

Jun 2013

5.4

6.2

0.2

-1.0

Jul 2013

5.2

6.1

-0.1

-0.8

Aug 2013

5.4

6.4

0.3

-0.3

Sep 2013

5.3

6.7

0.3

-0.5

Oct 2013

4.8

6.4

-0.3

-1.3

Nov 2013

4.6

6.7

0.3

-2.4

Dec 2013

4.7

6.8

0.1

-4.8

Jan 2014

5.1

7.1

0.3

1.9

Feb 2014

5.4

7.8

0.6

2.5

Mar 2014

5.4

8.4

0.6

3.0

Apr 2014

5.5

8.7

0.3

3.3

May 2014

5.7

9.1

0.4

3.0

Jun 2014

5.9

9.6

0.5

3.3

Jul 2014

5.8

9.8

0.2

3.5

Aug 2014

5.6

10.4

0.5

3.7

Sep 2014

5.8

10.7

0.3

3.7

Oct 2014

5.8

11.3

0.6

4.6

Nov 2014

5.8

11.9

0.6

4.9

Dec 2014

6.1

12.5

0.5

5.3

Jan 2015

6.1

12.8

0.3

5.3

Feb 2015

6.3

13.3

0.4

5.1

Mar 2015

5.8

13.2

-0.1

4.4

Apr 2015

6.2

13.8

0.6

4.7

May 2015

6.2

14.2

0.4

4.7

Jun 2015

6.3

14.4

0.1

4.3

Jul 2015

6.0

14.4

0.0

4.2

Aug 2015

6.0

14.7

0.3

3.9

Sep 2015

6.0

15.0

0.3

3.9

Oct 2015

6.3

15.5

0.4

3.7

Nov 2015

6.1

15.5

0.0

3.2

Dec 2015

5.8

15.6

0.1

2.8

Jan 2016

5.9

15.5

-0.1

2.4

Feb 2016

5.5

15.5

-0.1

1.9

Mar 2016

5.7

15.7

0.2

2.3

Apr 2016

5.5

16.0

0.2

1.9

May 2016

5.4

16.1

0.1

1.6

Jun 2016

5.1

16.3

0.1

1.6

Jul 2016

5.1

16.4

0.2

1.8

Aug 2016

4.9

16.3

-0.1

1.4

Sep 2016

4.5

16.2

-0.1

1.1

Oct 2016

4.1

16.0

-0.2

0.5

Nov 2016

3.7

15.8

-0.2

0.3

Dec 2016

3.2

15.6

-0.2

0.0

Jan 2017

3.7

16.1

0.5

0.5

Feb 2017

4.1

16.5

0.4

0.9

Mar 2017

3.9

17.2

0.5

1.3

Apr 2017

3.7

17.1

-0.1

1.0

May 2017

3.8

17.6

0.4

1.3

Jun 2017

3.6

17.5

-0.1

1.1

Jul 2017

3.4

17.6

-0.1

1.0

Aug 2017

3.4

17.5

-0.1

1.0

Sep 2017

3.0

17.5

0.0

1.1

Oct 2017

3.2

17.9

0.3

1.6

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

IIA United States International Trade. Table IIA-1 provides the trade balance of the US and monthly growth of exports and imports seasonally adjusted with the latest release and revisions (https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/index.html). Because of heavy dependence on imported oil, fluctuations in the US trade account originate largely in fluctuations of commodity futures prices caused by carry trades from zero interest rates into commodity futures exposures in a process similar to world inflation waves (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html). The Census Bureau revised data for 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014 and 2013. Exports changed 0.0 percent in Oct 2017 while imports increased 1.6 percent. The trade deficit increased from $44,890 million in Sep 2017 to $48,731 million in Oct 2017. The trade deficit deteriorated to $45,290 million in Feb 2016, improving to $37,380 million in Mar 2016. The trade deficit deteriorated to $38,422 million in Apr 2016, deteriorating to $41,520 million in May 2016 and $43,385 million in Jun 2016. The trade deficit improved to $41,294 million in Jul 2016, moving to $41,130 million in Aug 2016. The trade deficit improved to $38,466 million in Sep 2016, deteriorating to $43,069 million in Oct 2016. The trade deficit deteriorated to $46,373 million in Nov 2016, improving to $44,607 million in Dec 2016. The trade deficit deteriorated to $48,775 million in Jan 2017, improving to $44,507 million in Feb 2017. The trade deficit deteriorated to $44,812 million in Mar 2017 and $48,147 million in Apr 2017, improving to $47,883 million in May 2017. The trade deficit improved to $45,686 million in Jun 2017 and to $45,162 million in Jul 2017. The trade deficit improved to $44.306 million in Aug 2017, deteriorating to $44,890 million in Sep 2017. The trade deficit deteriorated to $48,731 million in Oct 2017.

Table IIA-1, US, Trade Balance of Goods and Services Seasonally Adjusted Millions of Dollars and ∆%  

Trade Balance

Exports

Month ∆%

Imports

Month ∆%

Oct 2017

-48,731

195,907

0.0

244,639

1.6

Sep

-44,890

195,928

1.1

240,817

1.2

Aug

-44,306

193,749

0.2

238,054

-0.2

Jul

-45,162

193,416

-0.1

238,578

-0.3

Jun

-45,686

193,565

1.2

239,251

0.0

May

-47,883

191,357

0.2

239,239

0.0

Apr

-48,147

191,050

-0.6

239,197

0.9

Mar

-44,812

192,218

0.0

237,029

0.1

Feb

-44,507

192,311

0.3

236,818

-1.5

Jan

-48,775

191,698

1.2

240,473

2.7

Dec 2016

-44,607

189,507

2.5

234,114

1.3

Nov

-46,373

184,848

-0.4

231,221

1.1

Oct

-43,069

185,599

-1.3

228,668

0.9

Sep

-38,466

188,123

0.4

226,588

-0.8

Aug

-41,130

187,385

1.1

228,514

0.8

Jul

-41,294

185,330

0.8

226,624

-0.4

Jun

-43,385

183,770

0.9

227,605

1.8

May

-41,520

182,166

0.1

223,686

1.5

Apr

-38,422

181,895

1.1

220,317

1.4

Mar

-37,380

179,887

-0.6

217,277

-3.9

Feb

-45,290

180,892

1.2

226,182

1.9

Jan

-43,409

178,660

-2.3

222,070

-0.9

Dec 2015

-41,125

182,919

-0.5

224,044

-0.3

Jan-Dec 2016

-504,793

2,208,072

-2.5

2,712,866

-1.9

Note: Trade Balance of Goods = Exports of Goods less Imports of Goods. Trade balance may not add exactly because of errors of rounding and seasonality. Source: US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

Table IIA-1B provides US exports, imports and the trade balance of goods. The US has not shown a trade surplus in trade of goods since 1976. The deficit of trade in goods deteriorated sharply during the boom years from 2000 to 2007. The deficit improved during the contraction in 2009 but deteriorated in the expansion after 2009. The deficit could deteriorate sharply with growth at full employment.

Table IIA-1B, US, International Trade Balance of Goods, Exports and Imports of Goods, Millions of Dollars, Census Basis

Balance

∆%

Exports

∆%

Imports

∆%

1960

4,608

(X)

19,626

(X)

15,018

(X)

1961

5,476

18.8

20,190

2.9

14,714

-2.0

1962

4,583

-16.3

20,973

3.9

16,390

11.4

1963

5,289

15.4

22,427

6.9

17,138

4.6

1964

7,006

32.5

25,690

14.5

18,684

9.0

1965

5,333

-23.9

26,699

3.9

21,366

14.4

1966

3,837

-28.1

29,379

10.0

25,542

19.5

1967

4,122

7.4

30,934

5.3

26,812

5.0

1968

837

-79.7

34,063

10.1

33,226

23.9

1969

1,289

54.0

37,332

9.6

36,043

8.5

1970

3,224

150.1

43,176

15.7

39,952

10.8

1971

-1,476

-145.8

44,087

2.1

45,563

14.0

1972

-5,729

288.1

49,854

13.1

55,583

22.0

1973

2,389

-141.7

71,865

44.2

69,476

25.0

1974

-3,884

-262.6

99,437

38.4

103,321

48.7

1975

9,551

-345.9

108,856

9.5

99,305

-3.9

1976

-7,820

-181.9

116,794

7.3

124,614

25.5

1977

-28,352

262.6

123,182

5.5

151,534

21.6

1978

-30,205

6.5

145,847

18.4

176,052

16.2

1979

-23,922

-20.8

186,363

27.8

210,285

19.4

1980

-19,696

-17.7

225,566

21.0

245,262

16.6

1981

-22,267

13.1

238,715

5.8

260,982

6.4

1982

-27,510

23.5

216,442

-9.3

243,952

-6.5

1983

-52,409

90.5

205,639

-5.0

258,048

5.8

1984

-106,702

103.6

223,976

8.9

330,678

28.1

1985

-117,711

10.3

218,815

-2.3

336,526

1.8

1986

-138,279

17.5

227,159

3.8

365,438

8.6

1987

-152,119

10.0

254,122

11.9

406,241

11.2

1988

-118,526

-22.1

322,426

26.9

440,952

8.5

1989

-109,399

-7.7

363,812

12.8

473,211

7.3

1990

-101,719

-7.0

393,592

8.2

495,311

4.7

1991

-66,723

-34.4

421,730

7.1

488,453

-1.4

1992

-84,501

26.6

448,164

6.3

532,665

9.1

1993

-115,568

36.8

465,091

3.8

580,659

9.0

1994

-150,630

30.3

512,626

10.2

663,256

14.2

1995

-158,801

5.4

584,742

14.1

743,543

12.1

1996

-170,214

7.2

625,075

6.9

795,289

7.0

1997

-180,522

6.1

689,182

10.3

869,704

9.4

1998

-229,758

27.3

682,138

-1.0

911,896

4.9

1999

-328,821

43.1

695,797

2.0

1,024,618

12.4

2000

-436,104

32.6

781,918

12.4

1,218,022

18.9

2001

-411,899

-5.6

729,100

-6.8

1,140,999

-6.3

2002

-468,263

13.7

693,103

-4.9

1,161,366

1.8

2003

-532,350

13.7

724,771

4.6

1,257,121

8.2

2004

-654,830

23.0

814,875

12.4

1,469,704

16.9

2005

-772,373

18.0

901,082

10.6

1,673,455

13.9

2006

-827,971

7.2

1,025,967

13.9

1,853,938

10.8

2007

-808,763

-2.3

1,148,199

11.9

1,956,962

5.6

2008

-816,199

0.9

1,287,442

12.1

2,103,641

7.5

2009

-503,582

-38.3

1,056,043

-18.0

1,559,625

-25.9

2010

-635,362

26.2

1,278,495

21.1

1,913,857

22.7

2011

-725,447

14.2

1,482,508

16.0

2,207,954

15.4

2012

-730,446

0.7

1,545,821

4.3

2,276,267

3.1

2013

-689,470

-5.6

1,578,517

2.1

2,267,987

-0.4

2014

-734,482

6.5

1,621,874

2.7

2,356,356

3.9

2015

-745,082

1.4

1,503,101

-7.3

2,248,183

-4.6

2016

-736,794

-1.1

1,451,011

-3.5

2,187,805

-2.7

Source: US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

Chart IIA-1 of the US Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce shows that the trade deficit (gap between exports and imports) fell during the economic contraction after 2007 but has grown again during the expansion. The low average rate of growth of GDP of 2.2 percent during the expansion beginning since IIIQ2009 does not deteriorate further the trade balance. Higher rates of growth may cause sharper deterioration.

Chart IIA-1, US, International Trade Balance, Exports and Imports of Goods and Services USD Billions

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/data/ustrade.jpg

Table IIA-2B provides the US international trade balance, exports and imports of goods and services on an annual basis from 1992 to 2016. The trade balance deteriorated sharply over the long term. The US has a large deficit in goods or exports less imports of goods but it has a surplus in services that helps to reduce the trade account deficit or exports less imports of goods and services. The current account deficit of the US not seasonally adjusted decreased from $115 billion in IQ2016 to $90 billion in IQ2017, increasing to $134 billion in IIQ2017 (https://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm). The current account deficit seasonally adjusted at annual rate increased from 2.3 percent of GDP in IIQ2016 to 2.4 percent of GDP in IQ2017, increasing to 2.6 percent of GDP in IIQ2017 (https://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm https://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP has stabilized around 3 percent of GDP compared with much higher percentages before the recession (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). The final rows of Table IIA-2B show marginal improvement of the trade deficit from $548,625 million in 2011 to lower $536,773 million in 2012 with exports growing 4.3 percent and imports 3.0 percent. The trade balance improved further to deficit of $461,876 million in 2013 with growth of exports of 3.4 percent while imports virtually stagnated. The trade deficit deteriorated in 2014 to $490,336 million with growth of exports of 3.6 percent and of imports of 4.0 percent. The trade deficit deteriorated in 2015 to $500,445 million with decrease of exports of 4.7 percent and decrease of imports of 3.6 percent. The trade deficit deteriorated in 2016 to $504,793 million with decrease of exports of 2.5 percent and decrease of imports of 1.9 percent. Growth and commodity shocks under alternating inflation waves (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html) have deteriorated the trade deficit from the low of $383,774 million in 2009.

Table IIA-2B, US, International Trade Balance of Goods and Services, Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, SA, Millions of Dollars, Balance of Payments Basis

Balance

Exports

∆%

Imports

∆%

1960

3,508

25,940

NA

22,432

NA

1961

4,195

26,403

1.8

22,208

-1.0

1962

3,370

27,722

5.0

24,352

9.7

1963

4,210

29,620

6.8

25,410

4.3

1964

6,022

33,341

12.6

27,319

7.5

1965

4,664

35,285

5.8

30,621

12.1

1966

2,939

38,926

10.3

35,987

17.5

1967

2,604

41,333

6.2

38,729

7.6

1968

250

45,543

10.2

45,293

16.9

1969

91

49,220

8.1

49,129

8.5

1970

2,254

56,640

15.1

54,386

10.7

1971

-1,302

59,677

5.4

60,979

12.1

1972

-5,443

67,222

12.6

72,665

19.2

1973

1,900

91,242

35.7

89,342

23.0

1974

-4,293

120,897

32.5

125,190

40.1

1975

12,404

132,585

9.7

120,181

-4.0

1976

-6,082

142,716

7.6

148,798

23.8

1977

-27,246

152,301

6.7

179,547

20.7

1978

-29,763

178,428

17.2

208,191

16.0

1979

-24,565

224,131

25.6

248,696

19.5

1980

-19,407

271,834

21.3

291,241

17.1

1981

-16,172

294,398

8.3

310,570

6.6

1982

-24,156

275,236

-6.5

299,391

-3.6

1983

-57,767

266,106

-3.3

323,874

8.2

1984

-109,072

291,094

9.4

400,166

23.6

1985

-121,880

289,070

-0.7

410,950

2.7

1986

-138,538

310,033

7.3

448,572

9.2

1987

-151,684

348,869

12.5

500,552

11.6

1988

-114,566

431,149

23.6

545,715

9.0

1989

-93,141

487,003

13.0

580,144

6.3

1990

-80,864

535,233

9.9

616,097

6.2

1991

-31,135

578,344

8.1

609,479

-1.1

1992

-39,212

616,882

6.7

656,094

7.6

1993

-70,311

642,863

4.2

713,174

8.7

1994

-98,493

703,254

9.4

801,747

12.4

1995

-96,384

794,387

13.0

890,771

11.1

1996

-104,065

851,602

7.2

955,667

7.3

1997

-108,273

934,453

9.7

1,042,726

9.1

1998

-166,140

933,174

-0.1

1,099,314

5.4

1999

-258,617

969,867

3.9

1,228,485

11.8

2000

-372,517

1,075,321

10.9

1,447,837

17.9

2001

-361,511

1,005,654

-6.5

1,367,165

-5.6

2002

-418,955

978,706

-2.7

1,397,660

2.2

2003

-493,890

1,020,418

4.3

1,514,308

8.3

2004

-609,883

1,161,549

13.8

1,771,433

17.0

2005

-714,245

1,286,022

10.7

2,000,267

12.9

2006

-761,716

1,457,642

13.3

2,219,358

11.0

2007

-705,375

1,653,548

13.4

2,358,922

6.3

2008

-708,726

1,841,612

11.4

2,550,339

8.1

2009

-383,774

1,583,053

-14.0

1,966,827

-22.9

2010

-494,658

1,853,606

17.1

2,348,263

19.4

2011

-548,625

2,127,021

14.8

2,675,646

13.9

2012

-536,773

2,218,989

4.3

2,755,762

3.0

2013

-461,876

2,293,457

3.4

2,755,334

0.0

2014

-490,336

2,375,905

3.6

2,866,241

4.0

2015

-500,445

2,263,907

-4.7

2,764,352

-3.6

2016

-504,793

2,208,072

-2.5

2,712,866

-1.9

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

Chart IIA-2 of the US Census Bureau provides the US trade account in goods and services SA from Jan 1992 to Oct 2017. There is long-term trend of deterioration of the US trade deficit shown vividly by Chart IIA-2. The global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 reversed the trend of deterioration. Deterioration resumed together with incomplete recovery and was influenced significantly by the carry trade from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures (these arguments are elaborated in Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html). Earlier research focused on the long-term external imbalance of the US in the form of trade and current account deficits (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b) 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). US external imbalances have not been fully resolved and tend to widen together with improving world economic activity and commodity price shocks. There are additional effects for revaluation of the dollar with the Fed orienting interest rate increases while the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan determine negative nominal interest rates.

Chart IIA-2, US, Balance of Trade SA, Monthly, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Jul 2017

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

Chart IIA-3 of the US Census Bureau provides US exports SA from Jan 1992 to Oct 2017. There was sharp acceleration from 2003 to 2007 during worldwide economic boom and increasing inflation. Exports fell sharply during the financial crisis and global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Growth picked up again together with world trade and inflation but stalled in the final segment with less rapid global growth and inflation.

Chart IIA-3, US, Exports SA, Monthly, Millions of Dollars Jan 1992-Jul 2017

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

Chart IIA-4 of the US Census Bureau provides US imports SA from Jan 1992 to Oct 2017. Growth was stronger between 2003 and 2007 with worldwide economic boom and inflation. There was sharp drop during the financial crisis and global recession. There is stalling import levels in the final segment resulting from weaker world economic growth and diminishing inflation because of risk aversion and portfolio reallocations from commodity exposures to equities.

Chart IIA-4, US, Imports SA, Monthly, Millions of Dollars Jan 1992-Jul 2017

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

There is deterioration of the US trade balance in goods in Table IIA-3 from deficit of $63,399 million in Oct 2016 to deficit of $69,076 million in Oct 2017. The nonpetroleum deficit increased $8518 million while the petroleum deficit decreased $2405 million. Total exports of goods increased 6.4 percent in Oct 2017 relative to a year earlier while total imports increased 7.3 percent. Nonpetroleum exports increased 2.5 percent from Oct 2016 to Oct 2017 while nonpetroleum imports increased 6.7 percent. Petroleum imports increased 17.0 percent.

Table IIA-3, US, International Trade in Goods Balance, Exports and Imports $ Millions and ∆% SA

Oct 2017

Oct 2016

∆%

Total Balance

-69,076

-63,399

Petroleum

-3,229

-5,634

Non-Petroleum

-64,873

-56,355

Total Exports

130,321

122,514

6.4

Petroleum

12,197

7,548

61.6

Non-Petroleum

117,684

114,813

2.5

Total Imports

199,397

185,913

7.3

Petroleum

15,426

13,183

17.0

Non-Petroleum

182,557

171,168

6.7

Details may not add because of rounding and seasonal adjustment

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

US exports and imports of goods not seasonally adjusted in Jan-Oct 2017 and Jan-Oct 2016 are in Table IIA-4. The rate of growth of exports was 6.1 percent and 6.8 percent for imports. The US has partial hedge of commodity price increases in exports of agricultural commodities that increased 4.4 percent and of mineral fuels that increased 46.3 percent both because prices of raw materials and commodities increase and fall recurrently because of shocks of risk aversion and portfolio reallocations. The US exports a growing amount of crude oil, increasing 35.8 percent in cumulative Jan-Oct 2017 relative to a year earlier. US exports and imports consist mostly of manufactured products, with less rapidly increasing prices. US manufactured exports increased 4.1 percent while manufactured imports increased 5.2 percent. Significant part of the US trade imbalance originates in imports of mineral fuels increasing 29.3 percent and petroleum increasing 29.3 percent with wide oscillations in oil prices. The limited hedge in exports of agricultural commodities and mineral fuels compared with substantial imports of mineral fuels and crude oil results in waves of deterioration of the terms of trade of the US, or export prices relative to import prices, originating in commodity price increases caused by carry trades from zero interest rates. These waves are similar to those in worldwide inflation.

Table IIA-4, US, Exports and Imports of Goods, Not Seasonally Adjusted Millions of Dollars and %, Census Basis

Jan-Oct 2017 $ Millions

Jan-Oct

2016 $ Millions

∆%

Exports

1,275,127

1,201,334

6.1

Manufactured

909,960

873,812

4.1

Agricultural
Commodities

112,251

107,535

4.4

Mineral Fuels

108,615

74,252

46.3

Petroleum

82,435

60,683

35.8

Imports

1,935,192

1,812,794

6.8

Manufactured

1,670,003

1,586,899

5.2

Agricultural
Commodities

100,730

95,005

6.0

Mineral Fuels

161,308

124,787

29.3

Petroleum

150,220

116,170

29.3

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

The current account of the US balance of payments is in Table VI-3A for IIQ201 and IIQ2017. The Bureau of Economic Analysis analyzes as follows (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/transactions/2017/pdf/trans217.pdf):

“The U.S. current-account deficit increased to $123.1 billion (preliminary) in the second quarter of 2017 from $113.5 billion (revised) in the first quarter of 2017, according to statistics released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The deficit increased to 2.6 percent of current-dollar gross domestic product (GDP) from 2.4 percent in the first quarter. The $9.6 billion increase in the current-account deficit reflected a $7.5 billion increase in the deficit on secondary income, a $2.9 billion decrease in the surplus on primary income, and a $0.8 billion increase in the deficit on goods. These changes were partly offset by a $1.6 billion increase in the surplus on services.”

The US has a large deficit in goods or exports less imports of goods but it has a surplus in services that helps to reduce the trade account deficit or exports less imports of goods and services. The current account deficit of the US not seasonally adjusted increased from $114.9 billion in IIQ2016 to $134.0 billion in IIQ2017. The current account deficit seasonally adjusted at annual rate increased from 2.3 percent of GDP in IIQ2016 to 2.4 percent of GDP in IQ2017, increasing to 2.6 percent of GDP in IIQ2017. The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP has stabilized below 3 percent of GDP compared with much higher percentages before the recession but is combined now with much higher imbalance in the Treasury budget (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). There is still a major challenge in the combined deficits in current account and in federal budgets.

Table VI-3A, US, Balance of Payments, Millions of Dollars NSA

IIQ2016

IIQ2017

Difference

Goods Balance

-186,924

-204,290

-17,366

X Goods

364,780

385,684

5.7 ∆%

M Goods

-551,704

-589,974

6.9 ∆%

Services Balance

54,508

54,111

397

X Services

183,263

190,512

4.0 ∆%

M Services

-128,755

-136,400

5.9 ∆%

Balance Goods and Services

-132,416

-150,179

-17,763

Exports of Goods and Services and Income Receipts

786,186

834,952

Imports of Goods and Services and Income Payments

-901,072

-968,907

Current Account Balance

-114,886

-133,954

-19,068

% GDP

IIQ2016

IIQ2017

IQ2017

2.3

2.6

2.4

X: exports; M: imports

Balance on Current Account = Exports of Goods and Services – Imports of Goods and Services and Income Payments

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#bop

In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):

“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”

The alternative fiscal scenario of the CBO (2012NovCDR, 2013Sep17) resembles an economic world in which eventually the placement of debt reaches a limit of what is proportionately desired of US debt in investment portfolios. This unpleasant environment is occurring in various European countries.

The current real value of government debt plus monetary liabilities depends on the expected discounted values of future primary surpluses or difference between tax revenue and government expenditure excluding interest payments (Cochrane 2011Jan, 27, equation (16)). There is a point when adverse expectations about the capacity of the government to generate primary surpluses to honor its obligations can result in increases in interest rates on government debt.

First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:

D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)

Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,

{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:

N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)

The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:

B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)

On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.

Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:

(Mt + Bt)/Pt = Et∫(1/Rt, t+Ï„)st+Ï„dÏ„ (4)

Equation (4) expresses the monetary, Mt, and debt, Bt, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, Pt, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, Rt, t+Ï„, of the future primary surpluses st+Ï„, which are equal to Tt+Ï„Gt+Ï„ or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post Rt, t+Ï„. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:

MtV(it, ·) = PtYt (5)

Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):

“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”

An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.

There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:

(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress

(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality

(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.

This analysis suggests that there may be a point of saturation of demand for United States financial liabilities without an increase in interest rates on Treasury securities. A risk premium may develop on US debt. Such premium is not apparent currently because of distressed conditions in the world economy and international financial system. Risk premiums are observed in the spread of bonds of highly indebted countries in Europe relative to bonds of the government of Germany.

The issue of global imbalances centered on the possibility of a disorderly correction (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b) 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). Such a correction has not occurred historically but there is no argument proving that it could not occur. The need for a correction would originate in unsustainable large and growing United States current account deficits (CAD) and net international investment position (NIIP) or excess of financial liabilities of the US held by foreigners net relative to financial liabilities of foreigners held by US residents. The IMF estimated that the US could maintain a CAD of two to three percent of GDP without major problems (Rajan 2004). The threat of disorderly correction is summarized by Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 15):

“It is possible that foreigners may be unwilling to increase their positions in US financial assets at prevailing interest rates. An exit out of the dollar could cause major devaluation of the dollar. The depreciation of the dollar would cause inflation in the US, leading to increases in American interest rates. There would be an increase in mortgage rates followed by deterioration of real estate values. The IMF has simulated that such an adjustment would cause a decline in the rate of growth of US GDP to 0.5 percent over several years. The decline of demand in the US by four percentage points over several years would result in a world recession because the weakness in Europe and Japan could not compensate for the collapse of American demand. The probability of occurrence of an abrupt adjustment is unknown. However, the adverse effects are quite high, at least hypothetically, to warrant concern.”

The United States could be moving toward a situation typical of heavily indebted countries, requiring fiscal adjustment and increases in productivity to become more competitive internationally. The CAD and NIIP of the United States are not observed in full deterioration because the economy is well below trend. There are two complications in the current environment relative to the concern with disorderly correction in the first half of the past decade. In the release of Jun 14, 2013, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/transactions/2013/pdf/trans113.pdf) informs of revisions of US data on US international transactions since 1999:

“The statistics of the U.S. international transactions accounts released today have been revised for the first quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2012 to incorporate newly available and revised source data, updated seasonal adjustments, changes in definitions and classifications, and improved estimating methodologies.”

The BEA introduced new concepts and methods (http://www.bea.gov/international/concepts_methods.htm) in comprehensive restructuring on Jun 18, 2014 (http://www.bea.gov/international/modern.htm):

“BEA introduced a new presentation of the International Transactions Accounts on June 18, 2014 and will introduce a new presentation of the International Investment Position on June 30, 2014. These new presentations reflect a comprehensive restructuring of the international accounts that enhances the quality and usefulness of the accounts for customers and bring the accounts into closer alignment with international guidelines.”

Table VI-3B provides data on the US fiscal and balance of payments imbalances incorporating all revisions and methods. In 2007, the federal deficit of the US was $161 billion corresponding to 1.1 percent of GDP while the Congressional Budget Office estimates the federal deficit in 2012 at $1087 billion or 6.8 percent of GDP. The estimate of the deficit for 2013 is $680 billion or 4.1 percent of GDP. The combined record federal deficits of the US from 2009 to 2012 are $5094 billion or 31.6 percent of the estimate of GDP for fiscal year 2012 implicit in the CBO (CBO 2013Sep11) estimate of debt/GDP. The deficits from 2009 to 2012 exceed one trillion dollars per year, adding to $5.094 trillion in four years, using the fiscal year deficit of $1087 billion for fiscal year 2012, which is the worst fiscal performance since World War II. Federal debt in 2007 was $5035 billion, slightly less than the combined deficits from 2009 to 2012 of $5094 billion. Federal debt in 2012 was 70.4 percent of GDP (CBO 2015Jan26) and 72.6 percent of GDP in 2013 (http://www.cbo.gov/). This situation may worsen in the future (CBO 2013Sep17):

“Between 2009 and 2012, the federal government recorded the largest budget deficits relative to the size of the economy since 1946, causing federal debt to soar. Federal debt held by the public is now about 73 percent of the economy’s annual output, or gross domestic product (GDP). That percentage is higher than at any point in U.S. history except a brief period around World War II, and it is twice the percentage at the end of 2007. If current laws generally remained in place, federal debt held by the public would decline slightly relative to GDP over the next several years, CBO projects. After that, however, growing deficits would ultimately push debt back above its current high level. CBO projects that federal debt held by the public would reach 100 percent of GDP in 2038, 25 years from now, even without accounting for the harmful effects that growing debt would have on the economy. Moreover, debt would be on an upward path relative to the size of the economy, a trend that could not be sustained indefinitely.

The gap between federal spending and revenues would widen steadily after 2015 under the assumptions of the extended baseline, CBO projects. By 2038, the deficit would be 6½ percent of GDP, larger than in any year between 1947 and 2008, and federal debt held by the public would reach 100 percent of GDP, more than in any year except 1945 and 1946. With such large deficits, federal debt would be growing faster than GDP, a path that would ultimately be unsustainable.

Incorporating the economic effects of the federal policies that underlie the extended baseline worsens the long-term budget outlook. The increase in debt relative to the size of the economy, combined with an increase in marginal tax rates (the rates that would apply to an additional dollar of income), would reduce output and raise interest rates relative to the benchmark economic projections that CBO used in producing the extended baseline. Those economic differences would lead to lower federal revenues and higher interest payments. With those effects included, debt under the extended baseline would rise to 108 percent of GDP in 2038.”

Table VI-3B, US, Current Account, NIIP, Fiscal Balance, Nominal GDP, Federal Debt and Direct Investment, Dollar Billions and %

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Goods &
Services

-705

-709

-384

-495

-549

Primary Income

85

130

115

168

211

Secondary Income

-91

-102

-104

-104

-107

Current Account

-711

-681

-373

-431

-445

NGDP

14478

14719

14419

14964

15518

Current Account % GDP

-4.9

-4.6

-2.6

-2.9

-2.9

NIIP

-1279

-3995

-2628

-2512

-4455

US Owned Assets Abroad

20705

19423

19426

21767

22209

Foreign Owned Assets in US

21984

23418

22054

24279

26664

NIIP % GDP

-8.8

-27.1

-18.2

-16.8

-28.7

Exports
Goods,
Services and
Income

2559

2742

2283

2625

2983

NIIP %
Exports
Goods,
Services and
Income

-50

-145

-115

-95

-149

DIA MV

5858

3707

4945

5486

5215

DIUS MV

4134

3091

3619

4099

4199

Fiscal Balance

-161

-459

-1413

-1294

-1300

Fiscal Balance % GDP

-1.1

-3.1

-9.8

-8.7

-8.5

Federal   Debt

5035

5803

7545

9019

10128

Federal Debt % GDP

35.2

39.3

52.3

60.9

65.9

Federal Outlays

2729

2983

3518

3457

3603

∆%

2.8

9.3

17.9

-1.7

4.2

% GDP

19.1

20.2

24.4

23.4

23.4

Federal Revenue

2568

2524

2105

2163

2303

∆%

6.7

-1.7

-16.6

2.7

6.5

% GDP

17.9

17.1

14.6

14.6

15.0

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Goods &
Services

-537

-462

-490

-500

-505

Primary Income

207

206

210

181

173

Secondary Income

-97

-94

-94

-115

-120

Current Account

-426

-350

-374

-434

-452

NGDP

16155

16692

17428

18121

18625

Current Account % GDP

-2.6

-2.1

-2.1

-2.4

-2.4

NIIP

-4518

-5373

-6980

-7493

-8318

US Owned Assets Abroad

22562

24145

24832

23352

23849

Foreign Owned Assets in US

27080

29517

31813

30846

32168

NIIP % GDP

-28.0

-32.2

-40.1

-41.3

-44.7

Exports
Goods,
Services and
Income

3096

3212

3333

3173

3157

NIIP %
Exports
Goods,
Services and
Income

-146

-167

-209

-236

-263

DIA MV

5969

7121

7189

6999

7375

DIUS MV

4662

5815

6370

6701

7569

Fiscal Balance

-1087

-680

-485

-439

-587

Fiscal Balance % GDP

-6.8

-4.1

-2.8

-2.4

-3.2

Federal   Debt

11281

11983

12780

13117

14168

Federal Debt % GDP

70.4

72.6

74.2

73.3

77.0

Federal Outlays

3537

3455

3506

3688

3853

∆%

-1.8

-2.3

1.5

5.2

4.5

% GDP

22.1

20.9

20.4

20.6

20.9

Federal Revenue

2450

2775

3022

3250

3268

∆%

6.4

13.3

8.9

7.6

0.5

% GDP

15.3

16.8

17.5

18.2

17.8

Sources:

Notes: NGDP: nominal GDP or in current dollars; NIIP: Net International Investment Position; DIA MV: US Direct Investment Abroad at Market Value; DIUS MV: Direct Investment in the US at Market Value. There are minor discrepancies in the decimal point of percentages of GDP between the balance of payments data and federal debt, outlays, revenue and deficits in which the original number of the CBO source is maintained. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, US International Economic Accounts: Concepts and Methods. 2014. Washington, DC: BEA, Department of Commerce, Jun 2014 http://www.bea.gov/international/concepts_methods.htm These discrepancies do not alter conclusions. Budget http://www.cbo.gov/

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#3

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#2

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#2 Balance of Payments and NIIP http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#bop Gross Domestic Product, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The most recent CBO long-term budget on Mar 27, 2017, projects US federal debt at 150.0 percent of GDP in 2047 (Congressional Budget Office, The 2017 Long-term Budget Outlook. Washington, DC, Mar 30, 2017 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52480).

Table VI-3C provides quarterly estimates NSA of the external imbalance of the United States. The current account deficit seasonally adjusted increases from 2.3 percent of GDP in IIQ2016 to 2.4 percent in IIIQ2016. The current account stabilizes to 2.4 percent of GDP in IVQ2016. The deficit does not change to 2.4 percent in IQ2017 and increases to 2.6 percent in IIQ2017. The absolute value of the net international investment position decreases from minus $8.3 trillion in IIQ2016 to minus $8.0 trillion in IIIQ2016, increasing at minus $8.3 trillion in IVQ2016. The absolute value of the net international investment position decreases to minus $8.1 trillion in IQ2017 and decreases to minus $7.9 trillion in IIQ2017. The BEA explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/2017/pdf/intinv217.pdf):

“The U.S. net international investment position increased to -$7,934.9 billion (preliminary) at the end of the second quarter of 2017 from -$8,091.6 billion (revised) at the end of the first quarter, according to statistics released today by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The $156.7 billion increase reflected a $1,004.2 billion increase in U.S. assets and an $847.5 billion increase in U.S. liabilities.”

The BEA explains further (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/2017/pdf/intinv217.pdf): “The $156.7 billion increase reflected net financial transactions of –$107.5 billion and net other changes in position, such as price and exchange-rate changes, of $264.2 billion.

The net investment position increased 1.9 percent in the second quarter, compared with an increase of 2.7 percent in the first quarter, and an average quarterly decrease of 5.6 percent from the first quarter of 2011 through the fourth quarter of 2016.

U.S. assets increased $1,004.2 billion to $25,937.6 billion at the end of the second quarter, mostly reflecting increases in portfolio investment and direct investment assets. Assets excluding financial derivatives increased $1,019.6 billion to $24,006.3 billion. The increase resulted from other changes in position of $657.3 billion and financial transactions of $362.2 billion (table A). Other changes in position mostly reflected the appreciation of major foreign currencies against the U.S. dollar that raised the value of assets in dollar terms. Financial transactions mostly reflected net acquisition of portfolio investment and direct investment equity assets. Liabilities excluding financial derivatives increased $858.3 billion to $31,978.2 billion. The increase resulted from financial transactions of $479.1 billion and other changes in position of $379.2 billion (table A). Financial transactions mostly reflected net incurrence of portfolio investment liabilities. Other changes in position mostly reflected price increases on portfolio investment and direct investment liabilities.”

The net investment position increased 2.1 percent in the first quarter, compared with a decrease of 3.5 percent in the fourth quarter and an average quarterly decrease of 5.7 percent from the first quarter of 2011 through the third quarter of 2016. U.S. assets increased $983.8 billion to $24,833.2 billion at the end of the first quarter. Assets excluding financial derivatives increased $1,246.1 billion to $22,886.5 billion, mostly reflecting increases in portfolio investment and direct investment assets. The $1,246.1 billion increase resulted from other changes in position of $951.9 billion and financial transactions of $294.1 billion (table A). Other changes in position mostly reflected price increases on portfolio investment and direct investment equity assets and the appreciation of major foreign currencies against the U.S. dollar that raised the value of assets in dollar terms. Financial derivatives decreased $262.3 billion to $1,946.7 billion, reflecting decreases in single currency interest rate contracts and foreign exchange contracts. U.S. liabilities increased $806.6 billion to $32,974.5 billion at the end of the first quarter. Liabilities excluding financial derivatives increased $1,049.2 billion to $31,069.4 billion, mostly reflecting increases in portfolio investment and direct investment liabilities. The $1,049.2 billion increase resulted from other changes in position of $656.1 billion and financial transactions of $393.2 billion (table A). Other changes in position were driven by price increases on portfolio investment and direct investment equity liabilities. Financial derivatives decreased $242.6 billion to $1,905.1 billion, reflecting decreases in single currency interest rate contracts and foreign exchange contracts.”

Table VI-3C, US, Current Account, NIIP, Fiscal Balance, Nominal GDP, Federal Debt and Direct Investment, Dollar Billions and % NSA

IIQ2016

IIIQ2016

IVQ2016

IQ2017

IIQ2017

Goods &
Services

-132

-136

-132

-113

-150

Primary

Income

43

43

51

49

47

Secondary Income

-26

-32

-31

-26

-31

Current Account

-115

-126

-112

-90

-134

Current Account % GDP

-2.3

-2.4

-2.4

-2.4

-2.6

NIIP

-8292

-8036

-8318

-8092

-7935

US Owned Assets Abroad

24558

24839

23849

24933

25938

Foreign Owned Assets in US

-32851

-32875

-32168

-33025

-33873

DIA MV

7002

7392

7375

7895

8202

DIA MV Equity

5780

6147

6172

6609

6918

DIUS MV

7123

7424

7569

7952

8162

DIUS MV Equity

5377

5607

5784

6153

6353

Notes: NIIP: Net International Investment Position; DIA MV: US Direct Investment Abroad at Market Value; DIUS MV: Direct Investment in the US at Market Value. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, US International Economic Accounts: Concepts and Methods. 2014. Washington, DC: BEA, Department of Commerce, Jun 2014 http://www.bea.gov/international/concepts_methods.htm

Chart VI-3C of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the quarterly and annual US net international investment position (NIIP) NSA in billion dollars. The NIIP deteriorated in 2008, improving in 2009-2011 followed by deterioration after 2012.

Chart VI-3C, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/intinvnewsrelease.htm

Chart VI-10 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the overnight Fed funds rate on business days from Jul 1, 1954 at 1.13 percent through Jan 10, 1979, at 9.91 percent per year, to Dec 7, 2017, at 1.16 percent per year. US recessions are in shaded areas according to the reference dates of the NBER (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). In the Fed effort to control the “Great Inflation” of the 1970s (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html), the fed funds rate increased from 8.34 percent on Jan 3, 1979 to a high in Chart VI-10 of 22.36 percent per year on Jul 22, 1981 with collateral adverse effects in the form of impaired savings and loans associations in the United States, emerging market debt and money-center banks (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 72-7; Pelaez 1986, 1987). Another episode in Chart VI-10 is the increase in the fed funds rate from 3.15 percent on Jan 3, 1994, to 6.56 percent on Dec 21, 1994, which also had collateral effects in impairing emerging market debt in Mexico and Argentina and bank balance sheets in a world bust of fixed income markets during pursuit by central banks of non-existing inflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 113-5). Another interesting policy impulse is the reduction of the fed funds rate from 7.03 percent on Jul 3, 2000, to 1.00 percent on Jun 22, 2004, in pursuit of equally non-existing deflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-85), followed by increments of 25 basis points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006, raising the fed funds rate to 5.25 percent on Jul 3, 2006 in Chart VI-10. Central bank commitment to maintain the fed funds rate at 1.00 percent induced adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMS) linked to the fed funds rate. Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at interest rates close to zero, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper with the objective of purchasing default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever-increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4). A final episode in Chart VI-10 is the reduction of the fed funds rate from 5.41 percent on Aug 9, 2007, to 2.97 percent on October 7, 2008, to 0.12 percent on Dec 5, 2008 and close to zero throughout a long period with the final point at 1.16 percent on Dec 7, 2017. Evidently, this behavior of policy would not have occurred had there been theory, measurements and forecasts to avoid these violent oscillations that are clearly detrimental to economic growth and prosperity without inflation. The Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Janet L. Yellen, stated on Jul 10, 2015 that (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150710a.htm):

“Based on my outlook, I expect that it will be appropriate at some point later this year to take the first step to raise the federal funds rate and thus begin normalizing monetary policy. But I want to emphasize that the course of the economy and inflation remains highly uncertain, and unanticipated developments could delay or accelerate this first step. I currently anticipate that the appropriate pace of normalization will be gradual, and that monetary policy will need to be highly supportive of economic activity for quite some time. The projections of most of my FOMC colleagues indicate that they have similar expectations for the likely path of the federal funds rate. But, again, both the course of the economy and inflation are uncertain. If progress toward our employment and inflation goals is more rapid than expected, it may be appropriate to remove monetary policy accommodation more quickly. However, if progress toward our goals is slower than anticipated, then the Committee may move more slowly in normalizing policy.”

There is essentially the same view in the Testimony of Chair Yellen in delivering the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jul 15, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150715a.htm). The FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) raised the fed funds rate to ¼ to ½ percent at its meeting on Dec 16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a.htm).

It is a forecast mandate because of the lags in effect of monetary policy impulses on income and prices (Romer and Romer 2004). The intention is to reduce unemployment close to the “natural rate” (Friedman 1968, Phelps 1968) of around 5 percent and inflation at or below 2.0 percent. If forecasts were reasonably accurate, there would not be policy errors. A commonly analyzed risk of zero interest rates is the occurrence of unintended inflation that could precipitate an increase in interest rates similar to the Himalayan rise of the fed funds rate from 9.91 percent on Jan 10, 1979, at the beginning in Chart VI-10, to 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981. There is a less commonly analyzed risk of the development of a risk premium on Treasury securities because of the unsustainable Treasury deficit/debt of the United States (Section II and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html

and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). There is not a fiscal cliff or debt limit issue ahead but rather free fall into a fiscal abyss. The combination of the fiscal abyss with zero interest rates could trigger the risk premium on Treasury debt or Himalayan hike in interest rates.

Chart VI-10, US, Fed Funds Rate, Business Days, Jul 1, 1954 to Mar 23, 2017, Percent per Year

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H15

There is a false impression of the existence of a monetary policy “science,” measurements and forecasting with which to steer the economy into “prosperity without inflation.” Market participants are remembering the Great Bond Crash of 1994 shown in Table VI-7G when monetary policy pursued nonexistent inflation, causing trillions of dollars of losses in fixed income worldwide while increasing the fed funds rate from 3 percent in Jan 1994 to 6 percent in Dec. The exercise in Table VI-7G shows a drop of the price of the 30-year bond by 18.1 percent and of the 10-year bond by 14.1 percent. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). The pursuit of nonexistent deflation during the past ten years has resulted in the largest monetary policy accommodation in history that created the 2007 financial market crash and global recession and is currently preventing smoother recovery while creating another financial crash in the future. The issue is not whether there should be a central bank and monetary policy but rather whether policy accommodation in doses from zero interest rates to trillions of dollars in the fed balance sheet endangers economic stability.

Table VI-7G, Fed Funds Rates, Thirty and Ten Year Treasury Yields and Prices, 30-Year Mortgage Rates and 12-month CPI Inflation 1994

1994

FF

30Y

30P

10Y

10P

MOR

CPI

Jan

3.00

6.29

100

5.75

100

7.06

2.52

Feb

3.25

6.49

97.37

5.97

98.36

7.15

2.51

Mar

3.50

6.91

92.19

6.48

94.69

7.68

2.51

Apr

3.75

7.27

88.10

6.97

91.32

8.32

2.36

May

4.25

7.41

86.59

7.18

88.93

8.60

2.29

Jun

4.25

7.40

86.69

7.10

90.45

8.40

2.49

Jul

4.25

7.58

84.81

7.30

89.14

8.61

2.77

Aug

4.75

7.49

85.74

7.24

89.53

8.51

2.69

Sep

4.75

7.71

83.49

7.46

88.10

8.64

2.96

Oct

4.75

7.94

81.23

7.74

86.33

8.93

2.61

Nov

5.50

8.08

79.90

7.96

84.96

9.17

2.67

Dec

6.00

7.87

81.91

7.81

85.89

9.20

2.67

Notes: FF: fed funds rate; 30Y: yield of 30-year Treasury; 30P: price of 30-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 6.29 percent and maturity in exactly 30 years; 10Y: yield of 10-year Treasury; 10P: price of 10-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 5.75 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years; MOR: 30-year mortgage; CPI: percent change of CPI in 12 months

Sources: yields and mortgage rates http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm CPI ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.t

Chart VI-14 provides the overnight fed funds rate, the yield of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond, the yield of the 30-year constant maturity bond and the conventional mortgage rate from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. In Jan 1991, the fed funds rate was 6.91 percent, the 10-year Treasury yield 8.09 percent, the 30-year Treasury yield 8.27 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 9.64 percent. Before monetary policy tightening in Oct 1993, the rates and yields were 2.99 percent for the fed funds, 5.33 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 5.94 for the 30-year Treasury and 6.83 percent for the conventional mortgage rate. After tightening in Nov 1994, the rates and yields were 5.29 percent for the fed funds rate, 7.96 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 8.08 percent for the 30-year Treasury and 9.17 percent for the conventional mortgage rate.

Chart VI-14, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Chart VI-15 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. There does not appear acceleration of consumer prices requiring aggressive tightening.

Chart VI-15, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-16 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. Inflation collapsed during the recession from Jul 1990 (III) and Mar 1991 (I) and the end of the Kuwait War on Feb 25, 1991 that stabilized world oil markets. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). Policy tightening had adverse collateral effects in the form of emerging market crises in Mexico and Argentina and fixed income markets worldwide.

Chart VI-16, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Twelve-Month Percentage Change, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

     The Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2017Jun29, CBO 2017Jan24) estimates potential GDP, potential labor force and potential labor productivity provided in Table IB-3. The CBO estimates average rate of growth of potential GDP from 1950 to 2016 at 3.2 percent per year. The projected path is significantly lower at 1.8 percent per year from 2017 to 2027. The legacy of the economic cycle expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2017 at 2.2 percent on average is in contrast with 3.8 percent on average in the expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1991 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html). Subpar economic growth may perpetuate unemployment and underemployment estimated at 24.4 million or 12.6 percent of the effective labor force in Oct 2017 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html) with much lower hiring than in the period before the current cycle (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html).

Table IB-3, US, Congressional Budget Office History and Projections of Potential GDP of US Overall Economy, ∆%

Potential GDP

Potential Labor Force

Potential Labor Productivity*

Average Annual ∆%

1950-1973

4.0

1.6

2.4

1974-1981

3.2

2.5

0.6

1982-1990

3.4

1.7

1.7

1991-2001

3.3

1.2

2.0

2002-2007

2.4

1.0

1.4

2008-2016

1.4

0.5

0.9

Total 1950-2016

3.2

1.4

1.7

Projected Average Annual ∆%

2017-2020

1.7

0.5

1.2

2021-2027

1.9

0.5

1.4

2017-2027

1.8

0.5

1.3

*Ratio of potential GDP to potential labor force

Source: CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2017-2027. Washington, DC, Jan 24, 2017 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370 CBO (2014BEOFeb4), CBO, Key assumptions in projecting potential GDP—February 2014 baseline. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 4, 2014. CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2015 to 2025. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Jan 26, 2015. Aug 2016

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6

Chart IB1-A1 of the Congressional Budget Office provides historical and projected annual growth of United States potential GDP. There is sharp decline of growth of United States potential GDP.

Chart IB-1A1, Congressional Budget Office, Projections of Annual Growth of United States Potential GDP

Source: CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2017-2027. Washington, DC, Jan 24, 2017 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6

Chart IB-1A of the Congressional Budget Office provides historical and projected potential and actual US GDP. The gap between actual and potential output closes by 2017. Potential output expands at a lower rate than historically. Growth is even weaker relative to trend.

Chart IB-1A, Congressional Budget Office, Estimate of Potential GDP and Gap

Source: Congressional Budget Office

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49890

Chart IB-1 of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2013BEOFeb5) provides actual and potential GDP of the United States from 2000 to 2011 and projected to 2024. Lucas (2011May) estimates trend of United States real GDP of 3.0 percent from 1870 to 2010 and 2.2 percent for per capita GDP. The United States successfully returned to trend growth of GDP by higher rates of growth during cyclical expansion as analyzed by Bordo (2012Sep27, 2012Oct21) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR). Growth in expansions following deeper contractions and financial crises was much higher in agreement with the plucking model of Friedman (1964, 1988). The unusual weakness of growth at 2.2 percent on average from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2017 during the current economic expansion in contrast with 3.8 percent on average in the cyclical expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1991 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html) cannot be explained by the contraction of 4.2 percent of GDP from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 and the financial crisis. Weakness of growth in the expansion is perpetuating unemployment and underemployment of 21.4 million or 12.6 percent of the labor force as estimated for Oct 2017 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html). There is no exit from unemployment/underemployment and stagnating real wages because of the collapse of hiring (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html). The US economy and labor markets collapsed without recovery. Abrupt collapse of economic conditions can be explained only with cyclic factors (Lazear and Spletzer 2012Jul22) and not by secular stagnation (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941 with early dissent by Simons 1942).

Chart IB-1, US, Congressional Budget Office, Actual and Projections of Potential GDP, 2000-2024, Trillions of Dollars

Source: Congressional Budget Office, CBO (2013BEOFeb5). The last year in common in both projections is 2017. The revision lowers potential output in 2017 by 7.3 percent relative to the projection in 2007.

Chart IB-2 provides differences in the projections of potential output by the CBO in 2007 and more recently on Feb 4, 2014, which the CBO explains in CBO (2014Feb28).

Chart IB-2, Congressional Budget Office, Revisions of Potential GDP

Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2014Feb 28. Revisions to CBO’s Projection of Potential Output since 2007. Washington, DC, CBO, Feb 28, 2014.

Chart IB-3 provides actual and projected potential GDP from 2000 to 2024. The gap between actual and potential GDP disappears at the end of 2017 (CBO2014Feb4). GDP increases in the projection at 2.5 percent per year.

Chart IB-3, Congressional Budget Office, GDP and Potential GDP

Source: CBO (2013BEOFeb5), CBO, Key assumptions in projecting potential GDP—February 2014 baseline. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 4, 2014.

Chart IIA2-3 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce shows on the lower negative panel the sharp increase in the deficit in goods and the deficits in goods and services from 1960 to 2012. The upper panel shows the increase in the surplus in services that was insufficient to contain the increase of the deficit in goods and services. The adjustment during the global recession has been in the form of contraction of economic activity that reduced demand for goods.

Chart IIA2-3, US, Balance of Goods, Balance on Services and Balance on Goods and Services, 1960-2013, Millions of Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm

Chart IIA2-4 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows exports and imports of goods and services from 1960 to 2012. Exports of goods and services in the upper positive panel have been quite dynamic but have not compensated for the sharp increase in imports of goods. The US economy apparently has become less competitive in goods than in services.

Chart IIA2-4, US, Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, 1960-2013, Millions of Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm

Chart IIA2-5 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows the US balance on current account from 1960 to 2012. The sharp devaluation of the dollar resulting from unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and elimination of auctions of 30-year Treasury bonds did not adjust the US balance of payments. Adjustment only occurred after the contraction of economic activity during the global recession.

Chart IIA2-5, US, Balance on Current Account, 1960-2013, Millions of Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm

Chart IIA2-6 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis provides real GDP in the US from 1960 to 2016. The contraction of economic activity during the global recession was a major factor in the reduction of the current account deficit as percent of GDP.

Chart IIA2-6, US, Real GDP, 1960-2016, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-7 provides the US current account deficit on a quarterly basis from 1980 to IQ1983. The deficit is at a lower level because of growth below potential not only in the US but worldwide. The combination of high government debt and deficit with external imbalance restricts potential prosperity in the US.

Chart IIA-7, US, Balance on Current Account, Quarterly, 1980-2013

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Risk aversion channels funds toward US long-term and short-term securities that finance the US balance of payments and fiscal deficits benefitting from risk flight to US dollar denominated assets. There are now temporary interruptions because of fear of rising interest rates that erode prices of US government securities because of mixed signals on monetary policy and exit from the Fed balance sheet of four trillion dollars of securities held outright. Net foreign purchases of US long-term securities (row C in Table VA-4) strengthened from $57.1 billion in Aug 2017 to $65.1 billion in Sep

2017. Foreign residents’ purchases minus sales of US long-term securities (row A in Table VA-4) in Aug 2017 of $40.6 billion strengthened to $60.8 billion in Sep 2017. Net US (residents) purchases of long-term foreign securities (row B in Table VA-4) weakened from $32.6 billion in Aug 2017 to $20.1 billion in Sep 2017. Other transactions (row C2 in Table VA-4) changed from minus $16.1 billion in Aug 2017 to minus $15.9 billion in Sep 2017. In Sep 2017,

C = A + B + C2 = $60.8 billion + $20.1 billion - $15.9 billion = $65.0 billion

There are minor rounding errors. There is strengthening demand in Table VA-4 in Sep 2017 in A1 private purchases by residents overseas of US long-term securities of $59.5 billion of which weakening in A11 Treasury securities of $13.1 billion, strengthening in A12 of $9.1 billion in agency securities, weakening of

$14.1 billion of corporate bonds and strengthening of $23.2 billion in equities. Worldwide risk aversion causes flight into US Treasury obligations with significant oscillations. Official purchases of securities in row A2 increased $1.3 billion with decrease of Treasury securities of $0.4 billion in Sep 2017. Official purchases of agency securities decreased $0.2 billion in Sep 2017. Row D shows increase in Sep 2017 of $2.4 billion in purchases of short-term dollar denominated obligations. Foreign private holdings of US Treasury bills increased $6.6 billion (row D11) with foreign official holdings increasing $1.1 billion while the category “other” decreased $5.3 billion. Foreign private holdings of US Treasury bills increased $6.6 billion in what could be arbitrage of duration exposures and international risks. Risk aversion of default losses in foreign securities dominates decisions to accept zero interest rates in Treasury securities with no perception of principal losses. In the case of long-term securities, investors prefer to sacrifice inflation and possible duration risk to avoid principal losses with significant oscillations in risk perceptions.

Table VA-1, Net Cross-Borders Flows of US Long-Term Securities, Billion Dollars, NSA

Sep 2016 12 Months

Sep 2017 12 Months

Aug 2017

Sep 2017

A Foreign Purchases less Sales of
US LT Securities

15.8

329.3

40.6

60.8

A1 Private

354.2

430.8

40.4

59.5

A11 Treasury

68.8

142.0

19.7

13.1

A12 Agency

207.1

107.6

8.2

9.1

A13 Corporate Bonds

134.0

109.4

16.7

14.1

A14 Equities

-55.6

71.8

-4.2

23.2

A2 Official

-338.4

-101.5

0.2

1.3

A21 Treasury

-365.3

-146.9

-2.2

-0.4

A22 Agency

34.2

39.1

1.1

-0.2

A23 Corporate Bonds

-4.5

-0.3

2.5

-1.2

A24 Equities

-2.8

6.6

-1.2

3.0

B Net US Purchases of LT Foreign Securities

196.3

139.4

32.6

20.1

B1 Foreign Bonds

245.7

239.7

32.2

24.2

B2 Foreign Equities

-49.4

-100.3

0.3

-4.1

C1 Net Transactions

212.1

468.7

73.2

80.9

C2 Other

-252.9

-250.2

-16.1

-15.9

C Net Foreign Purchases of US LT Securities

-40.8

218.5

57.1

65.1

D Increase in Foreign Holdings of Dollar Denominated Short-term 

US Securities & Other Liab

115.8

17.6

-34.9

2.4

D1 US Treasury Bills

31.6

4.9

-5.8

7.6

D11 Private

67.6

-28.1

0.7

6.6

D12 Official

-35.9

33.1

-6.5

1.1

D2 Other

84.1

12.7

-29.1

-5.3

C1 = A + B; C = C1+C2

A = A1 + A2

A1 = A11 + A12 + A13 + A14

A2 = A21 + A22 + A23 + A24

B = B1 + B2

D = D1 + D2

Sources: United States Treasury

https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticpress.aspx

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2609.aspx

Table VA-5 provides major foreign holders of US Treasury securities. China is the largest holder with $1180.8 billion in Sep 2017, decreasing 1.6 percent from $1200.5 billion in Aug 2017 while increasing $23.8 billion from Sep 2016 or 2.1 percent. The United States Treasury estimates US government debt held by private investors at $11,533 billion in Jun 2017. China’s holding of US Treasury securities represents 10.2 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing debt held by private investors (http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html). Min Zeng, writing on “China plays a big role as US Treasury yields fall,” on Jul 16, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-plays-a-big-role-as-u-s-treasury-yields-fall-1405545034?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj), finds that acceleration in purchases of US Treasury securities by China has been an important factor in the decline of Treasury yields in 2014. Japan decreased its holdings from $1136.4 billion in Sep 2016 to $1096.0 billion in Sep 2017 or 3.6 percent. The combined holdings of China and Japan in Sep 2017 add to $2276.8 billion, which is equivalent to 19.7 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing securities held by investors of $11,533 billion in Jun 2017 (http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html). Total foreign holdings of Treasury securities increased from $6155.9 billion in Sep 2016 to $6323.5 billion in Sep 2017, or 2.7 percent. The US continues to finance its fiscal and balance of payments deficits with foreign savings (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007)). A point of saturation of holdings of US Treasury debt may be reached as foreign holders evaluate the threat of reduction of principal by dollar devaluation and reduction of prices by increases in yield, including possibly risk premium. Shultz et al (2012) find that the Fed financed three-quarters of the US deficit in fiscal year 2011, with foreign governments financing significant part of the remainder of the US deficit while the Fed owns one in six dollars of US national debt. Concentrations of debt in few holders are perilous because of sudden exodus in fear of devaluation and yield increases and the limit of refinancing old debt and placing new debt. In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):

“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”

Table VA-5, US, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities $ Billions at End of Period

Sep 2017

Aug 2017

Sep 2016

Total

6323.5

6269.8

6155.9

China

1180.8

1200.5

1157.0

Japan

1096.0

1101.7

1136.4

Ireland

310.8

307.2

270.9

Brazil

272.8

273.6

258.1

Cayman Islands

267.6

260.0

262.6

Switzerland

254.9

248.3

241.0

United Kingdom

237.4

225.4

217.6

Luxembourg

214.1

213.4

228.3

Hong Kong

194.7

197.3

189.8

Taiwan

183.9

180.4

189.3

India

145.1

138.9

122.7

Saudi Arabia

136.7

137.9

89.4

Foreign Official Holdings

4070.4

4051.7

3899.4

A. Treasury Bills

352.2

324.1

292.1

B. Treasury Bonds and Notes

3745.2

3727.6

3607.3

Source: United States Treasury

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticpress.aspx

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/index.aspx

http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

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