Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth, Exiting Quantitative Easing QE∞, United States Housing Collapse, Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities, Global Economic Deceleration, International Financial Risks and the Global Recession Risk
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012
Executive Summary
I Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth
IA Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation
II United States Housing Collapse and Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
IIA United States Housing Collapse
IIA1 United States New House Sales
IIA2 United States House Prices
IIA3 Factors of United States Housing Collapse
IIB United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
IIB1 Transmission of Monetary Policy
IIB2 Functions of Banks
IIB3 United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
III World Financial Turbulence
IIIA Financial Risks
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets. The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html
Table VI-1 shows the phenomenal impulse to valuations of risk financial assets originating in the initial shock of near zero interest rates in 2003-2004 with the fed funds rate at 1 percent, in fear of deflation that never materialized, and quantitative easing in the form of suspension of the auction of 30-year Treasury bonds to lower mortgage rates. World financial markets were dominated by monetary and housing policies in the US. Between 2002 and 2008, the DJ UBS Commodity Index rose 165.5 percent largely because of unconventional monetary policy encouraging carry trades from low US interest rates to long leveraged positions in commodities, exchange rates and other risk financial assets. The charts of risk financial assets show sharp increase in valuations leading to the financial crisis and then profound drops that are captured in Table VI-1 by percentage changes of peaks and troughs. The first round of quantitative easing and near zero interest rates depreciated the dollar relative to the euro by 39.3 percent between 2003 and 2008, with revaluation of the dollar by 25.1 percent from 2008 to 2010 in the flight to dollar-denominated assets in fear of world financial risks and then devaluation of the dollar of 8.6 percent by Fri Oct 26, 2012. Dollar devaluation is a major vehicle of monetary policy in reducing the output gap that is implemented in the probably erroneous belief that devaluation will not accelerate inflation, misallocating resources toward less productive economic activities and disrupting financial markets. The last row of Table VI-1 shows CPI inflation in the US rising from 1.9 percent in 2003 to 4.1 percent in 2007 even as monetary policy increased the fed funds rate from 1 percent in Jun 2004 to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006.
Table VI-1, Volatility of Assets
| DJIA | 10/08/02-10/01/07 | 10/01/07-3/4/09 | 3/4/09- 4/6/10 | |
| ∆% | 87.8 | -51.2 | 60.3 | |
| NYSE Financial | 1/15/04- 6/13/07 | 6/13/07- 3/4/09 | 3/4/09- 4/16/07 | |
| ∆% | 42.3 | -75.9 | 121.1 | |
| Shanghai Composite | 6/10/05- 10/15/07 | 10/15/07- 10/30/08 | 10/30/08- 7/30/09 | |
| ∆% | 444.2 | -70.8 | 85.3 | |
| STOXX EUROPE 50 | 3/10/03- 7/25/07 | 7/25/07- 3/9/09 | 3/9/09- 4/21/10 | |
| ∆% | 93.5 | -57.9 | 64.3 | |
| UBS Com. | 1/23/02- 7/1/08 | 7/1/08- 2/23/09 | 2/23/09- 1/6/10 | |
| ∆% | 165.5 | -56.4 | 41.4 | |
| 10-Year Treasury | 6/10/03 | 6/12/07 | 12/31/08 | 4/5/10 |
| % | 3.112 | 5.297 | 2.247 | 3.986 |
| USD/EUR | 6/26/03 | 7/14/08 | 6/07/10 | 10/26/2012 |
| Rate | 1.1423 | 1.5914 | 1.192 | 1.2942 |
| CNY/USD | 01/03 | 07/21 | 7/15 | 10/26/ 2012 |
| Rate | 8.2798 | 8.2765 | 6.8211 | 6.2628 |
| New House | 1963 | 1977 | 2005 | 2009 |
| Sales 1000s | 560 | 819 | 1283 | 375 |
| New House | 2000 | 2007 | 2009 | 2010 |
| Median Price $1000 | 169 | 247 | 217 | 203 |
| 2003 | 2005 | 2007 | 2010 | |
| CPI | 1.9 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 1.5 |
Sources: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata
http://www.census.gov/const/www/newressalesindex_excel.html
http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Hist/dat00_eu.htm
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt
Table VI-2 extracts four rows of Table VI-I with the Dollar/Euro (USD/EUR) exchange rate and Chinese Yuan/Dollar (CNY/USD) exchange rate that reveal pursuit of exchange rate policies resulting from monetary policy in the US and capital control/exchange rate policy in China. The ultimate intentions are the same: promoting internal economic activity at the expense of the rest of the world. The easy money policy of the US was deliberately or not but effectively to devalue the dollar from USD 1.1423/EUR on Jun 26, 2003 to USD 1.5914/EUR on Jul 14, 2008, or by 39.3 percent. The flight into dollar assets after the global recession caused revaluation to USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010, or by 25.1 percent. After the temporary interruption of the sovereign risk issues in Europe from Apr to Jul, 2010, shown in Table VI-4 below, the dollar has devalued again to USD 1.2942/EUR on Oct 26, 2012 or by 8.6 percent {[(1.2942/1.192)-1]100 = 8.6%}. Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment. Risk aversion erodes devaluation of the dollar. China fixed the CNY to the dollar for a long period at a highly undervalued level of around CNY 8.2765/USD subsequently revaluing to CNY 6.8211/USD until Jun 7, 2010, or by 17.6 percent and after fixing it again to the dollar, revalued to CNY 6.2628/USD on Fri Oct 26, 2012, or by an additional 8.2 percent, for cumulative revaluation of 24.3 percent. The final row of Table VI-2 shows revaluation of the CNY in two of the past four weeks by 0.9 percent in the week of Oct 12, 2012 and 0.2 percent in the week of Oct 19, 2012 but devaluation by 0.6 percent in the week of Oct 5, 2012 and 0.1 percent in the week of Oct 26, 2012.
Table VI-2, Dollar/Euro (USD/EUR) Exchange Rate and Chinese Yuan/Dollar (CNY/USD) Exchange Rate
| USD/EUR | 12/26/03 | 7/14/08 | 6/07/10 | 10/26/ |
| Rate | 1.1423 | 1.5914 | 1.192 | 1.2942 |
| CNY/USD | 01/03 | 07/21 | 7/15 | 10/26/ 2012 |
| Rate | 8.2798 | 8.2765 | 6.8211 | 6.2628 |
| Weekly Rates | 10/5/2012 | 10/12/2012 | 10/19/2012 | 10/26/ 2012 |
| CNY/USD | 6.3240 | 6.2670 | 6.2546 | 6.2628 |
| ∆% from Earlier Week* | -0.6 | 0.9 | 0.2 | -0.1 |
*Negative sign is depreciation, positive sign is appreciation
Source:
http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_currencies.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000
http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Hist/dat00_ch.htm
The Dow Jones Newswires informs on Oct 15 that the premier of China Wen Jiabao announced that the Chinese yuan will not be further appreciated to prevent adverse effects on exports (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203914304576632790881396896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection). Bob Davis and Lingling Wei, writing on “China shifts course, lets Yuan drop,” on Jul 25, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444840104577548610131107868.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), find that China is depreciating the CNY relative to the USD in an effort to diminish the impact of appreciation of the CNY relative to the EUR. Table VI-2A provides the CNY/USD rate from Oct 28, 2011 to Oct 26, 2012 in selected intervals on Fridays. The CNY/USD revalued by 0.9 percent from Oct 28, 2012 to Apr 27, 2012. The CNY was virtually unchanged relative to the USD by Aug 24, 2012 to CNY 6.3558/USD from the rate of CNY 6.3588/USD on Oct 28, 2011 and then revalued slightly by 1.1 percent to CNY 6.2858/USD on Sep 28, 2012. Devaluation of 0.6 percent from CNY 6.2858/USD on Sep 28, 2012 to CNY 6.3240/USD on Oct 5, 2012, reduced to 0.5 percent the cumulative revaluation from Oct 28, 2011 to Oct 5, 2012. Revaluation by 0.2 percent to CNY 6.2546/USD on Oct 12, 2012, revalued the CNY by 1.6 percent relative to the dollar from CNY 6.3588/USD on Oct 29, 2011. By Oct 26, 2012, the CNY revalued 1.6 percent to CNY 6.2628/USD relative to CNY 6.3588/USD on Oct 29, 2011. Meanwhile, the Senate of the US is proceeding with a bill on China’s trade that could create a confrontation but may not be approved by the entire Congress. An important statement by the People’s Bank of China (PBC), China’s central bank, on Apr 14, 2012, announced the widening of the daily maximum band of fluctuation of the renminbi (RMB) yuan (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2012/20120414090756030448561/20120414090756030448561_.html):
“Along with the development of China’s foreign exchange market, the pricing and risk management capabilities of market participants are gradually strengthening. In order to meet market demands, promote price discovery, enhance the flexibility of RMB exchange rate in both directions, further improve the managed floating RMB exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies, the People’s Bank of China has decided to enlarge the floating band of RMB’s trading prices against the US dollar and is hereby making a public announcement as follows:
Effective from April 16, 2012 onwards, the floating band of RMB’s trading prices against the US dollar in the inter-bank spot foreign exchange market is enlarged from 0.5 percent to 1 percent, i.e., on each business day, the trading prices of the RMB against the US dollar in the inter-bank spot foreign exchange market will fluctuate within a band of ±1 percent around the central parity released on the same day by the China Foreign Exchange Trade System. The spread between the RMB/USD selling and buying prices offered by the foreign exchange-designated banks to their customers shall not exceed 2 percent of the central parity, instead of 1 percent, while other provisions in the Circular of the PBC on Relevant Issues Managing the Trading Prices in the Inter-bank Foreign Exchange Market and Quoted Exchange Rates of Exchange-Designated Banks(PBC Document No.[2010]325) remain valid.
In view of the domestic and international economic and financial conditions, the People’s Bank of China will continue to fulfill its mandates in relation to the RMB exchange rate, keeping RMB exchange rate basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies to preserve stability of the Chinese economy and financial markets.”
Table VI-2A, Renminbi Yuan US Dollar Rate
| CNY/USD | ∆% from 10/28/2011 | |
| 10/26/12 | 6.2628 | 1.5 |
| 10/19/12 | 6.2546 | 1.6 |
| 10/12/12 | 6.2670 | 1.4 |
| 10/5/12 | 6.3240 | 0.5 |
| 9/28/12 | 6.2858 | 1.1 |
| 9/21/12 | 6.3078 | 0.8 |
| 9/14/12 | 6.3168 | 0.7 |
| 9/7/12 | 6.3438 | 0.2 |
| 8/31/12 | 6.3498 | 0.1 |
| 8/24/12 | 6.3558 | 0.0 |
| 8/17/12 | 6.3589 | 0.0 |
| 8/10/12 | 6.3604 | 0.0 |
| 8/3/12 | 6.3726 | -0.2 |
| 7/27/12 | 6.3818 | -0.4 |
| 7/20/12 | 6.3750 | -0.3 |
| 7/13/12 | 6.3868 | -0.4 |
| 7/6/12 | 6.3658 | -0.1 |
| 6/29/12 | 6.3552 | 0.1 |
| 6/22/12 | 6.3650 | -0.1 |
| 6/15/12 | 6.3678 | -0.1 |
| 6/8/2012 | 6.3752 | -0.3 |
| 6/1/2012 | 6.3708 | -0.2 |
| 4/27/2012 | 6.3016 | 0.9 |
| 3/23/2012 | 6.3008 | 0.9 |
| 2/3/2012 | 6.3030 | 0.9 |
| 12/30/2011 | 6.2940 | 1.0 |
| 11/25/2011 | 6.3816 | -0.4 |
| 10/28/2011 | 6.3588 | - |
Source:
http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_currencies.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000
http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Hist/dat00_ch.htm
Chart VI-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the CNY/USD exchange rate from Jan 3, 2000 to Oct 19, 2012 together with US recession dates in shaded areas. China fixed the CNY/USD rate for a long period as shown in the horizontal segment from 2000 to 2005. There was systematic revaluation of 17.6 percent from CNY 8.2765 on Jul 21, 2005 to CNY 6.8211 on Jul 15, 2008. China fixed the CNY/USD rate until Jun 7, 2010, to avoid adverse effects on its economy from the global recession, which is shown as a horizontal segment from 2009 until mid 2010. China then continued the policy of appreciation of the CNY relative to the USD with oscillations until the beginning of 2012 when the rate began to move sideways followed by a final upward slope of devaluation that is measured in Table VI-2A but virtually disappeared in the rate of CNY 6.3589/USD on Aug 17, 2012 and was nearly unchanged at CNY 6.3558/USD on Aug 24, 2012. China then revalued 0.2 percent in the week of Oct 19, 2012, to CNY 6.2546/USD for cumulative 1.6 percent revaluation from Oct 28, 2011 and devalued 0.1 percent for cumulative revaluation of 1.5 percent by Oct 26, 2012. Revaluation of the CNY relative to the USD by 24.3 percent by Oct 26, 2012 has not reduced the trade surplus of China but reversal of the policy of revaluation could result in international confrontation. The upward slope in the final segment on the right of Chart VI-I is measured as virtually stability in Table VI-2A with slight decrease in the final segment.
Chart VI-1, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (US), Jan 3, 2000-Oct 19, 2012
Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H10
The G7 meeting in Washington on Apr 21 2006 of finance ministers and heads of central bank governors of the G7 established the “doctrine of shared responsibility” (G7 2006Apr):
“We, Ministers and Governors, reviewed a strategy for addressing global imbalances. We recognized that global imbalances are the product of a wide array of macroeconomic and microeconomic forces throughout the world economy that affect public and private sector saving and investment decisions. We reaffirmed our view that the adjustment of global imbalances:
- Is shared responsibility and requires participation by all regions in this global process;
- Will importantly entail the medium-term evolution of private saving and investment across countries as well as counterpart shifts in global capital flows; and
- Is best accomplished in a way that maximizes sustained growth, which requires strengthening policies and removing distortions to the adjustment process.
In this light, we reaffirmed our commitment to take vigorous action to address imbalances. We agreed that progress has been, and is being, made. The policies listed below not only would be helpful in addressing imbalances, but are more generally important to foster economic growth.
- In the United States, further action is needed to boost national saving by continuing fiscal consolidation, addressing entitlement spending, and raising private saving.
- In Europe, further action is needed to implement structural reforms for labor market, product, and services market flexibility, and to encourage domestic demand led growth.
- In Japan, further action is needed to ensure the recovery with fiscal soundness and long-term growth through structural reforms.
Others will play a critical role as part of the multilateral adjustment process.
- In emerging Asia, particularly China, greater flexibility in exchange rates is critical to allow necessary appreciations, as is strengthening domestic demand, lessening reliance on export-led growth strategies, and actions to strengthen financial sectors.
- In oil-producing countries, accelerated investment in capacity, increased economic diversification, enhanced exchange rate flexibility in some cases.
- Other current account surplus countries should encourage domestic consumption and investment, increase micro-economic flexibility and improve investment climates.
We recognized the important contribution that the IMF can make to multilateral surveillance.”
The concern at that time was that fiscal and current account global imbalances could result in disorderly correction with sharp devaluation of the dollar after an increase in premiums on yields of US Treasury debt (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007)). The IMF was entrusted with monitoring and coordinating action to resolve global imbalances. The G7 was eventually broadened to the formal G20 in the effort to coordinate policies of countries with external surpluses and deficits.
The database of the WEO (http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO) is used to contract Table VI-3 with fiscal and current account imbalances projected for 2012 and 2015. The WEO finds the need to rebalance external and domestic demand (IMF 2011WEOSep xvii):
“Progress on this front has become even more important to sustain global growth. Some emerging market economies are contributing more domestic demand than is desirable (for example, several economies in Latin America); others are not contributing enough (for example, key economies in emerging Asia). The first set needs to restrain strong domestic demand by considerably reducing structural fiscal deficits and, in some cases, by further removing monetary accommodation. The second set of economies needs significant currency appreciation alongside structural reforms to reduce high surpluses of savings over investment. Such policies would help improve their resilience to shocks originating in the advanced economies as well as their medium-term growth potential.”
The IMF (2012WEOApr, XVII) explains decreasing importance of the issue of global imbalances as follows:
“The latest developments suggest that global current account imbalances are no longer expected to widen again, following their sharp reduction during the Great Recession. This is largely because the excessive consumption growth that characterized economies that ran large external deficits prior to the crisis has been wrung out and has not been offset by stronger consumption in surplus economies. Accordingly, the global economy has experienced a loss of demand and growth in all regions relative to the boom years just before the crisis. Rebalancing activity in key surplus economies toward higher consumption, supported by more market-determined exchange rates, would help strengthen their prospects as well as those of the rest of the world.”
Table VI-3, Fiscal Deficit, Current Account Deficit and Government Debt as % of GDP and 2011 Dollar GDP
| GDP 2012 | FD | CAD | Debt | FD%GDP | CAD%GDP | Debt | |
| US | 15653 | -7.8 | -3.1 | 80.3 | -2.2 | -3.2 | 89.5 |
| Japan | 5984 | -8.9 | 2.0 | 126.4 | -4.6 | 2.4 | 152.4 |
| UK | 2434 | -5.7 | -1.9 | 76.6 | -1.5 | -1.5 | 91.5 |
| Euro | 15653 | -1.5 | 0.4 | 68.0 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 74.4 |
| Ger | 3366 | 0.9 | 5.7 | 55.3 | 1.2 | 4.4 | 56.2 |
| France | 2580 | -2.7 | -1.9 | 78.8 | 0.4 | -1.2 | 86.1 |
| Italy | 1980 | 0.8 | -3.2 | 99.6 | 4.2 | -1.2 | 102.4 |
| Can | 1770 | -3.9 | -2.8 | 33.1 | -1.3 | -3.5 | 37.8 |
| China | 8250 | -1.2 | 2.8 | 25.8 | -0.1 | 3.2 | 14.9 |
| Brazil | 2425 | 3.1 | -2.1 | 34.4 | 3.1 | -3.3 | 28.7 |
Note: GER = Germany; Can = Canada; FD = fiscal deficit; CAD = current account deficit
FD is primary except total for China; Debt is net except gross for China
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO
The current account of the US balance of payments is provided in Table VI-3A for IIQ2011 and IIQ2012. The US has a large deficit in goods or exports less imports of goods but it has a surplus in services that helps to reduce the trade account deficit or exports less imports of goods and services. The current account deficit of the US decreased from $124.5 billion in IIQ2011, or 3.2 percent of GDP, to $123.2 billion in IIQ2012, or 3.0 percent of GDP. The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP has stabilized around 3 percent of GDP compared with much higher percentages before the recession (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71).
Table VI-3A, US Balance of Payments, Millions of Dollars NSA
| IIQ2011 | IIQ2012 | Difference | |
| Goods Balance | -190,477 | -189,344 | 1,133 |
| X Goods | 375,554 | 396,218 | 5.5 ∆% |
| M Goods | -566,031 | -585,562 | 3.5 ∆% |
| Services Balance | 39,949 | 40,690 | 741 |
| X Services | 148,999 | 154,291 | 3.6 ∆% |
| M Services | -109,050 | -113,601 | 4.2 ∆% |
| Balance Goods and Services | -150,528 | -148,654 | 1,874 |
| Balance Income | 58,335 | 57,504 | -831 |
| Unilateral Transfers | -32,291 | -32,049 | -242 |
| Current Account Balance | -124,484 | -123,199 | -1,285 |
| % GDP | IIQ2011 | IVQ2011 | IIQ2012 |
| 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.0 |
X: exports; M: imports
Balance on Current Account = Balance on Goods and Services + Balance on Income + Unilateral Transfers
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#bop
In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):
“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seigniorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”
The current real value of government debt plus monetary liabilities depends on the expected discounted values of future primary surpluses or difference between tax revenue and government expenditure excluding interest payments (Cochrane 2011Jan, 27, equation (16)). There is a point when adverse expectations about the capacity of the government to generate primary surpluses to honor its obligations can result in increases in interest rates on government debt.
This analysis suggests that there may be a point of saturation of demand for United States financial liabilities without an increase in interest rates on Treasury securities. A risk premium may develop on US debt. Such premium is not apparent currently because of distressed conditions in the world economy and international financial system. Risk premiums are observed in the spread of bonds of highly indebted countries in Europe relative to bonds of the government of Germany.
The issue of global imbalances centered on the possibility of a disorderly correction (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b) 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). Such a correction has not occurred historically but there is no argument proving that it could not occur. The need for a correction would originate in unsustainable large and growing United States current account deficits (CAD) and net international investment position (NIIP) or excess of financial liabilities of the US held by foreigners net of financial liabilities of foreigners held by US residents. The IMF estimated that the US could maintain a CAD of two to three percent of GDP without major problems (Rajan 2004). The threat of disorderly correction is summarized by Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 15):
“It is possible that foreigners may be unwilling to increase their positions in US financial assets at prevailing interest rates. An exit out of the dollar could cause major devaluation of the dollar. The depreciation of the dollar would cause inflation in the US, leading to increases in American interest rates. There would be an increase in mortgage rates followed by deterioration of real estate values. The IMF has simulated that such an adjustment would cause a decline in the rate of growth of US GDP to 0.5 percent over several years. The decline of demand in the US by four percentage points over several years would result in a world recession because the weakness in Europe and Japan could not compensate for the collapse of American demand. The probability of occurrence of an abrupt adjustment is unknown. However, the adverse effects are quite high, at least hypothetically, to warrant concern.”
The United States could be moving toward a situation typical of heavily indebted countries, requiring fiscal adjustment and increases in productivity to become more competitive internationally. The CAD and NIIP of the United States are not observed in full deterioration because the economy is well below potential. There are two complications in the current environment relative to the concern with disorderly correction in the first half of the past decade. Table VI-3B provides data on the US fiscal and balance of payments imbalances. In 2007, the federal deficit of the US was $161 billion corresponding to 1.2 percent of GDP while the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2011AugBEO, 2) estimates the federal deficit in 2012 at $1128 billion or 7.3 percent of GDP (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html). The combined record federal deficits of the US from 2009 to 2012 are $5135 billion or 33 percent of the estimate of GDP of $15,538 billion for fiscal year 2012 by the CBO (http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43542 2012AugBEO). The deficits from 2009 to 2012 exceed one trillion dollars per year, adding to $5.096 trillion in four years, using the fiscal year deficit of $1089.4 billion for fiscal year 2012 (http://www.fms.treas.gov/mts/mts0912.txt), which is the worst fiscal performance since World War II. Federal debt in 2007 was $5035 billion, less than the combined deficits from 2009 to 2012 of $5135 billion using the CBO forecast or $5096 billion using the fiscal year 2012 value of $1089 billion (http://www.fms.treas.gov/mts/mts0912.txt), and corresponded to 36.3 percent of GDP. Federal debt in 2011 was 67.7 percent of GDP and is estimated to reach 72.8 percent of GDP in 2012 (CBO2012AugBEO). This situation may worsen in the future (CBO 2012LTBO):
“The budget outlook is much bleaker under the extended alternative fiscal scenario, which maintains what some analysts might consider “current policies,” as opposed to current laws. Federal debt would grow rapidly from its already high level, exceeding 90 percent of GDP in 2022. After that, the growing imbalance between revenues and spending, combined with spiraling interest payments, would swiftly push debt to higher and higher levels. Debt as a share of GDP would exceed its historical peak of 109 percent by 2026, and it would approach 200 percent in 2037.
The changes under this scenario would result in much lower revenues than would occur under the extended baseline scenario because almost all expiring tax provisions are assumed to be extended through 2022 (with the exception of the current reduction in the payroll tax rate for Social Security). After 2022, revenues under this scenario are assumed to remain at their 2022 level of 18.5 percent of GDP, just above the average of the past 40 years.
Outlays would be much higher than under the other scenario. This scenario incorporates assumptions that through 2022, lawmakers will act to prevent Medicare’s payment rates for physicians from declining; that after 2022, lawmakers will not allow various restraints on the growth of Medicare costs and health insurance subsidies to exert their full effect; and that the automatic reductions in spending required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 will not occur (although the original caps on discretionary appropriations in that law are assumed to remain in place). Finally, under this scenario, federal spending as a percentage of GDP for activities other than Social Security, the major health care programs, and interest payments is assumed to return to its average level during the past two decades, rather than fall significantly below that level, as it does under the extended baseline scenario.”
Table VI-3B, US, Current Account, NIIP, Fiscal Balance, Nominal GDP, Federal Debt and Direct Investment, Dollar Billions and %
| 2000 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | |
| Goods & | -377 | -697 | -698 | -379 | -495 | -559 |
| Income | 19 | 101 | 147 | 119 | 184 | 227 |
| UT | -58 | -115 | -126 | -122 | -131 | -133 |
| Current Account | -416 | -710 | -677 | -382 | -442 | -466 |
| NGDP | 9951 | 14028 | 14291 | 13974 | 14499 | 15076 |
| Current Account % GDP | -3.8 | -5.1 | -4.7 | -2.7 | -3.1 | -3.1 |
| NIIP | -1337 | -1796 | -3260 | -2321 | -2474 | -4030 |
| US Owned Assets Abroad | 6239 | 18399 | 19464 | 18512 | 20298 | 21132 |
| Foreign Owned Assets in US | 7576 | 20195 | 22724 | 20833 | 22772 | 25162 |
| NIIP % GDP | -13.4 | -12.8 | -22.8 | -16.6 | -17.1 | 26.7 |
| Exports | 1425 | 2488 | 2657 | 2181 | 2519 | 2848 |
| NIIP % | -94 | -72 | -123 | -106 | -98 | -142 |
| DIA MV | 2694 | 5274 | 3102 | 4287 | 4767 | 4450 |
| DIUS MV | 2783 | 3551 | 2486 | 2995 | 3397 | 3509 |
| Fiscal Balance | +236 | -161 | -459 | -1413 | -1294 | -1300 |
| Fiscal Balance % GDP | +2.4 | -1.2 | -3.2 | -10.1 | -9.0 | -8.7 |
| Federal Debt | 3410 | 5035 | 5803 | 7545 | 9019 | 10128 |
| Federal Debt % GDP | 34.7 | 36.3 | 40.5 | 54.1 | 62.8 | 67.7 |
| Federal Outlays | 1789 | 2729 | 2983 | 3518 | 3456 | 3603 |
| ∆% | 5.1 | 2.8 | 9.3 | 17.9 | -1.8 | 4.3 |
| % GDP | 18.2 | 19.7 | 20.8 | 25.2 | 24.1 | 24.1 |
| Federal Revenue | 2052 | 2568 | 2524 | 2105 | 2162 | 2303 |
| ∆% | 10.8 | 6.7 | -1.7 | -16.6 | 2.7 | 6.5 |
| % GDP | 20.6 | 18.5 | 17.6 | 15.1 | 15.1 | 15.4 |
Sources:
Notes: UT: unilateral transfers; NGDP: nominal GDP or in current dollars; NIIP: Net International Investment Position; DIA MV: US Direct Investment Abroad at Market Value; DIUS MV: Direct Investment in the US at Market Value. There are minor discrepancies in the decimal point of percentages of GDP between the balance of payments data and federal debt, outlays, revenue and deficits in which the original number of the CBO source is maintained. These discrepancies do not alter conclusions.
Sources: Balance of Payments and NIIP, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#bop
Gross Domestic Product, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides an international safety net for prevention and resolution of international financial crises. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) provides analysis of the economic and financial sectors of countries (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-62, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008), 114-23). Relating economic and financial sectors is a challenging task both for theory and measurement. The IMF (2012WEOOct) provides surveillance of the world economy with its Global Economic Outlook (WEO) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/pdf/text.pdf), of the world financial system with its Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) (IMF 2012GFSROct) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/02/pdf/text.pdf) and of fiscal affairs with the Fiscal Monitor (IMF 2012FMOct) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2012/02/fmindex.htm). There appears to be a moment of transition in global economic and financial variables that may prove of difficult analysis and measurement. It is useful to consider global economic and financial risks, which are analyzed in the comments of this blog.
Economic risks include the following:
1. China’s Economic Growth. China is lowering its growth target to 7.5 percent per year. Lu Hui, writing on “China lowers GDP target to achieve quality economic growth, on Mar 12, 2012, published in Beijing by Xinhuanet (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/12/c_131461668.htm), informs that Premier Jiabao wrote in a government work report that the GDP growth target will be lowered to 7.5 percent to enhance the quality and level of development of China over the long term. The quarterly growth rate of GDP in IIQ2012 of 1.8 percent is equivalent to 7.4 percent per year and growth in IIQ2012 relative to IIQ2011 is estimated at 7.6 percent, which is the lowest since the global recession. GDP in China increased 2.2 percent in IIIQ2012 relative to IIQ2012, or annual equivalent of 9.1 percent, and 7.4 percent relative to IIQ2011 (See Subsection VC at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/world-inflation-waves-stagnating-united_21.html). There is also ongoing political development in China during a decennial political reorganization. Xinhuanet informs that Premier Wen Jiabao considers the need for macroeconomic stimulus, arguing that “we should continue to implement proactive fiscal policy and a prudent monetary policy, while giving more priority to maintaining growth” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/20/c_131599662.htm). Premier Wen elaborates that “the country should properly handle the relationship between maintaining growth, adjusting economic structures and managing inflationary expectations” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/20/c_131599662.htm).
2. United States Economic Growth, Labor Markets and Budget/Debt Quagmire. (i) The US is experiencing the first expansion from a recession after World War II without growth and without jobs. The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as decelerating from mediocre growth of 2.4 percent on an annual basis in 2011 to cumulative growth of 1.3 percent in the first three quarters of 2012, which is equivalent to 1.77 percent per year (Section I Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/historically-sharper-recoveries-from.html). Growth is not only mediocre but sharply decelerating to a rhythm that is not consistent with reduction of unemployment and underemployment of 28.7 million people. (ii) The labor market continues fractured with 28.7 million unemployed or underemployed (Section I http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/recovery-without-jobs-stagnating-real.html). There are 10 million fewer full-time jobs and hiring has collapsed (Section I at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/recovery-without-hiring-imf-view-united.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html). (iii) There is a difficult climb from the record federal deficit of 9.9 percent of GDP in 2009 and cumulative deficit of $5135 billion in four consecutive years of deficits exceeding one trillion dollars from 2009 to 2012, using the CBO estimate $5.096 trillion in four years, using the deficit of $1089.4 billion for fiscal year 2012 (http://www.fms.treas.gov/mts/mts0912.txt), which is the worst fiscal performance since World War II (Section IB at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html). There is no subsequent jump of debt in US peacetime history as the one from 40.5 percent of GDP in 2008 to 67.7 percent of GDP in 2011 and projected by the Congressional Budget Office (Table IB-3 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html and CBO 2012AugBEO http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-22-2012-Update_to_Outlook.pdf iv) at 72.8 percent in 2012. The CBO (2012AugBEO) must use current law without any changes in the baseline scenario but also calculates another alternative scenario with different assumptions. In the alternative scenario, the debt/GDP ratio rises to 89.7 percent by 2022 (Table IB-6 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html). The US is facing an unsustainable debt/GDP path. Feldstein (2012Mar19) finds that the most troubling uncertainty in the US is the programmed tax increases projected by the CBO (2012JanBEO) under current law with federal government revenue increasing from $2.4 trillion in fiscal year 2012 to $2.9 trillion in fiscal year 2013. The increase of $512 billion of federal revenue would be about 2.9 percent of GDP, raising the share of federal revenue in GDP from 15.8 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 18.7 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2013. In the analysis of Feldstein (2012Mar19), increasing revenue would originate in higher personal tax rates, payroll tax contributions and taxes on dividends, capital gains and corporate income tax. The share of federal revenue in GDP would increase to 19.8 percent in 2014, remaining above 20 percent during the rest of the decade. Feldstein (2012Mar19) finds that such a shock of sustained tax increases would risk another recession in 2013, requiring preventive legislation to smooth tax increases
3. Economic Growth and Labor Markets in Advanced Economies. Advanced economies are growing slowly. Japan’s GDP fell 0.7 percent in IVQ2011 relative to a year earlier but grew 2.9 percent in IQ2012 relative to a year earlier, 1.3 percent in IQ2012 relative to IVQ2011 and 0.2 percent in IIQ2012 relative to IQ2011 (see Table V-3 and Table VB-1 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation_16.html). The euro zone’s GDP fell 0.3 percent in IVQ2011 and was flat in IQ2012 and relative to a year earlier in IQ2011 but fell 0.2 percent in IIQ2012 and declined 0.4 percent relative to IIQ2011; Germany’s GDP fell 0.1 percent in IVQ2011 but grew 0.5 percent in IQ2012 and 1.7 percent relative to IQ2011, increasing 0.3 percent in IIQ2012 and 0.5 percent relative to IIQ2011; and the UK’s GDP fell 0.4 percent in IVQ2011, 0.3 percent in IQ2012 and 0.4 percent in IIQ2012 for cumulative decline of 1.1 percent in three consecutive quarters at annual equivalent rate of minus 1.5 percent and declined 0.5 percent in IIQ2012 relative to IIQ2011. In IIIQ2012, the UK grew 1.0 percent relative to IIQ2012 and 0.0 percent relative to IIIQ2011. There is still high unemployment in advanced economies
4. World Inflation Waves. Inflation continues in repetitive waves globally (see Section I http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/world-inflation-waves-stagnating-united.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html)
A list of financial uncertainties includes:
1. Euro Area Survival Risk. The resilience of the euro to fiscal and financial doubts on larger member countries is still an unknown risk. Adjustment programs consist of immediate adoption of economic reforms that would increase future growth permitting fiscal consolidation, which would reduce risk spreads on sovereign debt. Fiscal consolidation is challenging in an environment of weak economic growth as analyzed by Blanchard (2011WEOSep) and consolidation can restrict growth as analyzed by Blanchard (2012WEOApr). Adjustment of countries such as Italy requires depreciation of the currency to parity, as proposed by Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15), but it is not workable within the common currency and zero interest rates in the US. Bailouts of euro area member countries with temporary liquidity challenges cannot be permanently provided by stronger members at the risk of impairing their own sovereign debt credibility
2. Foreign Exchange Wars. Exchange rate struggles continue as zero interest rates in advanced economies induce devaluation of their currencies. After deep global recession, regulation, trade and devaluation wars were to be expected (Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008c), 181): “There are significant grounds for concern on the basis of this experience. International economic cooperation and the international financial framework can collapse during extreme events. It is unlikely that there will be a repetition of the disaster of the Great Depression. However, a milder contraction can trigger regulatory, trade and exchange wars”
3. Valuation of Risk Financial Assets. Valuations of risk financial assets have reached extremely high levels in markets with lower volumes. For example, the DJIA has increased 35.3 percent since the trough of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe on Jul 2, 2010 to Oct 26, 2012, and the S&P 500 has gained 38.1 percent. It is challenging in theory and practice to assess when variables have peaked but sustained valuations to very high levels could be followed by contractions of valuations. Jonathan Cheng, writing on “Stocks add 66 points, post first-quarter record,” published on Mar 30, 2012, in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577313123753822852.html?mod=WSJ_Markets_LEFTTopStories&mg=reno64-sec-wsj), finds that the DJIA rose 8.1 percent in IQ2012, which is the highest since 1998, while the S&P 500 gained 12 percent. Paul A. Samuelson remarked that “the stock market has predicted nine of the last five recessions.” Another version of this phrase would be that “the stock market has predicted nine of the last five economic booms.” The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:
(Mt + Bt)/Pt = Et∫(1/Rt, t+τ)st+τdτ (1)
Equation (1) expresses the monetary, Mt, and debt, Bt, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, Pt, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, Rt, t+τ, of the future primary surpluses st+τ, which are equal to Tt+τ – Gt+τ or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post Rt, t+τ. The present value of the firm can also be expressed as the discounted future value of net cash flows. Equities can inflate beyond sound values if cash flows that depend on economic activity prove to be illusory in continuing mediocre growth
4. Duration Trap of the Zero Bound. The yield of the US 10-year Treasury rose from 2.031 percent on Mar 9, 2012, to 2.294 percent on Mar 16, 2012. Considering a 10-year Treasury with coupon of 2.625 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years, the price would fall from 105.3512 corresponding to yield of 2.031 percent to 102.9428 corresponding to yield of 2.294 percent, for loss in a week of 2.3 percent but far more in a position with leverage of 10:1. Min Zeng, writing on “Treasurys fall, ending brutal quarter,” published on Mar 30, 2012, in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577313400029412564.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_markets), informs that Treasury bonds maturing in more than 20 years lost 5.52 percent in the first quarter of 2012
5. Credibility and Commitment of Central Bank Policy. There is a credibility issue of the commitment of monetary policy. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) advised on its Sep 13, 2012 statement that: “To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative. To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee also decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm). At its meeting on Jan 25, 2012, the FOMC began to provide to the public the specific forecasts of interest rates and other economic variables by FOMC members. These forecasts are analyzed in Section IV Global Inflation. Thomas J. Sargent and William L. Silber, writing on “The challenges of the Fed’s bid for transparency,” on Mar 20, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/778eb1ce-7288-11e1-9c23-00144feab49a.html#axzz1pexRlsiQ), analyze the costs and benefits of transparency by the Fed. In the analysis of Sargent and Silber (2012Mar20), benefits of transparency by the Fed will exceed costs if the Fed is successful in conveying to the public what policies would be implemented and how forcibly in the presence of unforeseen economic events. History has been unkind to policy commitments. The risk in this case is if the Fed would postpone adjustment because of political pressures as has occurred in the past or because of errors of evaluation and forecasting of economic and financial conditions. Both political pressures and errors abounded in the unhappy stagflation of the 1970s also known as the US Great Inflation (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). The challenge of the Fed, in the view of Sargent and Silber 2012Mar20), is to convey to the public the need to deviate from the commitment to interest rates of zero to ¼ percent because conditions have changed instead of unwarranted inaction or policy changes. Errors have abounded such as a critical cause of the global recession pointed by Sargent and Silber (2012Mar20): “While no president is known to have explicitly pressurized Mr. Bernanke’s predecessor, Alan Greenspan, he found it easy to maintain low interest rates for too long, fuelling the credit boom and housing bubble that led to the financial crisis in 2008.” Sargent and Silber (2012Mar20) also find need of commitment of fiscal authorities to consolidation needed to attain sustainable path of debt.
The analysis by Kydland and Prescott (1977, 447-80, equation 5) uses the “expectation augmented” Phillips curve with the natural rate of unemployment of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), which in the notation of Barro and Gordon (1983, 592, equation 1) is:
Ut = Unt – α(πt – πe) α > 0 (1)
Where Ut is the rate of unemployment at current time t, Unt is the natural rate of unemployment, πt is the current rate of inflation and πe is the expected rate of inflation by economic agents based on current information. Equation (1) expresses unemployment net of the natural rate of unemployment as a decreasing function of the gap between actual and expected rates of inflation. The system is completed by a social objective function, W, depending on inflation, π, and unemployment, U:
W = W(πt, Ut) (2)
The policymaker maximizes the preferences of the public, (2), subject to the constraint of the tradeoff of inflation and unemployment, (1). The total differential of W set equal to zero provides an indifference map in the Cartesian plane with ordered pairs (πt, Ut - Un) such that the consistent equilibrium is found at the tangency of an indifference curve and the Phillips curve in (1). The indifference curves are concave to the origin. The consistent policy is not optimal. Policymakers without discretionary powers following a rule of price stability would attain equilibrium with unemployment not higher than with the consistent policy. The optimal outcome is obtained by the rule of price stability, or zero inflation, and no more unemployment than under the consistent policy with nonzero inflation and the same unemployment. Taylor (1998LB) attributes the sustained boom of the US economy after the stagflation of the 1970s to following a monetary policy rule instead of discretion (see Taylor 1993, 1999).
6. Carry Trades. Commodity prices driven by zero interest rates have resumed their increasing path. Some analytical aspects of the carry trade are instructive (Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 101-5, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 202-4), Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008c), 70-4). Consider the following symbols: Rt is the exchange rate of a country receiving carry trade denoted in units of domestic currency per dollars at time t of initiation of the carry trade; Rt+τ is the exchange of the country receiving carry trade denoted in units of domestic currency per dollars at time t+τ when the carry trade is unwound; if is the domestic interest rate of the high-yielding country where investment will be made; iusd is the interest rate on short-term dollar debt assumed to be 0.5 percent per year; if >iusd, which expresses the fact that the interest rate on the foreign country is much higher than that in short-term USD (US dollars); St is the dollar value of the investment principal; and π is the dollar profit from the carry trade. The investment of the principal St in the local currency debt of the foreign country provides a profit of:
π = (1 + if)(RtSt)(1/Rt+τ) – (1 + iusd)St (3)
The profit from the carry trade, π, is nonnegative when:
(1 + if)/ (1 + iusd) ≥ Rt+τ/Rt (4)
In words, the difference in interest rate differentials, left-hand side of inequality (4), must exceed the percentage devaluation of the currency of the host country of the carry trade, right hand side of inequality (4). The carry trade must earn enough in the host-country interest rate to compensate for depreciation of the host-country at the time of return to USD. A simple example explains the vulnerability of the carry trade in fixed-income. Let if be 0.10 (10 percent), iusd 0.005 (0.5 percent), St USD100 and Rt CUR 1.00/USD. Adopt the fixed-income rule of months of 30 days and years of 360 days. Consider a strategy of investing USD 100 at 10 percent for 30 days with borrowing of USD 100 at 0.5 percent for 30 days. At time t, the USD 100 are converted into CUR 100 and invested at [(30/360)10] equal to 0.833 percent for thirty days. At the end of the 30 days, assume that the rate Rt+30 is still CUR 1/USD such that the return amount from the carry trade is USD 0.833. There is still a loan to be paid [(0.005)(30/360)USD100] equal to USD 0.042. The investor receives the net amount of USD 0.833 minus USD 0.042 or US 0.791. The rate of return on the investment of the USD 100 is 0.791 percent, which is equivalent to the annual rate of return of 9.49 percent {(0.791)(360/30)}. This is incomparably better than earning 0.5 percent. There are alternatives of hedging by buying forward the exchange for conversion back into USD.
Research by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis finds that the dollar declined on average by 6.56 percent in the events of quantitative easing, ranging from depreciation of 10.8 percent relative to the Japanese yen to 3.6 percent relative to the pound sterling (http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2010/2010-018.pdf). A critical assumption of Rudiger Dornbusch (1976) in his celebrated analysis of overshooting (Rogoff 2002MF http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/kr/112901.pdf) is “that exchange rates and asset markets adjust fast relative to goods markets” (Rudiger Dornbusch 1976, 1162). The market response of a monetary expansion is “to induce an immediate depreciation in the exchange rate and accounts therefore for fluctuations in the exchange rate and the terms of trade. During the adjustment process, rising prices may be accompanied by an appreciating exchange rate so that the trend behavior of exchange rates stands potentially in strong contrast with the cyclical behavior of exchange rates and prices” (Dornbusch 1976, 1162). The volatility of the exchange rate “is needed to temporarily equilibrate the system in response to monetary shocks, because underlying national prices adjust so slowly” (Rogoff 2002MF http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/kr/112901.pdf 3). The exchange rate “is identified as a critical channel for the transmission of monetary policy to aggregate demand for domestic output” (Dornbusch 1976, 1162).
In a world of exchange wars, depreciation of the host-country currency can move even faster such that the profits from the carry trade may become major losses. Depreciation is the percentage change in instants against which the interest rate of a day is in the example [(10)(1/360)] or 0.03 percent. Exchange rates move much faster in the real world as in the overshooting model of Dornbusch (1976). Profits in carry trades have greater risks but equally greater returns when the short position in zero interest rates, or borrowing, and on the dollar, are matched with truly agile financial risk assets such as commodities and equities. A simplified analysis could consider the portfolio balance equations Aij = f(r, x) where Aij is the demand for i = 1,2,∙∙∙n assets from j = 1,2, ∙∙∙m sectors, r the 1xn vector of rates of return, ri, of n assets and x a vector of other relevant variables. Tobin (1969) and Brunner and Meltzer (1973) assume imperfect substitution among capital assets such that the own first derivatives of Aij are positive, demand for an asset increases if its rate of return (interest plus capital gains) is higher, and cross first derivatives are negative, demand for an asset decreases if the rate of return of alternative assets increases. Theoretical purity would require the estimation of the complete model with all rates of return. In practice, it may be impossible to observe all rates of return such as in the critique of Roll (1976). Policy proposals and measures by the Fed have been focused on the likely impact of withdrawals of stocks of securities in specific segments, that is, of effects of one or several specific rates of return among the n possible rates. In fact, the central bank cannot influence investors and arbitrageurs to allocate funds to assets of desired categories such as asset-backed securities that would lower the costs of borrowing for mortgages and consumer loans. Floods of cheap money may simply induce carry trades in arbitrage of opportunities in fast moving assets such as currencies, commodities and equities instead of much lower returns in fixed income securities (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html).
It is in this context of economic and financial uncertainties that decisions on portfolio choices of risk financial assets must be made. There is a new carry trade that learned from the losses after the crisis of 2007 or learned from the crisis how to avoid losses. The sharp rise in valuations of risk financial assets shown in Table VI-1 after the first policy round of near zero fed funds and quantitative easing by the equivalent of withdrawing supply with the suspension of the 30-year Treasury auction was on a smooth trend with relatively subdued fluctuations. The credit crisis and global recession have been followed by significant fluctuations originating in sovereign risk issues in Europe, doubts of continuing high growth and accelerating inflation in China now complicated by political developments, events such as in the Middle East and Japan and legislative restructuring, regulation, insufficient growth, falling real wages, depressed hiring and high job stress of unemployment and underemployment in the US now with realization of growth standstill. The “trend is your friend” motto of traders has been replaced with a “hit and realize profit” approach of managing positions to realize profits without sitting on positions. There is a trend of valuation of risk financial assets driven by the carry trade from zero interest rates with fluctuations provoked by events of risk aversion or the “sharp shifts in risk appetite” of Blanchard (2012WEOApr, XIII). Table VI-4, which is updated for every comment of this blog, shows the deep contraction of valuations of risk financial assets after the Apr 2010 sovereign risk issues in the fourth column “∆% to Trough.” There was sharp recovery after around Jul 2010 in the last column “∆% Trough to 10/26/12,” which has been recently stalling or reversing amidst bouts of risk aversion. “Let’s twist again” monetary policy during the week of Sep 23 caused deep worldwide risk aversion and selloff of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/collapse-of-household-income-and-wealth.html). Monetary policy was designed to increase risk appetite but instead suffocated risk exposures. There has been rollercoaster fluctuation in risk aversion and financial risk asset valuations: surge in the week of Dec 2, 2011, mixed performance of markets in the week of Dec 9, renewed risk aversion in the week of Dec 16, end-of-the-year relaxed risk aversion in thin markets in the weeks of Dec 23 and Dec 30, mixed sentiment in the weeks of Jan 6 and Jan 13 2012 and strength in the weeks of Jan 20, Jan 27 and Feb 3 followed by weakness in the week of Feb 10 but strength in the weeks of Feb 17 and 24 followed by uncertainty on financial counterparty risk in the weeks of Mar 2 and Mar 9. All financial values have fluctuated with events such as the surge in the week of Mar 16 on favorable news of Greece’s bailout even with new risk issues arising in the week of Mar 23 but renewed risk appetite in the week of Mar 30 because of the end of the quarter and the increase in the firewall of support of sovereign debts in the euro area. New risks developed in the week of Apr 6 with increase of yields of sovereign bonds of Spain and Italy, doubts on Fed policy and weak employment report. Asia and financial entities are experiencing their own risk environments. Financial markets were under stress in the week of Apr 13 because of the large exposure of Spanish banks to lending by the European Central Bank and the annual equivalent growth rate of China’s GDP of 7.4 percent in IQ2012 [(1.018)4], which was repeated in IIQ2012. There was strength again in the week of Apr 20 because of the enhanced IMF firewall and Spain placement of debt, continuing into the week of Apr 27. Risk aversion returned in the week of May 4 because of the expectation of elections in Europe and the new trend of deterioration of job creation in the US. Europe’s sovereign debt crisis and the fractured US job market continued to influence risk aversion in the week of May 11. Politics in Greece and banking issues in Spain were important factors of sharper risk aversion in the week of May 18. Risk aversion continued during the week of May 25 and exploded in the week of Jun 1. Expectations of stimulus by central banks caused valuation of risk financial assets in the week of Jun 8 and in the week of Jun 15. Expectations of major stimulus were frustrated by minor continuance of maturity extension policy in the week of Jun 22 together with doubts on the silent bank run in highly indebted euro area member countries. There was a major rally of valuations of risk financial assets in the week of Jun 29 with the announcement of new measures on bank resolutions by the European Council. New doubts surfaced in the week of Jul 6, 2012 on the implementation of the bank resolution mechanism and on the outlook for the world economy because of interest rate reductions by the European Central, Bank of England and People’s Bank of China. Risk appetite returned in the week of July 13 in relief that economic data suggests continuing high growth in China but fiscal and banking uncertainties in Spain spread to Italy in the selloff of July 20, 2012. Mario Draghi (2012Jul26), president of the European Central Bank, stated: “But there is another message I want to tell you.
Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” This statement caused return of risk appetite, driving upward valuations of risk financial assets worldwide. Buiter (2011Oct31) analyzes that the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) would need a “bigger bazooka” to bail out euro members in difficulties that could possibly be provided by the ECB. The dimensions of the problem may require more firepower than a bazooka perhaps that of the largest conventional bomb of all times of 44,000 pounds experimentally detonated only once by the US in 1948 (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/mar-apr/coker.html). Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. Risk appetite continued in the week of Aug 3, 2012, in expectation of purchases of sovereign bonds by the ECB. Growth of China’s exports by 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2012 released in the week of Aug 10, 2012, together with doubts on the purchases of bonds by the ECB injected a mild dose of risk aversion. There was optimism on the resolution of the European debt crisis on Aug 17, 2012. The week of Aug 24, 2012 had alternating shocks of risk aversion and risk appetite from the uncertainties of success of the Greek adjustment program, the coming decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the European Stability Mechanism, disagreements between the Deutsche Bundesbank and the European Central Bank on purchase of sovereign bonds of highly indebted euro area member countries and the exchange of letters between Darrell E. Issa (2012Aug1), Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Chairman Bernanke (2012Aug22) on monetary policy. Bernanke (2012JHAug31) and Draghi (2012Aug29) generated risk enthusiasm in the week of Aug 31, 2012. Risk appetite returned in the week of Sep 7, 2012, with the announcement of the bond-buying program of OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions) on Sep 6, 2012, by the European Central Bank (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html). Valuations of risk financial assets increased sharply after the statement of the FOMC on Sep 13, 2012 with open-ended quantitative easing and self-imposed single-mandate of jobs that would maintain easing monetary policy well after the economy returns to full potential. Risk aversion returned in the week of Sep 21, 2012 on doubts about the success of quantitative easing and weakness in flash purchasing managers’ indices. Risk aversion returned in the week of Sep 28, 2012, because of uncertainty on the consequences of a bailout of Spain and weakness of central banks in controlling financial turbulence but was followed by risk appetite in the week of Oct 5, aversion in the week of Oct 12 and mixed views in the week of Oct 19. Revenue declines for reporting companies caused decline of stocks in the week of Oct 26. The highest valuations in column “∆% Trough to 10/26/12” are by US equities indexes: DJIA 35.3 percent and S&P 500 38.1 percent, driven by stronger earnings and economy in the US than in other advanced economies but with doubts on the relation of business revenue to the weakening economy and fractured job market. The DJIA reached 13,703.53 on Oct 5, 2012, which is the highest level in 52 weeks (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). The carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in risk financial assets had proved strongest for commodity exposures but US equities have regained leadership. Before the current round of risk aversion, almost all assets in the column “∆% Trough to 10/26/12” had double digit gains relative to the trough around Jul 2, 2010 but now some valuations of equity indexes show varying increases: China’s Shanghai Composite is 13.3 percent below the trough; Japan’s Nikkei Average is 1.9 percent above the trough; DJ Asia Pacific TSM is 8.3 percent above the trough; Dow Global is 12.5 percent above the trough; STOXX 50 of 50 blue-chip European equities (http://www.stoxx.com/indices/index_information.html?symbol=sx5E) is 10.3 percent above the trough; and NYSE Financial is 13.2 percent above the trough. DJ UBS Commodities is 15.3 percent above the trough. DAX index of German equities (http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/DAX:IND) is 27.5 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 1.9 percent above the trough on Aug 31, 2010 and 21.1 percent below the peak on Apr 5, 2010. The Nikkei Average closed at 8993.06 on Fri Oct 26, 2012 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata), which is 12.3 percent lower than 10,254.43 on Mar 11, 2011, on the date of the Tōhoku or Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami. Global risk aversion erased the earlier gains of the Nikkei. The dollar depreciated by 8.6 percent relative to the euro and even higher before the new bout of sovereign risk issues in Europe. The column “∆% week to 10/26/12” in Table VI-4 shows that there were decreases of valuations of risk financial assets in the week of Oct 26, 2012 such as 2.2 percent for Dow Global, 1.7 percent for NYSE Financial, 1.5 percent for STOXX 50, 2.0 percent for DAX and 1.5 percent for DJ Asia Pacific TSM. Nikkei Average decreased 0.1 percent in the week. DJ UBS Commodities decreased 2.3 percent. China’s Shanghai Composite decreased 2.9 percent in the week of Oct 26, 2012. The DJIA decreased 1.8 percent and S&P 500 decreased 1.5 percent. The USD appreciated 0.6 percent. There are still high uncertainties on European sovereign risks and banking soundness, US and world growth slowdown and China’s growth tradeoffs. Sovereign problems in the “periphery” of Europe and fears of slower growth in Asia and the US cause risk aversion with trading caution instead of more aggressive risk exposures. There is a fundamental change in Table VI-4 from the relatively upward trend with oscillations since the sovereign risk event of Apr-Jul 2010. Performance is best assessed in the column “∆% Peak to 10/26/12” that provides the percentage change from the peak in Apr 2010 before the sovereign risk event to Oct 19, 2012. Most risk financial assets had gained not only relative to the trough as shown in column “∆% Trough to 10/26/12” but also relative to the peak in column “∆% Peak to 10/26/12.” There are now only three equity indexes above the peak in Table VI-4: DJIA 17.0 percent, S&P 500 16.0 percent and DAX 14.2 percent. There are several indexes below the peak: NYSE Financial Index (http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/nykid.shtml) by 9.8 percent, Nikkei Average by 21.1 percent, Shanghai Composite by 34.7 percent, DJ Asia Pacific by 5.1 percent, STOXX 50 by 6.6 percent and Dow Global by 8.2 percent. DJ UBS Commodities Index is now 1.4 percent below the peak. The US dollar strengthened 14.2 percent relative to the peak. The factors of risk aversion have adversely affected the performance of risk financial assets. The performance relative to the peak in Apr 2010 is more important than the performance relative to the trough around early Jul 2010 because improvement could signal that conditions have returned to normal levels before European sovereign doubts in Apr 2010. Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. It may be quite painful to exit QE∞ or use of the balance sheet of the central together with zero interest rates forever. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:
Where Rτ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; Cτ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or
![clip_image004[1]](http://lh5.ggpht.com/-fp9oDRFwsC0/UI31keEOgOI/AAAAAAAAMcA/tViP1qV2iuw/s1600-h/clip_image004%25255B1%25255D%25255B2%25255D.gif "clip_image004[1]"){kind=small}
declines. Equally, decline in expected revenue from the stock or project, Rτ, causes decline in valuation. An intriguing issue is the difference in performance of valuations of risk financial assets and economic growth and employment. Paul A. Samuelson (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1970/samuelson-bio.html) popularized the view of the elusive relation between stock markets and economic activity in an often-quoted phrase “the stock market has predicted nine of the last five recessions.” In the presence of zero interest rates forever, valuations of risk financial assets are likely to differ from the performance of the overall economy. The interrelations of financial and economic variables prove difficult to analyze and measure.
Table VI-4, Stock Indexes, Commodities, Dollar and 10-Year Treasury
| Peak | Trough | ∆% to Trough | ∆% Peak to 10/26/ /12 | ∆% Week 10/26/12 | ∆% Trough to 10/26/ 12 | |
| DJIA | 4/26/ | 7/2/10 | -13.6 | 17.0 | -1.8 | 35.3 |
| S&P 500 | 4/23/ | 7/20/ | -16.0 | 16.0 | -1.5 | 38.1 |
| NYSE Finance | 4/15/ | 7/2/10 | -20.3 | -9.8 | -1.7 | 13.2 |
| Dow Global | 4/15/ | 7/2/10 | -18.4 | -8.2 | -2.2 | 12.5 |
| Asia Pacific | 4/15/ | 7/2/10 | -12.5 | -5.1 | -1.5 | 8.3 |
| Japan Nikkei Aver. | 4/05/ | 8/31/ | -22.5 | -21.1 | -0.1 | 1.9 |
| China Shang. | 4/15/ | 7/02 | -24.7 | -34.7 | -2.9 | -13.3 |
| STOXX 50 | 4/15/10 | 7/2/10 | -15.3 | -6.6 | -1.5 | 10.3 |
| DAX | 4/26/ | 5/25/ | -10.5 | 14.2 | -2.0 | 27.5 |
| Dollar | 11/25 2009 | 6/7 | 21.2 | 14.5 | 0.6 | -8.6 |
| DJ UBS Comm. | 1/6/ | 7/2/10 | -14.5 | -1.4 | -2.3 | 15.3 |
| 10-Year T Note | 4/5/ | 4/6/10 | 3.986 | 1.748 |
T: trough; Dollar: positive sign appreciation relative to euro (less dollars paid per euro), negative sign depreciation relative to euro (more dollars paid per euro)
Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata
Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. Table VI-5 shows a gain by Apr 29, 2011 in the DJIA of 14.3 percent and of the S&P 500 of 12.5 percent since Apr 26, 2010, around the time when sovereign risk issues in Europe began to be acknowledged in financial risk asset valuations. The last row of Table VI-5 for Oct 26, 2012, shows that the S&P 500 is now 16.5 percent above the Apr 26, 2010 level and the DJIA is 17.0 percent above the level on Apr 26, 2010. Multiple rounds of risk aversion eroded earlier gains, showing that risk aversion can destroy market value even with zero interest rates. Relaxed risk aversion has contributed to recovery of valuations. Much the same as zero interest rates and quantitative easing have not had any effects in recovering economic activity while distorting financial markets and resource allocation.
Table VI-5, Percentage Changes of DJIA and S&P 500 in Selected Dates
| 2010 | ∆% DJIA from prior date | ∆% DJIA from | ∆% S&P 500 from prior date | ∆% S&P 500 from |
| Apr 26 | ||||
| May 6 | -6.1 | -6.1 | -6.9 | -6.9 |
| May 26 | -5.2 | -10.9 | -5.4 | -11.9 |
| Jun 8 | -1.2 | -11.3 | 2.1 | -12.4 |
| Jul 2 | -2.6 | -13.6 | -3.8 | -15.7 |
| Aug 9 | 10.5 | -4.3 | 10.3 | -7.0 |
| Aug 31 | -6.4 | -10.6 | -6.9 | -13.4 |
| Nov 5 | 14.2 | 2.1 | 16.8 | 1.0 |
| Nov 30 | -3.8 | -3.8 | -3.7 | -2.6 |
| Dec 17 | 4.4 | 2.5 | 5.3 | 2.6 |
| Dec 23 | 0.7 | 3.3 | 1.0 | 3.7 |
| Dec 31 | 0.03 | 3.3 | 0.07 | 3.8 |
| Jan 7 | 0.8 | 4.2 | 1.1 | 4.9 |
| Jan 14 | 0.9 | 5.2 | 1.7 | 6.7 |
| Jan 21 | 0.7 | 5.9 | -0.8 | 5.9 |
| Jan 28 | -0.4 | 5.5 | -0.5 | 5.3 |
| Feb 4 | 2.3 | 7.9 | 2.7 | 8.1 |
| Feb 11 | 1.5 | 9.5 | 1.4 | 9.7 |
| Feb 18 | 0.9 | 10.6 | 1.0 | 10.8 |
| Feb 25 | -2.1 | 8.3 | -1.7 | 8.9 |
| Mar 4 | 0.3 | 8.6 | 0.1 | 9.0 |
| Mar 11 | -1.0 | 7.5 | -1.3 | 7.6 |
| Mar 18 | -1.5 | 5.8 | -1.9 | 5.5 |
| Mar 25 | 3.1 | 9.1 | 2.7 | 8.4 |
| Apr 1 | 1.3 | 10.5 | 1.4 | 9.9 |
| Apr 8 | 0.03 | 10.5 | -0.3 | 9.6 |
| Apr 15 | -0.3 | 10.1 | -0.6 | 8.9 |
| Apr 22 | 1.3 | 11.6 | 1.3 | 10.3 |
| Apr 29 | 2.4 | 14.3 | 1.9 | 12.5 |
| May 6 | -1.3 | 12.8 | -1.7 | 10.6 |
| May 13 | -0.3 | 12.4 | -0.2 | 10.4 |
| May 20 | -0.7 | 11.7 | -0.3 | 10.0 |
| May 27 | -0.6 | 11.0 | -0.2 | 9.8 |
| Jun 3 | -2.3 | 8.4 | -2.3 | 7.3 |
| Jun 10 | -1.6 | 6.7 | -2.2 | 4.9 |
| Jun 17 | 0.4 | 7.1 | 0.04 | 4.9 |
| Jun 24 | -0.6 | 6.5 | -0.2 | 4.6 |
| Jul 1 | 5.4 | 12.3 | 5.6 | 10.5 |
| Jul 8 | 0.6 | 12.9 | 0.3 | 10.9 |
| Jul 15 | -1.4 | 11.4 | -2.1 | 8.6 |
| Jul 22 | 1.6 | 13.2 | 2.2 | 10.9 |
| Jul 29 | -4.2 | 8.4 | -3.9 | 6.6 |
| Aug 05 | -5.8 | 2.1 | -7.2 | -1.0 |
| Aug 12 | -1.5 | 0.6 | -1.7 | -2.7 |
| Aug 19 | -4.0 | -3.5 | -4.7 | -7.3 |
| Aug 26 | 4.3 | 0.7 | 4.7 | -2.9 |
| Sep 02 | -0.4 | 0.3 | -0.2 | -3.1 |
| Sep 09 | -2.2 | -1.9 | -1.7 | -4.8 |
| Sep 16 | 4.7 | 2.7 | 5.4 | 0.3 |
| Sep 23 | -6.4 | -3.9 | -6.5 | -6.2 |
| Sep 30 | 1.3 | -2.6 | -0.4 | -6.7 |
| Oct 7 | 1.7 | -0.9 | 2.1 | -4.7 |
| Oct 14 | 4.9 | 3.9 | 5.9 | 1.0 |
| Oct 21 | 1.4 | 5.4 | 1.1 | 2.2 |
| Oct 28 | 3.6 | 9.2 | 3.8 | 6.0 |
| Nov 04 | -2.0 | 6.9 | -2.5 | 3.4 |
| Nov 11 | 1.4 | 8.5 | 0.8 | 4.3 |
| Nov 18 | -2.9 | 5.3 | -3.8 | 0.3 |
| Nov 25 | -4.8 | 0.2 | -4.7 | -4.4 |
| Dec 02 | 7.0 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 2.7 |
| Dec 09 | 1.4 | 8.7 | 0.9 | 3.6 |
| Dec 16 | -2.6 | 5.9 | -2.8 | 0.6 |
| Dec 23 | 3.6 | 9.7 | 3.7 | 4.4 |
| Dec 30 | -0.6 | 9.0 | -0.6 | 3.8 |
| Jan 6 2012 | 1.2 | 10.3 | 1.6 | 5.4 |
| Jan 13 | 0.5 | 10.9 | 0.9 | 6.4 |
| Jan 20 | 2.4 | 13.5 | 2.0 | 8.5 |
| Jan 27 | -0.5 | 13.0 | 0.1 | 8.6 |
| Feb 3 | 1.6 | 14.8 | 2.2 | 11.0 |
| Feb 10 | -0.5 | 14.2 | -0.2 | 10.8 |
| Feb 17 | 1.2 | 15.6 | 1.4 | 12.3 |
| Feb 24 | 0.3 | 15.9 | 0.3 | 12.7 |
| Mar 2 | 0.0 | 15.8 | 0.3 | 13.0 |
| Mar 9 | -0.4 | 15.3 | 0.1 | 13.1 |
| Mar 16 | 2.4 | 18.1 | 2.4 | 15.9 |
| Mar 23 | -1.1 | 16.7 | -0.5 | 15.3 |
| Mar 30 | 1.0 | 17.9 | 0.8 | 16.2 |
| Apr 6 | -1.1 | 16.6 | -0.7 | 15.3 |
| Apr 13 | -1.6 | 14.7 | -2.0 | 13.1 |
| Apr 20 | 1.4 | 16.3 | 0.6 | 13.7 |
| Apr 27 | 1.5 | 18.1 | 1.8 | 15.8 |
| May 4 | -1.4 | 16.4 | -2.3 | 12.9 |
| May 11 | -1.7 | 14.4 | -1.1 | 11.7 |
| May 18 | -3.5 | 10.4 | -4.3 | 6.4 |
| May 25 | 0.7 | 11.2 | 1.7 | 8.7 |
| Jun 1 | -2.7 | 8.2 | -3.0 | 5.4 |
| Jun 8 | 3.6 | 12.0 | 3.7 | 9.4 |
| Jun 15 | 1.7 | 13.9 | 1.3 | 10.8 |
| Jun 22 | -1.0 | 12.8 | -0.6 | 10.1 |
| Jun 29 | 1.9 | 14.9 | 2.0 | 12.4 |
| Jul 6 | -0.8 | 14.0 | -0.5 | 11.8 |
| Jul 13 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 0.2 | 11.9 |
| Jul 20 | 0.4 | 14.4 | 0.4 | 12.4 |
| Jul 27 | 2.0 | 16.7 | 1.7 | 14.3 |
| Aug 3 | 0.2 | 16.9 | 0.4 | 14.8 |
| Aug 10 | 0.9 | 17.9 | 1.1 | 16.0 |
| Aug 17 | 0.5 | 18.5 | 0.9 | 17.0 |
| Aug 24 | -0.9 | 17.4 | -0.5 | 16.4 |
| Aug 31 | -0.5 | 16.8 | -0.3 | 16.0 |
| Sep 7 | 1.6 | 18.8 | 2.2 | 18.6 |
| Sep 14 | 2.2 | 21.3 | 1.90 | 20.9 |
| Sep 21 | -0.1 | 21.2 | -0.4 | 20.5 |
| Sep 28 | -1.0 | 19.9 | -1.3 | 18.9 |
| Oct 5 | 1.3 | 21.5 | 1.4 | 20.5 |
| Oct 12 | -2.1 | 18.9 | -2.2 | 17.9 |
| Oct 19 | 0.1 | 19.1 | 0.3 | 18.3 |
| Oct 26 | -1.8 | 17.0 | -1.5 | 16.5 |
Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_us_stocks.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3014
Table VI-6, updated with every blog comment, shows that exchange rate valuations affect a large variety of countries, in fact, almost the entire world, in magnitudes that cause major problems for domestic monetary policy and trade flows. Dollar devaluation is expected to continue because of zero fed funds rate, expectations of rising inflation, large budget deficit of the federal government (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703907004576279321350926848.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection) and now zero interest rates indefinitely but with interruptions caused by risk aversion events. Such an event actually occurred in the week of Sep 23, 2011 reversing the devaluation of the dollar in the form of sharp appreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies from all over the world including the offshore Chinese yuan market. Column “Peak” in Table VI-6 shows exchange rates during the crisis year of 2008. There was a flight to safety in dollar-denominated government assets as a result of the arguments in favor of TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). This is evident in various exchange rates that depreciated sharply against the dollar such as the South African rand (ZAR) at the peak of depreciation of ZAR 11.578/USD on Oct 22, 2008, subsequently appreciating to the trough of ZAR 7.238/USD by Aug 15, 2010 but now depreciating by 19.4 percent to ZAR 8.6432/USD on Oct 26, 2012, which is still 25.3 percent stronger than on Oct 22, 2008. An example from Asia is the Singapore Dollar (SGD) highly depreciated at the peak of SGD 1.553/USD on Mar 3, 2009 but subsequently appreciating by 13.2 percent to the trough of SGD 1.348/USD on Aug 9, 2010 but is now only 9.5 percent stronger at SGD 1.2206/USD on Oct 26, 2012 relative to the trough of depreciation but still stronger by 21.4 percent relative to the peak of depreciation on Mar 3, 2009. Another example is the Brazilian real (BRL) that depreciated at the peak to BRL 2.43/USD on Dec 5, 2008 but appreciated 28.5 percent to the trough at BRL 1.737/USD on Apr 30, 2010, showing depreciation of 16.8 percent relative to the trough to BRL 2.0281/USD on Oct 26, 2012 but still stronger by 16.5 percent relative to the peak on Dec 5, 2008. At one point in 2011 the Brazilian real traded at BRL 1.55/USD and in the week of Sep 23 surpassed BRL 1.90/USD in intraday trading for depreciation of more than 20 percent. The Banco Central do Brasil, Brazil’s central bank, lowered its policy rate SELIC for the ninth consecutive meeting (http://www.bcb.gov.br/?INTEREST) of its monetary policy committee, COPOM (http://www.bcb.gov.br/textonoticia.asp?codigo=3675&IDPAI=NEWS):
“Copom reduces the Selic rate to 7.25 percent
10/10/2012 8:07:00 PM
Brasília - The Copom decided to reduce the Selic rate to 7.25 percent.”
The Selic rate has been lowered from 12.50 percent on Jul 20, 2011 to 7.25 percent on Oct 11, 2012 (http://www.bcb.gov.br/?INTEREST). Jeffrey T. Lewis, writing on “Brazil steps up battle to curb real’s rise,” on Mar 1, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203986604577255793224099580.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes new measures by Brazil to prevent further appreciation of its currency, including the extension of the tax on foreign capital for three years terms, subsequently broadened to five years, and intervention in the foreign exchange market by the central bank. Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing creates trends such as the depreciation of the dollar followed by Table VI-6 but with abrupt reversals during risk aversion. The main effects of unconventional monetary policy are on valuations of risk financial assets and not necessarily on consumption and investment or aggregate demand.
Table VI-6, Exchange Rates
| Peak | Trough | ∆% P/T | Oct 26, 2012 | ∆% T Oct 26, 2012 | ∆% P Oct 26, 2012 | |
| EUR USD | 7/15 | 6/7 2010 | 10/26/ 2012 | |||
| Rate | 1.59 | 1.192 | 1.2942 | |||
| ∆% | -33.4 | 7.9 | -22.9 | |||
| JPY USD | 8/18 | 9/15 | 10/26/ 2012 | |||
| Rate | 110.19 | 83.07 | 79.65 | |||
| ∆% | 24.6 | 4.1 | 27.7 | |||
| CHF USD | 11/21 2008 | 12/8 2009 | 10/26/ 2012 | |||
| Rate | 1.225 | 1.025 | 0.9347 | |||
| ∆% | 16.3 | 8.8 | 23.7 | |||
| USD GBP | 7/15 | 1/2/ 2009 | 10/26/ 2012 | |||
| Rate | 2.006 | 1.388 | 1.6104 | |||
| ∆% | -44.5 | 13.8 | -24.6 | |||
| USD AUD | 7/15 2008 | 10/27 2008 | 10/26/ | |||
| Rate | 1.0215 | 1.6639 | 1.0373 | |||
| ∆% | -62.9 | 42.1 | 5.6 | |||
| ZAR USD | 10/22 2008 | 8/15 | 10/26/ 2012 | |||
| Rate | 11.578 | 7.238 | 8.6432 | |||
| ∆% | 37.5 | -19.4 | 25.3 | |||
| SGD USD | 3/3 | 8/9 | 10/26/ | |||
| Rate | 1.553 | 1.348 | 1.2206 | |||
| ∆% | 13.2 | 9.5 | 21.4 | |||
| HKD USD | 8/15 2008 | 12/14 2009 | 10/26/ | |||
| Rate | 7.813 | 7.752 | 7.7504 | |||
| ∆% | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.8 | |||
| BRL USD | 12/5 2008 | 4/30 2010 | 10/26/ 2012 | |||
| Rate | 2.43 | 1.737 | 2.0281 | |||
| ∆% | 28.5 | -16.8 | 16.5 | |||
| CZK USD | 2/13 2009 | 8/6 2010 | 10/26/ | |||
| Rate | 22.19 | 18.693 | 19.269 | |||
| ∆% | 15.7 | -3.1 | 13.2 | |||
| SEK USD | 3/4 2009 | 8/9 2010 | 10/26/ 2012 | |||
| Rate | 9.313 | 7.108 | 6.7005 | |||
| ∆% | 23.7 | 5.7 | 28.1 | |||
| CNY USD | 7/20 2005 | 7/15 | 10/26/ | |||
| Rate | 8.2765 | 6.8211 | 6.2628 | |||
| ∆% | 17.6 | 8.2 | 24.3 |
Symbols: USD: US dollar; EUR: euro; JPY: Japanese yen; CHF: Swiss franc; GBP: UK pound; AUD: Australian dollar; ZAR: South African rand; SGD: Singapore dollar; HKD: Hong Kong dollar; BRL: Brazil real; CZK: Czech koruna; SEK: Swedish krona; CNY: Chinese yuan; P: peak; T: trough
Note: percentages calculated with currencies expressed in units of domestic currency per dollar; negative sign means devaluation and no sign appreciation
Source:
http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_currencies.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000
http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Hist/dat00_ch.htm
There are major ongoing and unresolved realignments of exchange rates in the international financial system as countries and regions seek parities that can optimize their productive structures. Seeking exchange rate parity or exchange rate optimizing internal economic activities is complex in a world of unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and even negative nominal interest rates of government obligations such as yield of 0.11 percent for the two-year government bond of Germany. Regulation, trade and devaluation conflicts should have been expected from a global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez (2007), The Global Recession Risk, Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008a)): “There are significant grounds for concern on the basis of this experience. International economic cooperation and the international financial framework can collapse during extreme events. It is unlikely that there will be a repetition of the disaster of the Great Depression. However, a milder contraction can trigger regulatory, trade and exchange wars” (Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008c), 181). Chart VI-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the key exchange rate of US dollars (USD) per euro (EUR) from Jan 4, 1999 to Oct 19, 2012. US recession dates are in shaded areas. The rate on Jan 4, 1999 was USD 1.1760/EUR, declining to USD 0.8279/EUR on Oct 25, 2000, or appreciation of the USD by 29.9 percent. The rate depreciated 21.9 percent to USD 1.0098/EUR on Jul 22, 2002. There was sharp devaluation of the USD of 34.9 percent to USD 1.3625/EUR on Dec 27, 2004 largely because of the 1 percent interest rate between Jun 2003 and Jun 2004 together with a form of quantitative easing by suspension of auctions of the 30-year Treasury, which was equivalent to withdrawing supply from markets. Another depreciation of 17.5 percent took the rate to USD 1.6010/EUR on Apr 22, 2008, already inside the shaded area of the global recession. The flight to the USD and obligations of the US Treasury appreciated the dollar by 22.3 percent to USD 1.2446/EUR on Oct 27, 2008. In the return of the carry trade after stress tests showed sound US bank balance sheets, the rate depreciated 21.2 percent to USD 1.5085/EUR on Nov 25, 2009. The sovereign debt crisis of Europe in the spring of 2010 caused sharp appreciation of 20.7 percent to USD 1.1959/EUR on Jun 6, 2010. Renewed risk appetite depreciated the rate 24.4 percent to USD 1.4875/EUR on May 3, 2011. The rate appreciated 12.5 percent to USD 1.3022/EUR on Oct 19, 2012, which is the last point in Chart VI-2. The data in Table VI-6 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).
Chart VI-2, US Dollars (USD) per Euro (EUR), Jan 4, 1999 to Oct 19, 2012
Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H10
Chart VI-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides indexes of the dollar from 2010 to 2012. The dollar depreciates during episodes of risk appetite but appreciate during risk aversion as funds seek dollar-denominated assets in avoiding financial risk.
Chart VI-3, US Dollar Currency Indexes
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Chart VI-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the exchange rate of the US relative to the euro, or USD/EUR. During maintenance of the policy of zero fed funds rates the dollar appreciates during periods of significant risk aversion such as the flight into US government obligations in late 2008 and early 2009 and during the various fears generated by the European sovereign debt crisis.
Chart VI-4, US Dollars per Euro, 2009-2012
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Chart VI-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate of Japanese yen (JPY) per US dollar (USD) from Jan 1971 to Oct 2012. The first data point on the extreme left is JPY 358.0200/USD for Jan 1971. The JPY has appreciated over the long term relative to the USD with fluctuations along an evident long-term appreciation. Before the global recession, the JPY stood at JPY 124.0900/USD on Jun 22, 2007. The use of the JPY as safe haven is evident by sharp appreciation during the global recession to JPY 110.48/USD on Aug 15, 2008, and to JPY 87.8000/USD on Jan 21, 2009. The final data point in Chart VI-5 is JPY 78.5600/USD in Oct 2012 for appreciation of 36.7 percent relative to JPY 124.0900/USD on Jun 22, 2007 before the global recession and expansion characterized by recurring bouts of risk aversion. The data in Table VI-6 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).
Chart VI-5, Japanese Yen JPY per US Dollars USD, Monthly, Jan 1971-Oct 2012
Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H10
The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html
Zero interest rates in the United States forever tend to depreciate the dollar against every other currency if there is no risk aversion preventing portfolio rebalancing toward risk financial assets, which include the capital markets and exchange rates of emerging-market economies. The objective of unconventional monetary policy as argued by Yellen 2011AS) is to devalue the dollar to increase net exports that increase US economic growth. Increasing net exports and internal economic activity in the US is equivalent to decreasing net exports and internal economic activity in other countries.
Continental territory, rich endowment of natural resources, investment in human capital, teaching and research universities, motivated labor force and entrepreneurial initiative provide Brazil with comparative advantages in multiple economic opportunities. Exchange rate parity is critical in achieving Brazil’s potential but is difficult in a world of zero interest rates. Chart IV-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate of Brazilian real (BRL) per US dollar (USD) from BRL 1.2074/USD on Jan 4, 1999 to BRL 2.0273/USD on Oct 5, 2012. The rate reached BRL 3.9450/USD on Oct 10, 2002 appreciating 60.5 percent to BRL 1.5580/USD on Aug 1, 2008. The rate depreciated 68.1 percent to BRL 2.6187/USD on Dec 5, 2008 during worldwide flight from risk. The rate appreciated again by 41.3 percent to BRL 1.5375/USD on Jul 26, 2011. The final data point in Chart VI-6 is BRL 2.0269/USD on Oct 19, 2012 for depreciation of 31.8 percent. The data in Table VI-6 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).
Chart VI-6, Brazilian Real (BRL) per US Dollar (USD) Jan 4, 1999 to Oct 19, 2012
Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H10
Chart VI-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the history of the BRL beginning with the first data point of BRL 0.8440/USD on Jan 2, 1995. The rate jumped to BRL 2.0700/USD on Jan 29, 1999 after changes in exchange rate policy and then to BRL 2.2000/USD on Mar 3, 1999. The rate depreciated 26.7 percent to BRL 2.7880/USD on Sep 21, 2001 relative to Mar 3, 1999.
Chart VI-7, Brazilian Real (BRL) per US Dollar (USD), Jan 2, 1995 to Oct 19, 2012
Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H10
Table VI-7, updated with every blog comment, provides in the second column the yield at the close of market of the 10-year Treasury note on the date in the first column. The price in the third column is calculated with the coupon of 2.625 percent of the 10-year note current at the time of the second round of quantitative easing after Nov 3, 2010 and the final column “∆% 11/04/10” calculates the percentage change of the price on the date relative to that of 101.2573 at the close of market on Nov 4, 2010, one day after the decision on quantitative easing by the Fed on Nov 3, 2010. Prices with new coupons such as 2.0 percent in recent auctions (http://www.treasurydirect.gov/RI/OFAuctions?form=extended&cusip=912828RR3) are not comparable to prices in Table VI-7. The highest yield in the decade was 5.510 percent on May 1, 2001 that would result in a loss of principal of 22.9 percent relative to the price on Nov 4. Monetary policy has created a “duration trap” of bond prices. Duration is the percentage change in bond price resulting from a percentage change in yield or what economists call the yield elasticity of bond price. Duration is higher the lower the bond coupon and yield, all other things constant. This means that the price loss in a yield rise from low coupons and yields is much higher than with high coupons and yields. Intuitively, the higher coupon payments offset part of the price loss. Prices/yields of Treasury securities were affected by the combination of Fed purchases for its program of quantitative easing and also by the flight to dollar-denominated assets because of geopolitical risks in the Middle East, subsequently by the tragic Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and now again by the sovereign risk doubts in Europe and the growth recession in the US and the world. The yield of 1.748 percent at the close of market on Fri Oct 26, 2012 would be equivalent to price of 108.0143 in a hypothetical bond maturing in 10 years with coupon of 2.625 percent for price gain of 6.7 percent relative to the price on Nov 4, 2010, one day after the decision on the second program of quantitative easing, as shown in the last row of Table VI-7. The price loss between Sep 7, 2012 and Sep 14, 2012 would have been 1.7 percent in just five trading days. The price loss between Jun 1, 2012 and Jun 8, 2012 would have been 1.6 percent, in just a week, and much higher with leverage of 10:1 as typical in Treasury positions. The price loss between Mar 9, 2012 and Mar 16, 2012 is 2.3 percent but much higher when using common leverage of 10:1. These losses defy annualizing. If inflation accelerates, yields of Treasury securities may rise sharply. Yields are not observed without special yield-lowering effects such as the flight into dollars caused by the events in the Middle East, continuing purchases of Treasury securities by the Fed, the tragic Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 affecting Japan, recurring fears on European sovereign credit issues and worldwide risk aversion in the week of Sep 30 caused by “let’s twist again” monetary policy. The realization of a growth standstill recession is also influencing yields. Important causes of the earlier rise in yields shown in Table VI-7 are expectations of rising inflation and US government debt estimated to be around 72.8 percent of GDP in 2012 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/united-states-gdp-growth-standstill.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/policy-inflation-growth-unemployment.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/budget-quagmire-fed-commodities_10.html), rising from 40.5 percent of GDP in 2008, 54.1 percent in 2009 (Table IV-1 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and Table 2 in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/budget-quagmire-fed-commodities_10.html) and 67.7 percent in 2011 (see Table IB-2 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html). On Oct 24, 2012, the line “Reserve Bank credit” in the Fed balance sheet stood at $2823 billion, or $2.8 trillion, with portfolio of long-term securities of $2587 billion, or $2.6 trillion, consisting of $1564 billion Treasury nominal notes and bonds, $72 billion of notes and bonds inflation-indexed, $83 billion Federal agency debt securities and $868 billion mortgage-backed securities; reserve balances deposited with Federal Reserve Banks reached $1433 billion or $1.5 trillion (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). There is no simple exit of this trap created by the highest monetary policy accommodation in US history together with the highest deficits and debt in percent of GDP since World War II. Risk aversion from various sources, discussed in section III World Financial Turbulence, has been affecting financial markets for several months. The risk is that in a reversal of risk aversion that has been typical in this cyclical expansion of the economy yields of Treasury securities may back up sharply.
Table VI-7, Yield, Price and Percentage Change to November 4, 2010 of Ten-Year Treasury Note
| Date | Yield | Price | ∆% 11/04/10 |
| 05/01/01 | 5.510 | 78.0582 | -22.9 |
| 06/10/03 | 3.112 | 95.8452 | -5.3 |
| 06/12/07 | 5.297 | 79.4747 | -21.5 |
| 12/19/08 | 2.213 | 104.4981 | 3.2 |
| 12/31/08 | 2.240 | 103.4295 | 2.1 |
| 03/19/09 | 2.605 | 100.1748 | -1.1 |
| 06/09/09 | 3.862 | 89.8257 | -11.3 |
| 10/07/09 | 3.182 | 95.2643 | -5.9 |
| 11/27/09 | 3.197 | 95.1403 | -6.0 |
| 12/31/09 | 3.835 | 90.0347 | -11.1 |
| 02/09/10 | 3.646 | 91.5239 | -9.6 |
| 03/04/10 | 3.605 | 91.8384 | -9.3 |
| 04/05/10 | 3.986 | 88.8726 | -12.2 |
| 08/31/10 | 2.473 | 101.3338 | 0.08 |
| 10/07/10 | 2.385 | 102.1224 | 0.8 |
| 10/28/10 | 2.658 | 99.7119 | -1.5 |
| 11/04/10 | 2.481 | 101.2573 | - |
| 11/15/10 | 2.964 | 97.0867 | -4.1 |
| 11/26/10 | 2.869 | 97.8932 | -3.3 |
| 12/03/10 | 3.007 | 96.7241 | -4.5 |
| 12/10/10 | 3.324 | 94.0982 | -7.1 |
| 12/15/10 | 3.517 | 92.5427 | -8.6 |
| 12/17/10 | 3.338 | 93.9842 | -7.2 |
| 12/23/10 | 3.397 | 93.5051 | -7.7 |
| 12/31/10 | 3.228 | 94.3923 | -6.7 |
| 01/07/11 | 3.322 | 94.1146 | -7.1 |
| 01/14/11 | 3.323 | 94.1064 | -7.1 |
| 01/21/11 | 3.414 | 93.4687 | -7.7 |
| 01/28/11 | 3.323 | 94.1064 | -7.1 |
| 02/04/11 | 3.640 | 91.750 | -9.4 |
| 02/11/11 | 3.643 | 91.5319 | -9.6 |
| 02/18/11 | 3.582 | 92.0157 | -9.1 |
| 02/25/11 | 3.414 | 93.3676 | -7.8 |
| 03/04/11 | 3.494 | 92.7235 | -8.4 |
| 03/11/11 | 3.401 | 93.4727 | -7.7 |
| 03/18/11 | 3.273 | 94.5115 | -6.7 |
| 03/25/11 | 3.435 | 93.1935 | -7.9 |
| 04/01/11 | 3.445 | 93.1129 | -8.0 |
| 04/08/11 | 3.576 | 92.0635 | -9.1 |
| 04/15/11 | 3.411 | 93.3874 | -7.8 |
| 04/22/11 | 3.402 | 93.4646 | -7.7 |
| 04/29/11 | 3.290 | 94.3759 | -6.8 |
| 05/06/11 | 3.147 | 95.5542 | -5.6 |
| 05/13/11 | 3.173 | 95.3387 | -5.8 |
| 05/20/11 | 3.146 | 95.5625 | -5.6 |
| 05/27/11 | 3.068 | 96.2089 | -4.9 |
| 06/03/11 | 2.990 | 96.8672 | -4.3 |
| 06/10/11 | 2.973 | 97.0106 | -4.2 |
| 06/17/11 | 2.937 | 97.3134 | -3.9 |
| 06/24/11 | 2.872 | 97.8662 | -3.3 |
| 07/01/11 | 3.186 | 95.2281 | -5.9 |
| 07/08/11 | 3.022 | 96.5957 | -4.6 |
| 07/15/11 | 2.905 | 97.5851 | -3.6 |
| 07/22/11 | 2.964 | 97.0847 | -4.1 |
| 07/29/11 | 2.795 | 98.5258 | -2.7 |
| 08/05/11 | 2.566 | 100.5175 | -0.7 |
| 08/12/11 | 2.249 | 103.3504 | 2.1 |
| 08/19/11 | 2.066 | 105.270 | 3.7 |
| 08/26/11 | 2.202 | 103.7781 | 2.5 |
| 09/02/11 | 1.992 | 105.7137 | 4.4 |
| 09/09/11 | 1.918 | 106.4055 | 5.1 |
| 09/16/11 | 2.053 | 101.5434 | 0.3 |
| 09/23/11 | 1.826 | 107.2727 | 5.9 |
| 09/30/11 | 1.912 | 106.4602 | 5.1 |
| 10/07/11 | 2.078 | 104.9161 | 3.6 |
| 10/14/11 | 2.251 | 103.3323 | 2.0 |
| 10/21/11 | 2.220 | 103.6141 | 2.3 |
| 10/28/11 | 2.326 | 102.6540 | 1.4 |
| 11/04/11 | 2.066 | 105.0270 | 3.7 |
| 11/11/11 | 2.057 | 105.1103 | 3.8 |
| 11/18/11 | 2.003 | 105.6113 | 4.3 |
| 11/25/11 | 1.964 | 105.9749 | 4.7 |
| 12/02/11 | 2.042 | 105.2492 | 3.9 |
| 12/09/11 | 2.065 | 105.0363 | 3.7 |
| 12/16/11 | 1.847 | 107.0741 | 5.7 |
| 12/23/11 | 2.027 | 105.3883 | 4.1 |
| 12/30/11 | 1.871 | 106.8476 | 5.5 |
| 01/06/12 | 1.957 | 106.0403 | 4.7 |
| 01/13/12 | 1.869 | 106.8664 | 5.5 |
| 01/20/12 | 2.026 | 105.3976 | 4.1 |
| 01/27/12 | 1.893 | 106.6404 | 5.3 |
| 02/03/12 | 1.923 | 106.3586 | 5.0 |
| 02/10/12 | 1.974 | 105.8815 | 4.6 |
| 02/17/12 | 2.000 | 105.6392 | 4.3 |
| 02/24/12 | 1.977 | 105.8535 | 4.5 |
| 03/02/12 | 1.977 | 105.8535 | 4.5 |
| 03/09/12 | 2.031 | 105.3512 | 4.0 |
| 03/16/12 | 2.294 | 102.9428 | 1.7 |
| 03/23/12 | 2.234 | 103.4867 | 2.2 |
| 03/30/12 | 2.214 | 103.6687 | 2.4 |
| 04/06/12 | 2.058 | 105.1010 | 3.8 |
| 04/13/12 | 1.987 | 105.7603 | 4.4 |
| 04/20/12 | 1.959 | 106.0216 | 4.7 |
| 04/27/12 | 1.931 | 106.2836 | 5.0 |
| 05/04/12 | 1.876 | 106.8004 | 5.5 |
| 05/11/12 | 1.845 | 107.0930 | 5.8 |
| 05/18/12 | 1.714 | 108.3393 | 7.0 |
| 05/25/12 | 1.738 | 108.1098 | 6.8 |
| 06/01/12 | 1.454 | 110.8618 | 9.5 |
| 06/08/12 | 1.635 | 109.0989 | 7.7 |
| 06/15/12 | 1.584 | 109.5924 | 8.2 |
| 06/22/12 | 1.676 | 108.7039 | 7.4 |
| 06/29/12 | 1.648 | 108.9734 | 7.6 |
| 07/06/12 | 1.548 | 109.9423 | 8.6 |
| 07/13/12 | 1.49 | 110.5086 | 9.1 |
| 07/20/12 | 1.459 | 110.8127 | 9.4 |
| 07/27/12 | 1.544 | 109.9812 | 8.6 |
| 08/03/12 | 1.569 | 109.7380 | 8.4 |
| 08/10/12 | 1.658 | 108.8771 | 7.5 |
| 08/17/12 | 1.814 | 107.3864 | 6.1 |
| 08/24/12 | 1.684 | 108.6270 | 7.3 |
| 08/31/12 | 1.543 | 109.9910 | 8.6 |
| 9/7/12 | 1.668 | 108.7808 | 7.4 |
| 9/14/12 | 1.863 | 106.9230 | 5.6 |
| 9/21/12 | 1.753 | 107.9666 | 6.6 |
| 9/28/12 | 1.631 | 109.1375 | 7.8 |
| 10/05/12 | 1.737 | 108.1193 | 6.8 |
| 10/12/12 | 1.663 | 108.8290 | 7.5 |
| 10/19/12 | 1.766 | 107.8426 | 6.5 |
| 10/26/12 | 1.748 | 108.0143 | 6.7 |
Note: price is calculated for an artificial 10-year note paying semi-annual coupon and maturing in ten years using the actual yields traded on the dates and the coupon of 2.625% on 11/04/10
Source:
http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_bonds.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000
Table VI-7A provides the maturity distribution and average length in months of marketable interest-bearing debt held by private investors from 2007 to Jun 2012. Total debt increased from $3635 billion in 2007 to $8793 billion in Jun 2012 or increase by 141.9 percent. There are two concerns with the maturity distribution of US debt. (1) Growth of debt is moving total debt to the point of saturation in investors’ portfolio. In a new environment of risk appetite and nonzero fed funds rates with economic growth at historical trend of around 3 percent, yields on risk financial assets are likely to increase. Placement of new debt may require increasing interest rates in an environment of continuing placement of debt by the US Treasury without strong fiscal constraints. (2) Refinancing of maturing debt is likely to occur in an environment of higher interest rates, exerting pressure on future fiscal budgets. In Jun 2012, $2808 billion or 31.9 percent of outstanding debt held by investors matures in less than a year and $3668 billion or 41.7 percent of total debt matures in one to five years. Debt maturing in five years or less adds to $6476 billion or 73.7 percent of total outstanding debt held by investors of $8793 billion. This historical episode may be remembered as one in which the US managed its government debt with short-dated instruments during record low long-dated yields and on the verge of fiscal pressures on all interest rates, which kind of maximizes over time interest payments on government debt by taxpayers that is precisely the opposite of the objective of sound debt management and taxpayer welfare.
Table VI-7A, Maturity Distribution and Average Length in Months of Marketable Interest-Bearing Public Debt Held by Private Investors, Billions of Dollars
| End of Fiscal Year or Month | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Jun 2012 |
| Total* | 3635 | 4745 | 6229 | 7676 | 7951 | 8793 |
| <1 Year | 1176 | 2042 | 2605 | 2480 | 2504 | 2808 |
| 1-5 Years | 1310 | 1468 | 2075 | 2956 | 3085 | 3668 |
| 5-10 Years | 678 | 719 | 995 | 1529 | 1544 | 1502 |
| 10-20 Years | 292 | 352 | 351 | 341 | 309 | 285 |
| >20 Years | 178 | 163 | 204 | 371 | 510 | 529 |
| Average | 58 | 49 | 49 | 57 | 60 | 56 |
*Amount Outstanding Privately Held
Source: United States Treasury. 2012Sep. Treasury Bulletin. Washington, DC, Sep 2012.
https://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html
Chart VI-8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the yield of the ten-year constant maturity Treasury from Jan 3, 1977 to Oct 25, 2012. The yield stood at 7.67 percent on Feb 16, 1977. A peak was reached at 15.21 percent on Oct 26, 1981 during the inflation control effort by the Fed. There is a second local peak in Chart VI-8 on May 3, 1984 at 13.94 percent followed by another local peak at 8.14 percent on Nov 21, 1994 during another inflation control effort (see Appendix I The Great Inflation). There was sharp reduction of the yields from 5.44 percent on Apr 1, 2002 until they reached a low point of 3.13 percent on Jun 13, 2003. Yields rose again to 4.89 percent on Jun 14, 2004 and 5.23 percent on Jul 5, 2006. Yields declined sharply during the financial crisis, reaching 2.08 percent on Dec 18, 2008, lowered by higher prices originating in sharply increasing demand in the flight to the US dollar and obligations of the US government. Yields rose again to 4.01 percent on Apr 5, 2010 but collapsed to 2.41 percent on Oct 8, 2010 because of higher demand originating in the flight from the European sovereign risk event. During higher risk appetite, yields rose to 3.75 percent on Feb 8, 2011 and collapsed to 1.86 percent on Oct 25, 2012, which is the last data point in Chart VI-8. There has been a trend of decline of yields with oscillations. During periods of risk aversion investors seek protection in obligations of the US government, causing decline in their yields. In an eventual resolution of international financial risks with higher economic growth there could be the trauma of rising yields with significant capital losses in portfolios of government securities. The data in Table VI-7 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).
Chart VI-8, US, Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yield, Jan 3, 1977 to Oct 25, 2012
Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/
Chart VI-9 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides securities held outright by Federal Reserve banks from 2002 to 2012. The first data point in Chart VI-9 is the level for Dec 18, 2002 of $629,407 million and the final data point in Chart VI-9 is level of $2,597,339 million on Oct 24, 2012.
Chart VI-9, US, Securities Held Outright by Federal Reserve Banks, Wednesday Level, Dec 18, 2002 to Oct 24, 2012, USD Millions
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_fedsbalancesheet.htm
VII Economic Indicators. Crude oil input in refineries increased 0.3 percent to 14,804 thousand barrels per day on average in the four weeks ending on Oct 19, 2012 from 14,760 thousand barrels per day in the four weeks ending on Oct 12, 2012, as shown in Table VII-1. The rate of capacity utilization in refineries continues at a relatively high level of 87.4 percent on Oct 19, 2012, which is higher than 85.0 percent on Oct 21, 2011 and equal to 87.4 percent on Oct 12, 2012. Imports of crude oil increased 3.8 percent from 8,026 thousand barrels per day on average in the four weeks ending on Oct 12 to 8,333 thousand barrels per day in the week of Oct 19. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) informs that “US crude oil imports averaged 8.8 million barrels per day last week, up by 476 thousand barrels per day from the previous week [Oct 12]” (http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/weekly_petroleum_status_report/current/pdf/highlights.pdf). Decreasing utilization in refineries with increasing imports at the margin in the prior week resulted in increase of commercial crude oil stocks by 5.9 million barrels from 369.2 million barrels on Oct 12 to 375.1 million barrels on Oct 19. Motor gasoline production increased 0.2 percent to 8,945 thousand barrels per day in the week of Oct 19 from 8,930 thousand barrels per day on average in the week of Oct 12. Gasoline stocks increased 1.5 million barrels and stocks of fuel oil decreased 0.7 million barrels. Supply of gasoline decreased from 8,767 thousand barrels per day on Oct 21, 2011, to 8,611 thousand barrels per day on Oct 19, 2012, or by 1.8 percent, while fuel oil supply decreased 7.7 percent. Part of the fall in consumption of gasoline is due to high prices and part to the growth recession. WTI crude oil price traded at $90.00/barrel on Oct 19, 2012, increasing 3.2 percent relative to $87.19/barrel on Oct 21, 2011. Gasoline prices increased 6.5 percent from Oct 24, 2011 to Oct 22, 2012. Increases in prices of crude oil and gasoline relative to a year earlier are moderating because year earlier prices are already reflecting the commodity price surge and commodity prices have been declining recently during worldwide risk aversion. Gasoline prices had been increasing to the highest levels at this time of the year.
Table VII-1, US, Energy Information Administration Weekly Petroleum Status Report
| Four Weeks Ending Thousand Barrels/Day | 10/19/12 | 10/12/12 | 10/21/11 |
| Crude Oil Refineries Input | 14,804 Week ∆%: 0.3 | 14,760 | 14,678 |
| Refinery Capacity Utilization % | 87.4 | 87.4 | 85.0 |
| Motor Gasoline Production | 8,945 Week ∆%: 0.2 | 8,930 | 9,112 |
| Distillate Fuel Oil Production | 4,449 Week ∆%: -1.3% | 4,506 | 4,666 |
| Crude Oil Imports | 8,333 Week ∆%: +3.8 | 8,026 | 8,734 |
| Motor Gasoline Supplied | 8,611 ∆% 2012/2011= -1.8% | 8,680 | 8,767 |
| Distillate Fuel Oil Supplied | 3,830 ∆% 2012/2011 = -7.7% | 3,874 | 4,150 |
| 10/12/12 | 10/5/12 | 10/14/11 | |
| Crude Oil Stocks | 375.1 ∆= +5.9 MB | 369.2 | 337.6 |
| Motor Gasoline Million B | 198.6 ∆= 1.5 MB | 197.1 | 204.9 |
| Distillate Fuel Oil Million B | 118.0 | 118.7 | 145.5 |
| WTI Crude Oil Price $/B | 90.00 ∆% 2012/2011 3.2 | 91.83 | 87.19 |
| 10/22/12 | 10/15/12 | 10/24/11 | |
| Regular Motor Gasoline $/G | 3.687 ∆% 2012/2011 | 3.819 | 3.462 |
B: barrels; G: gallon
Source: US Energy Information Administration http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/weekly_petroleum_status_report/current/pdf/highlights.pdf
Chart VII-1 of the US Energy Information Administration shows commercial stocks of crude oil of the US. There have been fluctuations around an upward trend since 2005. Crude oil stocks trended downwardly during a few weeks but with fluctuations followed by several sharp weekly increases alternating with declines.
Chart VII-1, US, Weekly Crude Oil Ending Stocks
Source: US Energy Information Administration
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WCESTUS1&f=W
Chart VII-2 of the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) provides crude oil stocks from 2011 to 2012. There was sharp downward trend from 2011 into 2012 followed by fluctuating sharp upward trend with reversing downward trend and renewed increase in the final segment.
Chart VII-2, US, Total Distillate Fuel Oil Stocks
Source: US Energy Information Administration
Chart VII-3 of the US Energy Information Administration shows the price of WTI crude oil since the 1980s. Chart VII-3 captures commodity price shocks during the past decade. The costly mirage of deflation was caused by the decline in oil prices during the recession of 2001. The upward trend after 2003 was promoted by the carry trade from near zero interest rates. The jump above $140/barrel during the global recession in 2008 at $145.29/barrel on Jul 3, 2008, can only be explained by the carry trade promoted by monetary policy of zero fed funds rate. After moderation of risk aversion, the carry trade returned with resulting sharp upward trend of crude prices. Risk aversion resulted in another drop in recent weeks followed by some recovery.
Chart VII-3, US, Crude Oil Futures Contract
Source: US Energy Information Administration
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RCLC1&f=D
There is typically significant difference between initial claims for unemployment insurance adjusted and not adjusted for seasonality provided in Table VII-2. Seasonally adjusted claims decreased 23,000 from 392,000 on Oct 13, 2012, to 369,000 on Oct 20. Claims not adjusted for seasonality decreased 20,032 from 362,734 on Oct 13, 2012 to 342,702 on Oct 20. Strong seasonality is preventing clear analysis of labor markets.
Table VII-2, US, Initial Claims for Unemployment Insurance
| SA | NSA | 4-week MA SA | |
| Oct 20, 2012 | 369,000 | 342,702 | 368,000 |
| Oct 13, 2012 | 392,000 | 362,734 | 366,500 |
| Change | -23,000 | -20,032 | +1,500 |
| Oct 6, 2012 | 342,000 | 329,919 | 364,750 |
| Prior Year | 397,000 | 377,156 | 400,750 |
Note: SA: seasonally adjusted; NSA: not seasonally adjusted; MA: moving average
Source: http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/eta/ui/current.htm#.UIxADW8xpe8
Table VII-3 provides seasonally and not seasonally adjusted claims in the comparable week for the years from 2001 to 2012. Seasonally adjusted claims typically are lower than claims not adjusted for seasonality. Claims not seasonally adjusted have declined from 464,895 on Oct 17, 2009 to 357,562 on Oct 15, 2011, and 342,700 on Oct 20, 2012. There is strong indication of significant decline in the level of layoffs in the US but some doubts at the margin after the high increase in unadjusted claims in the weeks of Jun 9, 2012 and Jul 7, 2012. Hiring has not recovered (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/recovery-without-hiring-imf-view-united.html) and there is continuing unemployment and underemployment of 28.7 million or 17.8 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html).
Table VII-3, US, Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims
| Not Seasonally Adjusted Claims | Seasonally Adjusted Claims | |
| Oct 20, 2001 | 429,542 | 482,000 |
| Oct 19, 2002 | 349,927 | 412,00 |
| Oct 18, 2003 | 328,572 | 387,000 |
| Oct 16, 2004 | 279,846 | 327,000 |
| Oct 15, 2005 | 303,158 | 348,000 |
| Oct 14, 2006 | 271,863 | 305,000 |
| Oct 20, 2007 | 307,675 | 334,000 |
| Oct 18, 2008 | 416,114 | 479,000 |
| Oct 17, 2009 | 464,985 | 537,000 |
| Oct 16, 2010 | 394,016 | 451,000 |
| Oct 15, 2011 | 357,562 | 402,000 |
| Oct 20, 2012 | 342,702 | 369,000 |
Source: http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims.asp
VIII Interest Rates. It is quite difficult to measure inflationary expectations because they tend to break abruptly from past inflation. There could still be an influence of past and current inflation in the calculation of future inflation by economic agents. Table VIII-1 provides inflation of the CPI. In the three months Jul to Sep 2012, CPI inflation for all items seasonally adjusted was minus 4.9 percent in annual equivalent, that is, compounding inflation in Jul-Sep 2012 and assuming it would be repeated for a full year. In the 12 months ending in Sep, CPI inflation of all items not seasonally adjusted was 2.0 percent. Inflation in Sep 2012 seasonally adjusted was 0.6 percent relative to Aug 2012, or 7.4 percent annual equivalent, and 0.4 not seasonally adjusted (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/), which is equivalent to 4.9 percent in a year. The second row provides the same measurements for the CPI of all items excluding food and energy: 2.0 percent in 12 months and 1.1 percent in annual equivalent Jul-Aug 2012. Bloomberg provides the yield curve of US Treasury securities (http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/rates-bonds/government-bonds/us/). The lowest yield is 0.11 percent for three months, 0.15 percent for six months, 0.17 percent for 12 months, 0.29 percent for two years, 0.40 percent for three years, 0.75 percent for five years, 1.19 percent for seven years, 1.74 percent for ten years and 2.90 percent for 30 years. The Irving Fisher definition of real interest rates is approximately the difference between nominal interest rates, which are those estimated by Bloomberg, and the rate of inflation expected in the term of the security, which could behave as in Table VIII-1. Aug inflation is high on the month but low in 12 months because of the unwinding of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures prices but could ignite again with subdued risk aversion. Real interest rates in the US have been negative during substantial periods in the past decade while monetary policy pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):
“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”
Negative real rates of interest distort calculations of risk and returns from capital budgeting by firms, through lending by financial intermediaries to decisions on savings, housing and purchases of households. Inflation on near zero interest rates misallocates resources away from their most productive uses and creates uncertainty of the future path of adjustment to higher interest rates that inhibit sound decisions.
Table VIII-1, US, Consumer Price Index Percentage Changes 12 months NSA and Annual Equivalent ∆%
| ∆% 12 Months Sep 2012/Sep | ∆% Annual Equivalent Jul-Sep 2012 SA | |
| CPI All Items | 2.0 | 4.9 |
| CPI ex Food and Energy | 2.0 | 1.2 |
Source: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
IX Conclusion. Lucas (2011May) estimates US economic growth in the long-term at 3 percent per year and about 2 percent per year in per capita terms. There are displacements from this trend caused by events such as wars and recessions but the economy then returns to trend. Historical US GDP data exhibit remarkable growth: Lucas (2011May) estimates an increase of US real income per person by a factor of 12 in the period from 1870 to 2010. The explanation by Lucas (2011May) of this remarkable growth experience is that government provided stability and education while elements of “free-market capitalism” were an important driver of long-term growth and prosperity. The analysis is sharpened by comparison with the long-term growth experience of G7 countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy and Japan) and Spain from 1870 to 2010. Countries benefitted from “common civilization” and “technology” to “catch up” with the early growth leaders of the US and UK, eventually growing at a faster rate. Significant part of this catch up occurred after World War II. Lucas (2011May) finds that the catch up stalled in the 1970s. The analysis of Lucas (2011May) is that the 20-40 percent gap that developed originated in differences in relative taxation and regulation that discouraged savings and work incentives in comparison with the US. A larger welfare and regulatory state, according to Lucas (2011May), could be the cause of the 20-40 percent gap. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in USD fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in Japan and France within the G7 in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. Long-term economic growth and prosperity are measured by the key indicators of growth of real income per capita, or what is earned per person after inflation. A refined concept would include real disposable income per capita, or what is earned per person after inflation and taxes.
Table IX-1 provides the data required for broader comparison of the cyclical expansions of IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and the current one from 2009 to 2012. First, in the 13 quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1985, GDP increased 19.6 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 5.7 percent; real disposable personal income (RDPI) increased 14.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.3 percent; RDPI per capita increased 11.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.4 percent; and population increased 2.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent. Second, in the 13 quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2012, GDP increased 7.2 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.2 percent. In the 12 quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2012, real disposable personal income (RDPI) increased 3.8 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent; RDPI per capita increased 1.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.5 percent; and population increased 2.3 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent. Third, since the beginning of the recession in IVQ2007 to IIIQ2012, GDP increased 2.2 percent, or barely above the level before the recession. Since the beginning of the recession in IVQ2007 to IIQ2012, real disposable personal income increased 3.5 percent; population increased 3.7 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita is 0.2 percent lower than the level before the recession. Real disposable personal income is the actual take home pay after inflation and taxes and real disposable income per capita is what is left per inhabitant. The current cyclical expansion is the worst in the period after World War II in terms of growth of economic activity and income. The United States grew during its history at high rates of per capita income that made its economy the largest in the world. That dynamism is disappearing. Bordo (2012 Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) provide strong evidence that recoveries have been faster after deeper recessions and recessions with financial crises, casting serious doubts on the conventional explanation of weak growth during the current expansion allegedly because of the depth of the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 of 4.7 percent and the financial crisis.
Table IX-1, US, GDP, Real Disposable Personal Income, Real Disposable Income per Capita and Population in 1983-85 and 2007-2011, %
| # Quarters | ∆% | ∆% Annual Equivalent | |
| IQ1983 to IVQ1985 | 13 | ||
| GDP | 19.6 | 5.7 | |
| RDPI | 14.5 | 4.3 | |
| RDPI Per Capita | 11.5 | 3.4 | |
| Population | 2.7 | 0.8 | |
| IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2012 | 13 | ||
| GDP | 7.2 | 2.2 | |
| RDPI* | 3.8 | 1.3 | |
| RDPI per Capita* | 1.4 | 0.5 | |
| Population* | 2.3 | 0.8 | |
| IVQ2007 to IIIQ2012 | 20 | ||
| GDP | 2.2 | 0.4 | |
| RDPI* | 3.5 | 0.7 | |
| RDPI per Capita* | -0.2 | ||
| Population* | 3.7 | 0.8 |
*: To IIQ2012; RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
There are six basic facts illustrating the current economic disaster of the United States: (1) GDP maintained trend growth in the entire business cycle from IQ1980 to IV1985, including contractions and expansions, but is well below trend in the entire business cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2012, including contractions and expansions; (2) per capita real disposable income exceeded trend growth in the 1980s but is substantially below trend in IIQ2012; (3) the number of employed persons increased in the 1980s but declined into IIQ2012; (4) the number of full-time employed persons increased in the 1980s but declined into IIQ2012; (5) the number unemployed, unemployment rate and number employed part-time for economic reasons fell in the recovery from the recessions of the 1980s but not substantially in the recovery after IIQ2009; and (6) wealth of households and nonprofit organizations soared in the 1980s but declined into IIQ2012. There is a critical issue of whether the United States economy will be able in the future to attain again the level of activity and prosperity of projected trend growth. Growth at trend during the entire business cycles built the largest economy in the world but there may be an adverse, permanent weakness in United States economic performance and prosperity. Table IX-2 provides data for analysis of these five basic facts. The six blocks of Table IX-2 are separated initially after individual discussion of each one followed by the full Table IX-2.
1. Trend Growth.
i. As shown in Table IX-2, actual GDP grew cumulatively 17.7 percent from IQ1980 to IVQ1985, which is relatively close to what trend growth would have been at 18.5 percent. Rapid growth at 5.7 percent annual rate on average per quarter during the expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 erased the loss of GDP of 4.8 percent during the contraction and maintained trend growth at 3 percent over the entire cycle.
ii. In contrast, cumulative growth from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2012 was 2.2 percent while trend growth would have been 15.1 percent. GDP in IIIQ2012 at seasonally adjusted annual rate is estimated at $13,616.2 percent by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and would have been $15,338.2 billion, or $1,722 billion higher, had the economy grown at trend over the entire business cycle as it happened during the 1980s and throughout most of US history. There is $1.7 trillion of foregone GDP that would have been created as it occurred during past cyclical expansions, which explains why employment has not rebounded to even higher than before. There would not be recovery of full employment even with growth of 3 percent per year beginning immediately because the opportunity was lost to grow faster during the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2012 after the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. The United States has acquired a heavy social burden of unemployment and underemployment of 28.7 million people or 17.8 percent of the effective labor force (Section I, Table I-4 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html) that will not be significantly diminished even with return to growth of GDP of 3 percent per year because of growth of the labor force by new entrants. The US labor force grew from 142.583 million in 2000 to 153.124 million in 2007 or by 7.4 percent at the average yearly rate of 1.0 percent per year. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 212.577 million in 2000 to 231.867 million in 2007 or 9.1 percent at the average yearly rate of 1.3 percent per year (data from http://www.bls.gov/data/). Data for the past five years cloud accuracy because of the number of people discouraged from seeking employment. The noninstitutional population of the United States increased from 231.867 million in 2007 to 239.618 million in 2011 or by 3.3 percent while the labor force increased from 153.124 million in 2007 to 153.617 million in 2011 or by 0.3 percent (data from http://www.bls.gov/data/). People ceased to seek jobs because they do not believe that there is a job available for them (Section I http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html).
| Period IQ1980 to IVQ1985 | |
| GDP SAAR USD Billions | |
| IQ1980 | 5,903.4 |
| IVQ1985 | 6,950.0 |
| ∆% IQ1980 to IVQ1985 | 17.7 |
| ∆% Trend Growth IQ1980 to IVQ1985 | 18.5 |
| Period IVQ2007 to IIIQ2012 | |
| GDP SAAR USD Billions | |
| IVQ2007 | 13,326.0 |
| IIIQ2012 | 13,616.2 |
| ∆% IVQ2007 to IIIQ2012 Actual | 2.2 |
| ∆% IVQ2007 to IIIQ2012 Trend | 15.1 |
2. Decline of Per Capita Real Disposable Income
i. In the entire business cycle from IQ1980 to IVQ1985, as shown in Table IX-2 trend growth of per capita real disposable income, or what is left per person after inflation and taxes, grew cumulatively 14.5 percent, which is close to what would have been trend growth of 12.1 percent.
ii. In contrast, in the entire business cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2012, per capita real disposable income fell 0.2 percent while trend growth would have been 9.3 percent. Income available after inflation and taxes is lower than before the contraction after 12 consecutive quarters of GDP growth at mediocre rates relative to those prevailing during historical cyclical expansions.
| Period IQ1980 to IVQ1985 |
| Real Disposable Personal Income per Capita IQ1980 Chained 2005 USD | 18,938 |
| Real Disposable Personal Income per Capita IVQ1985 Chained 2005 USD | 21,687 |
| ∆% IQ1980 to IVQ1985 | 14.5 |
| ∆% Trend Growth | 12.1 |
| Period IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 |
| Real Disposable Personal Income per Capita IVQ2007 Chained 2005USD | 32,837 |
| Real Disposable Personal Income per Capita IIQ2012 Chained 2005 USD | 32,779 |
| ∆% IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 | -0.2 |
| ∆% Trend Growth | 9.3 |
3. Number of Employed Persons
i. As shown in Table IX-2, the number of employed persons increased over the entire business cycle from 98.527 million not seasonally adjusted (NSA) in IQ1980 to 107.819 million NSA in IVQ1985 or by 9.4 percent.
ii. In contrast, during the entire business cycle the number employed fell from 146.334 million in IVQ2007 to 143.202 million in IIQ2012 or by 2.1 percent. There are 28.7 million persons unemployed or underemployed, which is 17.8 percent of the effective labor force (Section I, Table I-4 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html).
| Period IQ1980 to IVQ1985 |
| Employed Millions IQ1980 NSA End of Quarter | 98.527 |
| Employed Millions IV1985 NSA End of Quarter | 107.819 |
| ∆% Employed IQ1980 to IV1985 | 9.4 |
| Period IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 |
| Employed Millions IVQ2007 NSA End of Quarter | 146.334 |
| Employed Millions IIQ2012 NSA End of Quarter | 143.202 |
| ∆% Employed IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 | -2.1 |
4. Number of Full-Time Employed Persons
i. As shown in Table IX-2, during the entire business cycle in the 1980s, including contractions and expansion, the number of employed full-time rose from 81.280 million NSA in IQ1980 to 88.757 million NSA in IVQ1985 or 9.2 percent.
ii. In contrast, during the entire current business cycle, including contraction and expansion, the number of persons employed full-time fell from 121.042 million in IVQ2007 to 116.024 million in IIQ2012 or by minus 4.1 percent.
| Period IQ1980 to IVQ1985 |
| Employed Full-time Millions IQ1980 NSA End of Quarter | 81.280 |
| Employed Full-time Millions IV1985 NSA End of Quarter | 88.757 |
| ∆% Full-time Employed IQ1980 to IV1985 | 9.2 |
| Period IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 |
| Employed Full-time Millions IVQ2007 NSA End of Quarter | 121.042 |
| Employed Full-time Millions IIQ2012 NSA End of Quarter | 116.024 |
| ∆% Full-time Employed IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 | -4.1 |
5. Unemployed, Unemployment Rate and Employed Part-time for Economic Reasons.
i. As shown in Table IX-2 and in the following block, in the cycle from IQ1980 to IVQ1985: (a) the rate of unemployment was virtually the same at 6.7 percent in IQ1985 relative to 6.6 percent in IQ1980; (b) the number unemployed increased from 6.983 million in IQ1980 to 7.717 million in IVQ1985 or 10.5 percent; and (c) the number employed part-time for economic reasons increased 49.1 percent from 3.624 million in IQ1980 to 5.402 million in IVQ1985.
ii. In contrast, in the economic cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2012: (a) the rate of unemployment increased from 4.8 percent in IVQ2007 to 8.4 percent in IIQ2012; (b) the number unemployed increased 78.9 percent from 7.371 million in IVQ2007 to 13.184 million in IIQ2012; (c) the number employed part-time for economic reasons increased 76.7 percent from 4.750 in IVQ2007 to 8.394 million in IIQ2012; and (d) U6 Total Unemployed plus all marginally attached workers plus total employed part time for economic reasons as percent of all civilian labor force plus all marginally attached workers NSA increased from 8.7 percent in IVQ2007 to 14.2 percent in IIQ2012.
| Period IQ1980 to IVQ1985 |
| Unemployment Rate IQ1980 NSA End of Quarter | 6.6 |
| Unemployment Rate IV1985 NSA End of Quarter | 6.7 |
| Unemployed IQ1980 Millions End of Quarter | 6.983 |
| Unemployed IV 1985 Millions End of Quarter | 7.717 |
| Employed Part-time Economic Reasons Millions IQ1980 End of Quarter | 3.624 |
| Employed Part-time Economic Reasons Millions IVQ1985 End of Quarter | 5.402 |
| ∆% | 49.1 |
| Period IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 |
| Unemployment Rate IVQ2007 NSA End of Quarter | 4.8 |
| Unemployment Rate IIQ2012 NSA End of Quarter | 8.4 |
| Unemployed IVQ2007 Millions End of Quarter | 7.371 |
| Unemployed IIQ2009 Millions End of Quarter | 13.184 |
| ∆% | 78.9 |
| Employed Part-time Economic Reasons IVQ2007 Millions End of Quarter | 4.750 |
| Employed Part-time Economic Reasons Millions IIQ2009 End of Quarter | 8.394 |
| ∆% | 76.7 |
| U6 Total Unemployed plus all marginally attached workers plus total employed part time for economic reasons as percent of all civilian labor force plus all marginally attached workers NSA | |
| IVQ2007 | 8.7 |
| IIQ2012 | 14.2 |
6. Wealth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations.
i. The comparison of net worth of households and nonprofit organizations in the entire economic cycle from IQ1980 (and also from IVQ1979) to IVQ1985 and from IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 is provided in the following block and in Table IX-2. Net worth of households and nonprofit organizations increased from $8,326.4 billion in IVQ1979 to $14,395.2 billion in IVQ1985 or 72.9 percent or 69.3 percent from $8,502.9 billion in IQ1980. The starting quarter does not bias the results. The US consumer price index not seasonally adjusted increased from 76.7 in Dec 1979 to 109.3 in Dec 1985 or 42.5 percent or 36.5 percent from 80.1 in Mar 1980 (using consumer price index data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm). In terms of purchasing power measured by the consumer price index, real wealth of households and nonprofit organizations increased 21.3 percent in constant purchasing power from IVQ1979 to IVQ1985 or 24.0 percent from IQ1980.
ii. In contrast, as shown in the following block and in Table IX-2, net worth of households and nonprofit organizations fell from $66,057.1 billion in IVQ2007 to $62,668.4 billion in IIQ2012 by $3,388.7 billion or 5.1 percent. The US consumer price index was 210.036 in Dec 2007 and 229.478 in Jun 2012 for increase of 9.3 percent. In purchasing power of Dec 2007, wealth of households and nonprofit organizations is lower by 13.2 percent in Jun 2012 after 12 consecutive quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2012 relative to IVQ2012 when the recession began. The explanation is partly in the sharp decline of wealth of households and nonprofit organizations and partly in the mediocre growth rates of the cyclical expansion beginning in IIIQ2009. The average growth rate from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2012 has been 2.2 percent, which is substantially lower than the average of 6.2 percent in cyclical expansions after World War II and 5.7 percent in the expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 (see Table I-5 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/historically-sharper-recoveries-from.html). The US missed the opportunity of high growth rates that has been available in past cyclical expansions.
| Period IQ1980 to IVQ1985 | |
| Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations USD Billions | |
| IVQ1979 | 8,326.4 |
| IVQ1985 | 14,395.2 |
| ∆ USD Billions | +6,068.8 |
| Period IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 | |
| Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations USD Billions | |
| IVQ2007 | 66,057.1 |
| IIQ2012 | 62,668.4 |
| ∆ USD Billions | -3,388.7 |
Table IX-2, US, GDP and Real Disposable Personal Income per Capita Actual and Trend Growth and Employment, 1980-1985 and 2007-2012, SAAR USD Billions, Millions of Persons and ∆%
| Period IQ1980 to IVQ1985 | |
| GDP SAAR USD Billions | |
| IQ1980 | 5,903.4 |
| IVQ1985 | 6,950.0 |
| ∆% IQ1980 to IVQ1985 | 17.7 |
| ∆% Trend Growth IQ1980 to IVQ1985 | 18.5 |
| Real Disposable Personal Income per Capita IQ1980 Chained 2005 USD | 18,938 |
| Real Disposable Personal Income per Capita IVQ1985 Chained 2005 USD | 21,687 |
| ∆% IQ1980 to IVQ1985 | 14.5 |
| ∆% Trend Growth | 12.1 |
| Employed Millions IQ1980 NSA End of Quarter | 98.527 |
| Employed Millions IV1985 NSA End of Quarter | 107.819 |
| ∆% Employed IQ1980 to IV1985 | 9.4 |
| Employed Full-time Millions IQ1980 NSA End of Quarter | 81.280 |
| Employed Full-time Millions IV1985 NSA End of Quarter | 88.757 |
| ∆% Full-time Employed IQ1980 to IV1985 | 9.2 |
| Unemployment Rate IQ1980 NSA End of Quarter | 6.6 |
| Unemployment Rate IV1985 NSA End of Quarter | 6.7 |
| Unemployed IQ1980 Millions NSA End of Quarter | 6.983 |
| Unemployed IV 1985 Millions NSA End of Quarter | 7.717 |
| ∆% | 11.9 |
| Employed Part-time Economic Reasons IVQ2007 Millions NSA End of Quarter | 4.750 |
| Employed Part-time Economic Reasons Millions IIQ2009 NSA End of Quarter | 8.394 |
| ∆% | 76.7 |
| Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations USD Billions | |
| IVQ1979 | 8,326.4 |
| IVQ1985 | 14,395.2 |
| ∆ USD Billions | +6,068.8 |
| Period IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 | |
| GDP SAAR USD Billions | |
| IVQ2007 | 13,326.0 |
| IIIQ2012 | 13,616.2 |
| ∆% IVQ2007 to IIIQ2012 | 2.2 |
| ∆% IVQ2007 to IIIQ2012 Trend Growth | 15.1 |
| Real Disposable Personal Income per Capita IVQ2007 Chained 2005USD | 32,837 |
| Real Disposable Personal Income per Capita IIQ2012 Chained 2005 USD | 32,779 |
| ∆% IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 | -0.2 |
| ∆% Trend Growth | 9.3 |
| Employed Millions IVQ2007 NSA End of Quarter | 146.334 |
| Employed Millions IIQ2012 NSA End of Quarter | 143.202 |
| ∆% Employed IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 | -2.1 |
| Employed Full-time Millions IVQ2007 NSA End of Quarter | 121.042 |
| Employed Full-time Millions IIQ2012 NSA End of Quarter | 116.024 |
| ∆% Full-time Employed IVQ2007 to IIQ2012 | -4.1 |
| Unemployment Rate IVQ2007 NSA End of Quarter | 4.8 |
| Unemployment Rate IIQ2012 NSA End of Quarter | 8.4 |
| Unemployed IVQ2007 Millions NSA End of Quarter | 7.371 |
| Unemployed IIQ2009 Millions NSA End of Quarter | 13.184 |
| ∆% | 78.9 |
| Employed Part-time Economic Reasons IVQ2007 Millions NSA End of Quarter | 4.750 |
| Employed Part-time Economic Reasons Millions IIQ2009 NSA End of Quarter | 8.394 |
| ∆% | 76.7 |
| U6 Total Unemployed plus all marginally attached workers plus total employed part time for economic reasons as percent of all civilian labor force plus all marginally attached workers NSA | |
| IVQ2007 | 8.7 |
| IIQ2012 | 14.2 |
| Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations USD Billions | |
| IVQ2007 | 66,057.1 |
| IIQ2012 | 62,668.4 |
| ∆ USD Billions | -3,388.7 |
Note: GDP trend growth used is 3.0 percent per year and GDP per capita is 2.0 percent per year as estimated by Lucas (2011May) on data from 1870 to 2010.
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2012Sep20. Flow of funds accounts of the United States. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System.
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APPENDIXES
Appendix I. The Great Inflation
Inflation and unemployment in the period 1966 to 1985 is analyzed by Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) by means of a Phillips circuit joining points of inflation and unemployment. Chart I1 for Brazil in Pelaez (1986, 94-5) was reprinted in The Economist in the issue of Jan 17-23, 1987 as updated by the author. Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) argues that the Phillips circuit shows the weakness in Phillips curve correlation. The explanation is by a shift in aggregate supply, rise in inflation expectations or loss of anchoring. The case of Brazil in Chart I1 cannot be explained without taking into account the increase in the fed funds rate that reached 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) in the Volcker Fed that precipitated the stress on a foreign debt bloated by financing balance of payments deficits with bank loans in the 1970s; the loans were used in projects, many of state-owned enterprises with low present value in long gestation. The combination of the insolvency of the country because of debt higher than its ability of repayment and the huge government deficit with declining revenue as the economy contracted caused adverse expectations on inflation and the economy. This interpretation is consistent with the case of the 24 emerging market economies analyzed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 4), concluding that “higher debt levels are associated with significantly higher levels of inflation in emerging markets. Median inflation more than doubles (from less than seven percent to 16 percent) as debt rises from the low (0 to 30 percent) range to above 90 percent. Fiscal dominance is a plausible interpretation of this pattern.”
The reading of the Phillips circuits of the 1970s by Cochrane (2011Jan, 25) is doubtful about the output gap and inflation expectations:
“So, inflation is caused by ‘tightness’ and deflation by ‘slack’ in the economy. This is not just a cause and forecasting variable, it is the cause, because given ‘slack’ we apparently do not have to worry about inflation from other sources, notwithstanding the weak correlation of [Phillips circuits]. These statements [by the Fed] do mention ‘stable inflation expectations. How does the Fed know expectations are ‘stable’ and would not come unglued once people look at deficit numbers? As I read Fed statements, almost all confidence in ‘stable’ or ‘anchored’ expectations comes from the fact that we have experienced a long period of low inflation (adaptive expectations). All these analyses ignore the stagflation experience in the 1970s, in which inflation was high even with ‘slack’ markets and little ‘demand, and ‘expectations’ moved quickly. They ignore the experience of hyperinflations and currency collapses, which happen in economies well below potential.”
Chart I1, Brazil, Phillips Circuit 1963-1987
©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O cruzado e o austral. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.
DeLong (1997, 247-8) shows that the 1970s were the only peacetime period of inflation in the US without parallel in the prior century. The price level in the US drifted upward since 1896 with jumps resulting from the two world wars: “on this scale, the inflation of the 1970s was as large an increase in the price level relative to drift as either of this century’s major wars” (DeLong, 1997, 248). Monetary policy focused on accommodating higher inflation, with emphasis solely on the mandate of promoting employment, has been blamed as deliberate or because of model error or imperfect measurement for creating the Great Inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html). As DeLong (1997) shows, the Great Inflation began in the mid 1960s, well before the oil shocks of the 1970s (see also the comment to DeLong 1997 by Taylor 1997, 276-7). TableI1 provides the change in GDP, CPI and the rate of unemployment from 1960 to 1990. There are three waves of inflation (1) in the second half of the 1960s; (2) from 1973 to 1975; and (3) from 1978 to 1981. In one of his multiple important contributions to understanding the Great Inflation, Meltzer (2005) distinguishes between one-time price jumps, such as by oil shocks, and a “maintained” inflation rate. Meltzer (2005) uses a dummy variable to extract the one-time oil price changes, resulting in a maintained inflation rate that was never higher than 8 to 10 percent in the 1970s. There is revealing analysis of the Great Inflation and its reversal by Meltzer (2005, 2010a, 2010b).
Table I1, US Annual Rate of Growth of GDP and CPI and Unemployment Rate 1960-1982
| ∆% GDP | ∆% CPI | UNE | |
| 1960 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 6.6 |
| 1961 | 2.3 | 0.7 | 6.0 |
| 1962 | 6.1 | 1.3 | 5.5 |
| 1963 | 4.4 | 1.6 | 5.5 |
| 1964 | 5.8 | 1.0 | 5.0 |
| 1965 | 6.4 | 1.9 | 4.0 |
| 1966 | 6.5 | 3.5 | 3.8 |
| 1967 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 3.8 |
| 1968 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 3.4 |
| 1969 | 3.1 | 6.2 | 3.5 |
| 1970 | 0.2 | 5.6 | 6.1 |
| 1971 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 6.0 |
| 1972 | 5.3 | 3.4 | 5.2 |
| 1973 | 5.8 | 8.7 | 4.9 |
| 1974 | -0.6 | 12.3 | 7.2 |
| 1975 | -0.2 | 6.9 | 8.2 |
| 1976 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 7.8 |
| 1977 | 4.6 | 6.7 | 6.4 |
| 1978 | 5.6 | 9.0 | 6.0 |
| 1979 | 3.1 | 13.3 | 6.0 |
| 1980 | -0.3 | 12.5 | 7.2 |
| 1981 | 2.5 | 8.9 | 8.5 |
| 1982 | -1.9 | 3.8 | 10.8 |
| 1983 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 8.3 |
| 1984 | 7.2 | 3.9 | 7.3 |
| 1985 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 7.0 |
| 1986 | 3.5 | 1.1 | 6.6 |
| 1987 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 5.7 |
| 1988 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 5,3 |
| 1989 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 5.4 |
| 1990 | 1.9 | 6.1 | 6.3 |
Note: GDP: Gross Domestic Product; CPI: consumer price index; UNE: rate of unemployment; CPI and UNE are at year end instead of average to obtain a complete series
Source: ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt
http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea01.htm
http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet
There is a false impression of the existence of a monetary policy “science,” measurements and forecasting with which to steer the economy into “prosperity without inflation.” Market participants are remembering the Great Bond Crash of 1994 shown in Table I2 when monetary policy pursued nonexistent inflation, causing trillions of dollars of losses in fixed income worldwide while increasing the fed funds rate from 3 percent in Jan 1994 to 6 percent in Dec. The exercise in Table I2 shows a drop of the price of the 30-year bond by 18.1 percent and of the 10-year bond by 14.1 percent. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). The pursuit of nonexistent deflation during the past ten years has resulted in the largest monetary policy accommodation in history that created the 2007 financial market crash and global recession and is currently preventing smoother recovery while creating another financial crash in the future. The issue is not whether there should be a central bank and monetary policy but rather whether policy accommodation in doses from zero interest rates to trillions of dollars in the fed balance sheet endangers economic stability.
Table I2, Fed Funds Rates, Thirty and Ten Year Treasury Yields and Prices, 30-Year Mortgage Rates and 12-month CPI Inflation 1994
| 1994 | FF | 30Y | 30P | 10Y | 10P | MOR | CPI |
| Jan | 3.00 | 6.29 | 100 | 5.75 | 100 | 7.06 | 2.52 |
| Feb | 3.25 | 6.49 | 97.37 | 5.97 | 98.36 | 7.15 | 2.51 |
| Mar | 3.50 | 6.91 | 92.19 | 6.48 | 94.69 | 7.68 | 2.51 |
| Apr | 3.75 | 7.27 | 88.10 | 6.97 | 91.32 | 8.32 | 2.36 |
| May | 4.25 | 7.41 | 86.59 | 7.18 | 88.93 | 8.60 | 2.29 |
| Jun | 4.25 | 7.40 | 86.69 | 7.10 | 90.45 | 8.40 | 2.49 |
| Jul | 4.25 | 7.58 | 84.81 | 7.30 | 89.14 | 8.61 | 2.77 |
| Aug | 4.75 | 7.49 | 85.74 | 7.24 | 89.53 | 8.51 | 2.69 |
| Sep | 4.75 | 7.71 | 83.49 | 7.46 | 88.10 | 8.64 | 2.96 |
| Oct | 4.75 | 7.94 | 81.23 | 7.74 | 86.33 | 8.93 | 2.61 |
| Nov | 5.50 | 8.08 | 79.90 | 7.96 | 84.96 | 9.17 | 2.67 |
| Dec | 6.00 | 7.87 | 81.91 | 7.81 | 85.89 | 9.20 | 2.67 |
Notes: FF: fed funds rate; 30Y: yield of 30-year Treasury; 30P: price of 30-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 6.29 percent and maturity in exactly 30 years; 10Y: yield of 10-year Treasury; 10P: price of 10-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 5.75 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years; MOR: 30-year mortgage; CPI: percent change of CPI in 12 months
Sources: yields and mortgage rates http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm CPI ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.t
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies. Safe-haven currencies, such as the Swiss franc (CHF) and the Japanese yen (JPY) have been under threat of appreciation but also remained relatively unchanged. A characteristic of the global recession would be struggle for maintaining competitiveness by policies of regulation, trade and devaluation (Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation War (2008c)). Appreciation of the exchange rate causes two major effects on Japan.
1. Trade. Consider an example with actual data (Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008c), 70-72). The yen traded at JPY 117.69/USD on Apr 2, 2007 and at JPY 102.77/USD on Apr 2, 2008, or appreciation of 12.7 percent. This meant that an export of JPY 10,000 to the US sold at USD 84.97 on Apr 2, 2007 [(JPY 10,000)/(USD 117.69/USD)], rising to USD 97.30 on Apr 2, 2008 [(JPY 10,000)/(JPY 102.77)]. If the goods sold by Japan were invoiced worldwide in dollars, Japanese’s companies would suffer a reduction in profit margins of 12.7 percent required to maintain the same dollar price. An export at cost of JPY 10,000 would only bring JPY 8,732 when converted at JPY 102.77 to maintain the price of USD 84.97 (USD 84.97 x JPY 102.77/USD). If profit margins were already tight, Japan would be uncompetitive and lose revenue and market share. The pain of Japan from dollar devaluation is illustrated by Table 58 in the Nov 6 comment of this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/slow-growth-driven-by-reducing-savings.html): The yen traded at JPY 110.19/USD on Aug 18, 2008 and at JPY 75.812/USD on Oct 28, 2011, for cumulative appreciation of 31.2 percent. Cumulative appreciation from Sep 15, 2010 (JPY 83.07/USD) to Oct 28, 2011 (JPY 75.812) was 8.7 percent. The pain of Japan from dollar devaluation continues as illustrated by Table VI-6 in Section VII Valuation of Risk Financial Assets: The yen traded at JPY 110.19/USD on Aug 18, 2008 and at JPY 78.08/USD on Dec 23, 2011, for cumulative appreciation of 29.1 percent. Cumulative appreciation from Sep 15, 2010 (JPY 83.07/USD) to Dec 23, 2011 (JPY 78.08) was 6.0 percent.
2. Foreign Earnings and Investment. Consider the case of a Japanese company receiving earnings from investment overseas. Accounting the earnings and investment in the books in Japan would also result in a loss of 12.7 percent. Accounting would show fewer yen for investment and earnings overseas.
There is a point of explosion of patience with dollar devaluation and domestic currency appreciation. Andrew Monahan, writing on “Japan intervenes on yen to cap sharp rise,” on Oct 31, 2011, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204528204577009152325076454.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_MIDDLETopStories), analyzes the intervention of the Bank of Japan, at request of the Ministry of Finance, on Oct 31, 2011. Traders consulted by Monahan estimate that the Bank of Japan sold JPY 7 trillion, about $92.31 billion, against the dollar, exceeding the JPY 4.5 trillion on Aug 4, 2011. The intervention caused an increase of the yen rate to JPY 79.55/USD relative to earlier trading at a low of JPY 75.31/USD. The JPY appreciated to JPY76.88/USD by Fri Nov 18 for cumulative appreciation of 3.4 percent from JPY 79.55 just after the intervention. The JPY appreciated another 0.3 percent in the week of Nov 18 but depreciated 1.1 percent in the week of Nov 25. There was mild depreciation of 0.3 percent in the week of Dec 2 that was followed by appreciation of 0.4 percent in the week of Dec 9. The JPY was virtually unchanged in the week of Dec 16 with depreciation of 0.1 percent but depreciated by 0.5 percent in the week of Dec 23, appreciating by 1.5 percent in the week of Dec 30. Historically, interventions in yen currency markets have been unsuccessful (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 107-109). Interventions are even more difficult currently with daily trading of some $4 trillion in world currency markets. Risk aversion with zero interest rates in the US diverts hot capital movements toward safe-haven currencies such as Japan, causing appreciation of the yen. Mitsuru Obe, writing on Nov 25, on “Japanese government bonds tumble,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204452104577060231493070676.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the increase in yields of the Japanese government bond with 10 year maturity to a high for one month of 1.025 percent at the close of market on Nov 25. Thin markets in after-hours trading may have played an important role in this increase in yield but there may have been an effect of a dreaded reduction in positions of bonds by banks under pressure of reducing assets. The report on Japan sustainability by the IMF (2011JSRNov23, 2), analyzes how rising yields could threaten Japan:
· “As evident from recent developments, market sentiment toward sovereigns with unsustainably large fiscal imbalances can shift abruptly, with adverse effects on debt dynamics. Should JGB yields increase, they could initiate an adverse feedback loop from rising yields to deteriorating confidence, diminishing policy space, and a contracting real economy.
· Higher yields could result in a withdrawal of liquidity from global capital markets, disrupt external positions and, through contagion, put upward pressure on sovereign bond yields elsewhere.”
Exchange rate controls by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) fixing the rate at a minimum of CHF 1.20/EUR (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20110906/source/pre_20110906.en.pdf) has prevented flight of capital into the Swiss franc. The Swiss franc remained unchanged relative to the USD in the week of Dec 23 and appreciated 0.2 percent in the week of Dec 30 relative to the USD and 0.5 percent relative to the euro, as shown in Table II-1. Risk aversion is evident in the depreciation of the Australian dollar by cumulative 2.5 percent in the week of Fr Dec 16 after no change in the week of Dec 9. In the week of Dec 23, the Australian dollar appreciated 1.9 percent, appreciating another 0.5 percent in the week of Dec 30 as shown in Table II-1. Risk appetite would be revealed by carry trades from zero interest rates in the US and Japan into high yielding currencies such as in Australia with appreciation of the Australian dollar (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 202-4, Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 70-4).
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. There are three types of actions in Europe to steer the euro zone away from the threats of fiscal and banking crises: (1) fiscal compact; (2) enhancement of stabilization tools and resources; and (3) bank capital requirements. The first two consist of agreements by the Euro Area Heads of State and government while the third one consists of measurements and recommendations by the European Banking Authority.
1. Fiscal Compact. The “fiscal compact” consists of (1) conciliation of fiscal policies and budgets within a “fiscal rule”; and (2) establishment of mechanisms of governance, monitoring and enforcement of the fiscal rule.
i. Fiscal Rule. The essence of the fiscal rule is that “general government budgets shall be balanced or in surplus” by compliance of members countries that “the annual structural deficit does not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP” (European Council 2011Dec9, 3). Individual member states will create “an automatic correction mechanism that shall be triggered in the event of deviation” (European Council 2011Dec9, 3). Member states will define their automatic correction mechanisms following principles proposed by the European Commission. Those member states falling into an “excessive deficit procedure” will provide a detailed plan of structural reforms to correct excessive deficits. The European Council and European Commission will monitor yearly budget plans for consistency with adjustment of excessive deficits. Member states will report in anticipation their debt issuance plans. Deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP and/or debt in excess of 60 percent of GDP will trigger automatic consequences.
ii. Policy Coordination and Governance. The euro area is committed to following common economic policy. In accordance, “a procedure will be established to ensure that all major economic policy reforms planned by euro area member states will be discussed and coordinated at the level of the euro area, with a view to benchmarking best practices” (European Council 2011Dec9, 5). Governance of the euro area will be strengthened with regular euro summits at least twice yearly.
2. Stabilization Tools and Resources. There are several enhancements to the bailouts of member states.
i. Facilities. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) will use leverage and the European Central Bank as agent of its market operations. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or permanent bailout facility will be operational as soon as 90 percent of the capital commitments are ratified by member states. The ESM is planned to begin in Jul 2012.
ii. Financial Resources. The overall ceiling of the EFSF/ESM of €500 billion (USD 670 billion) will be reassessed in Mar 2012. Measures will be taken to maintain “the combined effective lending capacity of EUR 500 billion” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6). Member states will “consider, and confirm within 10 days, the provision of additional resources for the IMF of up to EUR 200 billion (USD 270 billion), in the form of bilateral loans, to ensure that the IMF has adequate resources to deal with the crisis. We are looking forward to parallel contributions from the international community” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6). Matthew Dalton and Matina Stevis, writing on Dec 20, 2011, on “Euro Zone Agrees to New IMF Loans,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204791104577107974167166272.html?mod=WSJPRO_hps_MIDDLESecondNews), inform that at a meeting on Dec 20, finance ministers of the euro-zone developed plans to contribute €150 billion in bilateral loans to the IMF as provided in the agreement of Dec 9. Bailouts “will strictly adhere to the well established IMF principles and practices.” There is a specific statement on private sector involvement and its relation to recent experience: “We clearly reaffirm that the decisions taken on 21 July and 26/27 October concerning Greek debt are unique and exceptional; standardized and identical Collective Action clauses will be included, in such a way as to preserve market liquidity, in the terms and conditions of all new euro government bonds” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6). Will there be again “unique and exceptional” conditions? The ESM is authorized to take emergency decisions with “a qualified majority of 85% in case the Commission and the ECB conclude that an urgent decision related to financial assistance is needed when the financial and economic sustainability of the euro area is threatened” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6).
3. Bank Capital. The European Banking Authority (EBA) finds that European banks have a capital shortfall of €114.7 billion (http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/capitalexercise/Press%20release%20FINAL.pdf). To avoid credit difficulties, the EBA recommends “that the credit institutions build a temporary capital buffer to reach a 9% Core Tier 1 ratio by 30 June 2012” (http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/capitalexercise/EBA%20BS%202011%20173%20Recommendation%20FINAL.pdf 6). Patrick Jenkins, Martin Stabe and Stanley Pignal, writing on Dec 9, 2011, on “EU banks slash sovereign holdings,” published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a6d2fd4e-228f-11e1-acdc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gAlaswcW), analyze the balance sheets of European banks released by the European Banking Authority. They conclude that European banks have reduced their holdings of riskier sovereign debt of countries in Europe by €65 billion from the end of 2010 to Sep 2011. Bankers informed that the European Central Bank and hedge funds acquired those exposures that represent 13 percent of their holdings of debt to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, which are down to €513 billion by the end of IIIQ2011.
The members of the European Monetary Union (EMU), or euro area, established the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), on May 9, 2010, to (http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm):
- “Provide loans to countries in financial difficulties
- Intervene in the debt primary and secondary markets. Intervention in the secondary market will be only on the basis of an ECB analysis recognising the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability
- Act on the basis of a precautionary programme
- Finance recapitalisations of financial institutions through loans to governments”
The EFSF will be replaced by the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2013. On Mar 30, 2012, members of the euro area reached an agreement providing for sufficient funding required in rescue programs of members countries facing funding and fiscal difficulties and the transition from the EFSF to the ESM. The agreement of Mar 30, 2012 of the euro area members provides for the following (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1513204/eurogroup_statement_30_march_12.pdf):
· Acceleration of ESM paid-in capital. The acceleration of paid-in capital for the ESM provides for two tranches paid in 2012, in July and Oct; another two tranches in 2013; and a final tranche in the first half of 2014. There could be acceleration of paid-in capital is required to maintain a 15 percent relation of paid-in capital and the outstanding issue of the ESM
· ESM Operation and EFSF transition. ESM will assume all new rescue programs beginning in Jul 2012. EFSF will administer programs begun before initiation of ESM activities. There will be a transition period for the EFSF until mid 2013 in which it can engage in new programs if required to maintain the full lending limit of €500 billion.
· Increase of ESM/EFSF lending limit. The combined ceiling of the ESM and EFSF will be increased to €700 billion to facilitate operation of the transition of the EFSF to the ESM. The ESM lending ceiling will be €500 billion by mid 2013. The combined lending ceiling of the ESM and EFSF will continue to €700 billion
· Prior lending. The bilateral Greek loan facility of €53 billion and €49 billion of the EFSF have been paid-out in supporting programs of countries: “all together the euro area is mobilizing an overall firewall of approximately EUR 800 billion, more than USD 1 trillion” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1513204/eurogroup_statement_30_march_12.pdf)
· Bilateral IMF contributions. Members of the euro area have made commitments of bilateral contributions to the IMF of €150 billion
A key development in the bailout of Greece is the approval by the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Mar 15, 2012, of a new four-year financing in the value of €28 billion to be disbursed in equal quarterly disbursements (http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2012/tr031512.htm). The sovereign debt crisis of Europe has moderated significantly with the elimination of immediate default of Greece. New economic and financial risk factors have developed, which are covered in VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets and V World Economic Slowdown.
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies. Safe-haven currencies, such as the Swiss franc (CHF) and the Japanese yen (JPY) have been under threat of appreciation but also remained relatively unchanged. A characteristic of the global recession would be struggle for maintaining competitiveness by policies of regulation, trade and devaluation (Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation War (2008c)). Appreciation of the exchange rate causes two major effects on Japan.
1. Trade. Consider an example with actual data (Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008c), 70-72). The yen traded at JPY 117.69/USD on Apr 2, 2007 and at JPY 102.77/USD on Apr 2, 2008, or appreciation of 12.7 percent. This meant that an export of JPY 10,000 to the US sold at USD 84.97 on Apr 2, 2007 [(JPY 10,000)/(USD 117.69/USD)], rising to USD 97.30 on Apr 2, 2008 [(JPY 10,000)/(JPY 102.77)]. If the goods sold by Japan were invoiced worldwide in dollars, Japanese’s companies would suffer a reduction in profit margins of 12.7 percent required to maintain the same dollar price. An export at cost of JPY 10,000 would only bring JPY 8,732 when converted at JPY 102.77 to maintain the price of USD 84.97 (USD 84.97 x JPY 102.77/USD). If profit margins were already tight, Japan would be uncompetitive and lose revenue and market share. The pain of Japan from dollar devaluation is illustrated by Table 58 in the Nov 6 comment of this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/slow-growth-driven-by-reducing-savings.html): The yen traded at JPY 110.19/USD on Aug 18, 2008 and at JPY 75.812/USD on Oct 28, 2011, for cumulative appreciation of 31.2 percent. Cumulative appreciation from Sep 15, 2010 (JPY 83.07/USD) to Oct 28, 2011 (JPY 75.812) was 8.7 percent. The pain of Japan from dollar devaluation continues as illustrated by Table VI-6 in Section VII Valuation of Risk Financial Assets: The yen traded at JPY 110.19/USD on Aug 18, 2008 and at JPY 78.08/USD on Dec 23, 2011, for cumulative appreciation of 29.1 percent. Cumulative appreciation from Sep 15, 2010 (JPY 83.07/USD) to Dec 23, 2011 (JPY 78.08) was 6.0 percent.
2. Foreign Earnings and Investment. Consider the case of a Japanese company receiving earnings from investment overseas. Accounting the earnings and investment in the books in Japan would also result in a loss of 12.7 percent. Accounting would show fewer yen for investment and earnings overseas.
There is a point of explosion of patience with dollar devaluation and domestic currency appreciation. Andrew Monahan, writing on “Japan intervenes on yen to cap sharp rise,” on Oct 31, 2011, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204528204577009152325076454.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_MIDDLETopStories), analyzes the intervention of the Bank of Japan, at request of the Ministry of Finance, on Oct 31, 2011. Traders consulted by Monahan estimate that the Bank of Japan sold JPY 7 trillion, about $92.31 billion, against the dollar, exceeding the JPY 4.5 trillion on Aug 4, 2011. The intervention caused an increase of the yen rate to JPY 79.55/USD relative to earlier trading at a low of JPY 75.31/USD. The JPY appreciated to JPY76.88/USD by Fri Nov 18 for cumulative appreciation of 3.4 percent from JPY 79.55 just after the intervention. The JPY appreciated another 0.3 percent in the week of Nov 18 but depreciated 1.1 percent in the week of Nov 25. There was mild depreciation of 0.3 percent in the week of Dec 2 that was followed by appreciation of 0.4 percent in the week of Dec 9. The JPY was virtually unchanged in the week of Dec 16 with depreciation of 0.1 percent but depreciated by 0.5 percent in the week of Dec 23, appreciating by 1.5 percent in the week of Dec 30. Historically, interventions in yen currency markets have been unsuccessful (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 107-109). Interventions are even more difficult currently with daily trading of some $4 trillion in world currency markets. Risk aversion with zero interest rates in the US diverts hot capital movements toward safe-haven currencies such as Japan, causing appreciation of the yen. Mitsuru Obe, writing on Nov 25, on “Japanese government bonds tumble,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204452104577060231493070676.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the increase in yields of the Japanese government bond with 10 year maturity to a high for one month of 1.025 percent at the close of market on Nov 25. Thin markets in after-hours trading may have played an important role in this increase in yield but there may have been an effect of a dreaded reduction in positions of bonds by banks under pressure of reducing assets. The report on Japan sustainability by the IMF (2011JSRNov23, 2), analyzes how rising yields could threaten Japan:
· “As evident from recent developments, market sentiment toward sovereigns with unsustainably large fiscal imbalances can shift abruptly, with adverse effects on debt dynamics. Should JGB yields increase, they could initiate an adverse feedback loop from rising yields to deteriorating confidence, diminishing policy space, and a contracting real economy.
· Higher yields could result in a withdrawal of liquidity from global capital markets, disrupt external positions and, through contagion, put upward pressure on sovereign bond yields elsewhere.”
Exchange rate controls by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) fixing the rate at a minimum of CHF 1.20/EUR (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20110906/source/pre_20110906.en.pdf) has prevented flight of capital into the Swiss franc. The Swiss franc remained unchanged relative to the USD in the week of Dec 23 and appreciated 0.2 percent in the week of Dec 30 relative to the USD and 0.5 percent relative to the euro, as shown in Table II-1. Risk aversion is evident in the depreciation of the Australian dollar by cumulative 2.5 percent in the week of Fr Dec 16 after no change in the week of Dec 9. In the week of Dec 23, the Australian dollar appreciated 1.9 percent, appreciating another 0.5 percent in the week of Dec 30 as shown in Table II-1. Risk appetite would be revealed by carry trades from zero interest rates in the US and Japan into high yielding currencies such as in Australia with appreciation of the Australian dollar (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 202-4, Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 70-4).
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. There are three types of actions in Europe to steer the euro zone away from the threats of fiscal and banking crises: (1) fiscal compact; (2) enhancement of stabilization tools and resources; and (3) bank capital requirements. The first two consist of agreements by the Euro Area Heads of State and government while the third one consists of measurements and recommendations by the European Banking Authority.
1. Fiscal Compact. The “fiscal compact” consists of (1) conciliation of fiscal policies and budgets within a “fiscal rule”; and (2) establishment of mechanisms of governance, monitoring and enforcement of the fiscal rule.
i. Fiscal Rule. The essence of the fiscal rule is that “general government budgets shall be balanced or in surplus” by compliance of members countries that “the annual structural deficit does not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP” (European Council 2011Dec9, 3). Individual member states will create “an automatic correction mechanism that shall be triggered in the event of deviation” (European Council 2011Dec9, 3). Member states will define their automatic correction mechanisms following principles proposed by the European Commission. Those member states falling into an “excessive deficit procedure” will provide a detailed plan of structural reforms to correct excessive deficits. The European Council and European Commission will monitor yearly budget plans for consistency with adjustment of excessive deficits. Member states will report in anticipation their debt issuance plans. Deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP and/or debt in excess of 60 percent of GDP will trigger automatic consequences.
ii. Policy Coordination and Governance. The euro area is committed to following common economic policy. In accordance, “a procedure will be established to ensure that all major economic policy reforms planned by euro area member states will be discussed and coordinated at the level of the euro area, with a view to benchmarking best practices” (European Council 2011Dec9, 5). Governance of the euro area will be strengthened with regular euro summits at least twice yearly.
2. Stabilization Tools and Resources. There are several enhancements to the bailouts of member states.
i. Facilities. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) will use leverage and the European Central Bank as agent of its market operations. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or permanent bailout facility will be operational as soon as 90 percent of the capital commitments are ratified by member states. The ESM is planned to begin in Jul 2012.
ii. Financial Resources. The overall ceiling of the EFSF/ESM of €500 billion (USD 670 billion) will be reassessed in Mar 2012. Measures will be taken to maintain “the combined effective lending capacity of EUR 500 billion” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6). Member states will “consider, and confirm within 10 days, the provision of additional resources for the IMF of up to EUR 200 billion (USD 270 billion), in the form of bilateral loans, to ensure that the IMF has adequate resources to deal with the crisis. We are looking forward to parallel contributions from the international community” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6). Matthew Dalton and Matina Stevis, writing on Dec 20, 2011, on “Euro Zone Agrees to New IMF Loans,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204791104577107974167166272.html?mod=WSJPRO_hps_MIDDLESecondNews), inform that at a meeting on Dec 20, finance ministers of the euro-zone developed plans to contribute €150 billion in bilateral loans to the IMF as provided in the agreement of Dec 9. Bailouts “will strictly adhere to the well established IMF principles and practices.” There is a specific statement on private sector involvement and its relation to recent experience: “We clearly reaffirm that the decisions taken on 21 July and 26/27 October concerning Greek debt are unique and exceptional; standardized and identical Collective Action clauses will be included, in such a way as to preserve market liquidity, in the terms and conditions of all new euro government bonds” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6). Will there be again “unique and exceptional” conditions? The ESM is authorized to take emergency decisions with “a qualified majority of 85% in case the Commission and the ECB conclude that an urgent decision related to financial assistance is needed when the financial and economic sustainability of the euro area is threatened” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6).
3. Bank Capital. The European Banking Authority (EBA) finds that European banks have a capital shortfall of €114.7 billion (http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/capitalexercise/Press%20release%20FINAL.pdf). To avoid credit difficulties, the EBA recommends “that the credit institutions build a temporary capital buffer to reach a 9% Core Tier 1 ratio by 30 June 2012” (http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/capitalexercise/EBA%20BS%202011%20173%20Recommendation%20FINAL.pdf 6). Patrick Jenkins, Martin Stabe and Stanley Pignal, writing on Dec 9, 2011, on “EU banks slash sovereign holdings,” published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a6d2fd4e-228f-11e1-acdc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gAlaswcW), analyze the balance sheets of European banks released by the European Banking Authority. They conclude that European banks have reduced their holdings of riskier sovereign debt of countries in Europe by €65 billion from the end of 2010 to Sep 2011. Bankers informed that the European Central Bank and hedge funds acquired those exposures that represent 13 percent of their holdings of debt to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, which are down to €513 billion by the end of IIIQ2011.
The members of the European Monetary Union (EMU), or euro area, established the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), on May 9, 2010, to (http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm):
- “Provide loans to countries in financial difficulties
- Intervene in the debt primary and secondary markets. Intervention in the secondary market will be only on the basis of an ECB analysis recognising the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability
- Act on the basis of a precautionary programme
- Finance recapitalisations of financial institutions through loans to governments”
The EFSF will be replaced by the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2013. On Mar 30, 2012, members of the euro area reached an agreement providing for sufficient funding required in rescue programs of members countries facing funding and fiscal difficulties and the transition from the EFSF to the ESM. The agreement of Mar 30, 2012 of the euro area members provides for the following (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1513204/eurogroup_statement_30_march_12.pdf):
· Acceleration of ESM paid-in capital. The acceleration of paid-in capital for the ESM provides for two tranches paid in 2012, in July and Oct; another two tranches in 2013; and a final tranche in the first half of 2014. There could be acceleration of paid-in capital is required to maintain a 15 percent relation of paid-in capital and the outstanding issue of the ESM
· ESM Operation and EFSF transition. ESM will assume all new rescue programs beginning in Jul 2012. EFSF will administer programs begun before initiation of ESM activities. There will be a transition period for the EFSF until mid 2013 in which it can engage in new programs if required to maintain the full lending limit of €500 billion.
· Increase of ESM/EFSF lending limit. The combined ceiling of the ESM and EFSF will be increased to €700 billion to facilitate operation of the transition of the EFSF to the ESM. The ESM lending ceiling will be €500 billion by mid 2013. The combined lending ceiling of the ESM and EFSF will continue to €700 billion
· Prior lending. The bilateral Greek loan facility of €53 billion and €49 billion of the EFSF have been paid-out in supporting programs of countries: “all together the euro area is mobilizing an overall firewall of approximately EUR 800 billion, more than USD 1 trillion” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1513204/eurogroup_statement_30_march_12.pdf)
· Bilateral IMF contributions. Members of the euro area have made commitments of bilateral contributions to the IMF of €150 billion
A key development in the bailout of Greece is the approval by the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Mar 15, 2012, of a new four-year financing in the value of €28 billion to be disbursed in equal quarterly disbursements (http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2012/tr031512.htm). The sovereign debt crisis of Europe has moderated significantly with the elimination of immediate default of Greece. New economic and financial risk factors have developed, which are covered in VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets and V World Economic Slowdown.
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort. European Central Bank. The operations of the European Central Bank (ECB) are important in analyzing risk taking in financial markets. Some events are discussed initially below followed by analysis of the ECB’s balance sheet. Risk aversion during the week of Mar 2, 2012, was dominated by the long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) of the European Central Bank. LTROs and related principles are analyzed in subsection IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort. First, as analyzed by David Enrich, writing on “ECB allots €529.5 billion in long-term refinancing operations,” published on Feb 29, 2012 by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203986604577252803223310964.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), the ECB provided a second round of three-year loans at 1.0 percent to about 800 banks. The earlier round provided €489 billion to more than 500 banks. Second, the ECB sets the fixed-rate for main refinancing operations at 1.00 percent and the overnight deposit facility at 0.25 percent (http://www.ecb.int/home/html/index.en.html) for negative spread of 75 basis points. That is, if a bank borrows at 1.0 percent for three years through the LTRO and deposits overnight at the ECB, it incurs negative spread of 75 basis points. An alternative allocation could be to lend for a positive spread to other banks. Richard Milne, writing on “Banks deposit record cash with ECB,” on Mar 2, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9798fd36-644a-11e1-b30e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1nxeicB6H), provides important information and analysis that banks deposited a record €776.9 billion at the ECB on Fri Mar 2 at interest receipt of 0.25 percent, just two days after receiving €529.5 billion of LTRO loans at interest cost of 1.0 percent. The main issue here is whether there is ongoing perceptions of high risks in counterparties in financial transactions that froze credit markets in 2008 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009a), 57-60, 217-27, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009b), 155-67). Richard Milne and Mary Watkins, writing on “European finance: the leaning tower of perils,” on Mar 27, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/82205f6e-7735-11e1-baf3-00144feab49a.html#axzz1qOqWaqF2), raise concerns that the large volume of LTROs can create future problems for banks and the euro area. An important issue is if the cheap loans at 1 percent for three-year terms finance the carry trade into securities of the governments of banks. Balance sheets of banks may be stressed during future sovereign-credit events. Sam Jones, writing on “ECB liquidity fuels high stakes hedging,” on Apr 4, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cb74d63a-7e75-11e1-b009-00144feab49a.html#axzz1qyDYxLjS), analyzes unusually high spreads in government bond markets in Europe that could have been caused by LTROs. There has been active relative value arbitrage of these spreads similar to the strategies of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) of capturing high spreads in mortgage-backed securities jointly with hedges in Treasury securities (on LTCM see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 108-12, 87-9, The Global Recession Risk (2007) 12-3, 102, 176, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 59-64).
The European Central Bank (ECB) has been pressured to assist in the bailouts by acquiring sovereign debts. The ECB has been providing liquidity lines to banks under pressure and has acquired sovereign debts but not in the scale desired by authorities. In an important statement to the European Parliament, the President of the ECB Mario Draghi (2011Dec1) opened the possibility of further ECB actions but after a decisive “fiscal compact:”
“What I believe our economic and monetary union needs is a new fiscal compact – a fundamental restatement of the fiscal rules together with the mutual fiscal commitments that euro area governments have made.
Just as we effectively have a compact that describes the essence of monetary policy – an independent central bank with a single objective of maintaining price stability – so a fiscal compact would enshrine the essence of fiscal rules and the government commitments taken so far, and ensure that the latter become fully credible, individually and collectively.
We might be asked whether a new fiscal compact would be enough to stabilise markets and how a credible longer-term vision can be helpful in the short term. Our answer is that it is definitely the most important element to start restoring credibility.
Other elements might follow, but the sequencing matters. And it is first and foremost important to get a commonly shared fiscal compact right. Confidence works backwards: if there is an anchor in the long term, it is easier to maintain trust in the short term. After all, investors are themselves often taking decisions with a long time horizon, especially with regard to government bonds.
A new fiscal compact would be the most important signal from euro area governments for embarking on a path of comprehensive deepening of economic integration. It would also present a clear trajectory for the future evolution of the euro area, thus framing expectations.”
An important statement of Draghi (2011Dec15) focuses on the role of central banking: “You all know that the statutes of the ECB inherited this important principle and that central bank independence and the credible pursuit of price stability go hand in hand.”
Draghi (2011Dec19) explains measures to ensure “access to funding markets” by euro zone banks:
§ “We have decided on three-year refinancing operations to support the supply of credit to the euro area economy. These measures address the risk that persistent financial markets tensions could affect the capacity of euro area banks to obtain refinancing over longer horizons.
§ Earlier, in October, the Governing Council had already decided to have two more refinancing operations with a maturity of around one year.
§ Also, it was announced then that in all refinancing operations until at least the first half of 2012 all liquidity demand by banks would be fully allotted at fixed rate.
§ Funding via the covered bonds market was also facilitated by the ECB deciding in October to introduce a new Covered Bond Purchase Programme of €40 billion.
§ Funding in US dollar is facilitated by lowering the pricing on the temporary US dollar liquidity swap arrangements.”
Lionel Barber and Ralph Atkins interviewed Mario Draghi on Dec 14 with the transcript published in the Financial Times on Dec 18 (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/25d553ec-2972-11e1-a066-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gzoHXOj6) as “FT interview transcript: Mario Draghi.” A critical question in the interview is if the new measures are a European version of quantitative easing. Draghi analyzes the difference between the measures of the European Central Bank (ECB) and quantitative easing such as in Japan, US and UK:
1. The measures are termed “non-standard” instead of “unconventional.” While quantitative easing attempts to lower the yield of targeted maturities, the three-year facility operates through the “bank channel.” Quantitative easing would not be feasible because the ECB is statutorily prohibited of funding central governments. The ECB would comply with its mandate of medium-term price stability.
2. There is a critical difference in the two programs. Quantitative easing has been used as a form of financial repression known as “directed lending.” For example, the purchase of mortgage-backed securities more recently or the suspension of the auctions of 30-year bonds in response to the contraction early in the 2000s has the clear objective of directing spending to housing. The ECB gives the banks entire discretion on how to use the funding within their risk/return decisions, which could include purchase of government bonds.
The question on the similarity of the ECB three-year lending facility and quantitative easing is quite valid. Tracy Alloway, writing on Oct 10, 2011, on “Investors worry over cheap ECB money side effects,” published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d2f87d16-f339-11e0-8383-00144feab49a.html#axzz1hAqMH1vn), analyzes the use of earlier long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) of the ECB. LTROs by the ECB in Jun, Sep and Dec 2009 lent €614 billion at 1 percent. Alloway quotes estimates of Deutsche Bank that banks used €442billion to acquire assets with higher yields. Carry trades developed from LTRO funds at 1 percent into liquid investments at a higher yield to earn highly profitable spreads. Alloway quotes estimates of Morgan Stanley that European debt of GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) in European bank balance sheets is €700 billion. Tracy Alloway, writing on Dec 21, 2011, on “Demand for ECB loans rises to €489bn,” published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d6ddd0ae-2bbd-11e1-98bc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1hAqMH1vn), informs that European banks borrowed the largest value of €489 billion in all LTROs of the ECB. Tom Fairless and David Cottle, writing on Dec 21, 2011, on “ECB sees record refinancing demand,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577111983838592746.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), inform that the first of three operations of the ECB lent €489.19 billion, or $639.96 billion, to 523 banks. Three such LTROs could add to $1.9 trillion, which is not far from the value of quantitative easing in the US of $2.5 trillion. Fairless and Cottle find that there could be renewed hopes that banks could use the LTROs to support euro zone bond markets. It is possible that there could be official moral suasion by governments on banks to increase their holdings of government bonds or at least not to sell existing holdings. Banks are not free to choose assets in evaluation of risk and returns. Floods of cheap money at 1 percent per year induce carry trades to high-risk assets and not necessarily financing of growth with borrowing and lending decisions constrained by shocks of confidence.
The LTROs of the ECB are not very different from the liquidity facilities of the Fed during the financial crisis. Kohn (2009Sep10) finds that the trillions of dollars in facilities provided by the Fed (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-64, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 224-7) could fall under normal principles of “lender of last resort” of central banks:
“The liquidity measures we took during the financial crisis, although unprecedented in their details, were generally consistent with Bagehot's principles and aimed at short-circuiting these feedback loops. The Federal Reserve lends only against collateral that meets specific quality requirements, and it applies haircuts where appropriate. Beyond the collateral, in many cases we also have recourse to the borrowing institution for repayment. In the case of the TALF, we are backstopped by the Treasury. In addition, the terms and conditions of most of our facilities are designed to be unattractive under normal market conditions, thus preserving borrowers' incentives to obtain funds in the market when markets are operating normally. Apart from a very small number of exceptions involving systemically important institutions, such features have limited the extent to which the Federal Reserve has taken on credit risk, and the overall credit risk involved in our lending during the crisis has been small.
In Ricardo's view, if the collateral had really been good, private institutions would have lent against it. However, as has been recognized since Bagehot, private lenders, acting to protect themselves, typically severely curtail lending during a financial crisis, irrespective of the quality of the available collateral. The central bank--because it is not liquidity constrained and has the infrastructure in place to make loans against a variety of collateral--is well positioned to make those loans in the interest of financial stability, and can make them without taking on significant credit risk, as long as its lending is secured by sound collateral. A key function of the central bank is to lend in such circumstances to contain the crisis and mitigate its effects on the economy.”
The Bagehot (1873) principle is that central banks should provide a safety net, lending to temporarily illiquid but solvent banks and not to insolvent banks (see Cline 2001, 2002; Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 175-8). Kohn (2009Apr18) characterizes “quantitative easing” as “large scale purchases of assets:”
“Another aspect of our efforts to affect financial conditions has been the extension of our open market operations to large-scale purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), agency debt, and longer-term Treasury debt. We initially announced our intention to undertake large-scale asset purchases last November, when the federal funds rate began to approach its zero lower bound and we needed to begin applying stimulus through other channels as the economic contraction deepened. These purchases are intended to reduce intermediate- and longer-term interest rates on mortgages and other credit to households and businesses; those rates influence decisions about investments in long-lived assets like houses, consumer durable goods, and business capital. In ordinary circumstances, the typically quite modest volume of central bank purchases and sales of such assets has only small and temporary effects on their yields. However, the extremely large volume of purchases now underway does appear to have substantially lowered yields. The decline in yields reflects "preferred habitat" behavior, meaning that there is not perfect arbitrage between the yields on longer-term assets and current and expected short-term interest rates. These preferences are likely to be especially strong in current circumstances, so that long-term asset prices rise and yields fall as the Federal Reserve acquires a significant portion of the outstanding stock of securities held by the public.”
Non-standard ECB policy and unconventional Fed policy have a common link in the scale of implementation or policy doses. Direct lending by the central bank to banks is the function “large scale lender of last resort.” If there is moral suasion by governments to coerce banks into increasing their holdings of government bonds, the correct term would be financial repression.
An important additional measure discussed by Draghi (2011Nov19) is relaxation on the collateral pledged by banks in LTROs:
“Some banks’ access to refinancing operations may be restricted by lack of eligible collateral. To overcome this, a temporary expansion of the list of collateral has been decided. Furthermore, the ECB intends to enhance the use of bank loans as collateral in Eurosystem operations. These measures should support bank lending, by increasing the amount of assets on euro area banks’ balance sheets that can be used to obtain central bank refinancing.”
There are collateral concerns about European banks. David Enrich and Sara Schaefer Muñoz, writing on Dec 28, on “European bank worry: collateral,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203899504577126430202451796.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyze the strain on bank funding from a squeeze in the availability of high-quality collateral as guarantee in funding. High-quality collateral includes government bonds and investment-grade non-government debt. There could be difficulties in funding for a bank without sufficient available high-quality collateral to offer in guarantee of loans. It is difficult to assess from bank balance sheets the availability of sufficient collateral to support bank funding requirements. There has been erosion in the quality of collateral as a result of the debt crisis and further erosion could occur. Perceptions of counterparty risk among financial institutions worsened the credit/dollar crisis of 2007 to 2009. The banking theory of Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b) and the model of Diamond Dybvig (1983, 1986) provide the analysis of bank functions that explains the credit crisis of 2007 to 2008 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 155-7, 48-52, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 52-66, 217-24). In fact, Rajan (2005, 339-41) anticipated the role of low interest rates in causing a hunt for yields in multiple financial markets from hedge funds to emerging markets and that low interest rates foster illiquidity. Rajan (2005, 341) argued:
“The point, therefore, is that common factors such as low interest rates—potentially caused by accommodative monetary policy—can engender excessive tolerance for risk on both sides of financial transactions.”
A critical function of banks consists of providing transformation services that convert illiquid risky loans and investment that the bank monitors into immediate liquidity such as unmonitored demand deposits. Credit in financial markets consists of the transformation of asset-backed securities (SRP) constructed with monitoring by financial institutions into unmonitored immediate liquidity by sale and repurchase agreements (SRP). In the financial crisis financial institutions distrusted the quality of their own balance sheets and those of their counterparties in SRPs. The financing counterparty distrusted that the financed counterparty would not repurchase the assets pledged in the SRP that could collapse in value below the financing provided. A critical problem was the unwillingness of banks to lend to each other in unsecured short-term loans. Emse Bartha, writing on Dec 28, on “Deposits at ECB hit high,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204720204577125913779446088.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), informs that banks deposited €453.034 billion, or $589.72 billion, at the ECB on Dec 28, which is a record high in two consecutive days. The deposit facility is typically used by banks when they do prefer not to extend unsecured loans to other banks. In addition, banks borrowed €6.225 billion from the overnight facility on Dec 28, when in normal times only a few hundred million euro are borrowed. The collateral issues and the possible increase in counterparty risk occurred a week after large-scale lender of last resort by the ECB in the value of €489 billion in the prior week. The ECB may need to extend its lender of last resort operations.
The financial reform of the United States around the proposal of a national bank by Alexander Hamilton (1780) to develop the money economy with specialization away from the barter economy is credited with creating the financial system that brought prosperity over a long period (see Pelaez 2008). Continuing growth and prosperity together with sound financial management earned the US dollar the role as reserve currency and the AAA rating of its Treasury securities. McKinnon (2011Dec18) analyzes the resolution of the European debt crisis by comparison with the reform of Alexander Hamilton. Northern states of the US had financed the revolutionary war with the issue of paper notes that were at risk of default by 1890. Alexander Hamilton proposed the purchase of the states’ paper notes by the Federal government without haircuts. McKinnon (2011Dec18) describes the conflicts before passing the assumption bill in 1790 for federal absorption of the debts of states. Other elements in the Hamilton reform consisted of creation of a market for US Treasury bonds by their use as paid-in capital in the First Bank of the United States. McKinnon (2011Dec18) finds growth of intermediation in the US by the branching of the First Bank of the United States throughout several states, accepting deposits to provide commercial short-term credit. The reform consolidated the union of states, fiscal credibility for the union and financial intermediation required for growth. The reform also introduced low tariffs and an excise tax on whisky to service the interest on the federal debt. Trade relations among members of the euro zone are highly important to economic activity. There are two lessons drawn by McKinnon (2011Dec18) from the experience of Hamilton for the euro zone currently. (1) The reform of Hamilton included new taxes for the assumption of debts of states with concrete provisions for their credibility. (2) Commercial lending was consolidated with a trusted bank both for accepting private deposits and for commercial lending, creating the structure of financial intermediation required for growth.
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk. Markets have been dominated by rating actions of Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (S&PRS) (2012Jan13) on 16 members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or eurozone. The actions by S&PRS (2012Jan13) are of several types:
1. Downgrades by two notches of long-term credit ratings of Cyprus (from BBB/Watch/NegA-3+ to BB+/Neg/B), Italy (from A/Watch Neg/A-1 to BBB+/Neg/A-2), Portugal (from BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3 to BB/Neg/B) and Spain (from AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+ to A/Neg/A-1).
2. Downgrades by one notch of long-term credit ratings of Austria (from AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+ to AA+/Neg/A-1+), France (from AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+ to AA+/Neg A-1+), Malta (from A/Watch, Neg/A-1 to A-/Neg/A-2), Slovakia (from A+/Watch Neg/A-1 to A/Stable/A-1) and Slovenia (AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+ to A+/Neg/A-1).
3. Affirmation of long-term ratings of Belgium (AA/Neg/A-1+), Estonia (AA-/Neg/A-1+), Finland (AAA/Neg/A-1+), Germany (AAA/Stable/A-1+), Ireland (BBB+/Neg/A-2), Luxembourg (AAA/Neg/A-1+) and the Netherlands (AAA/Neg/A-1+) with removal from CreditWatch.
4. Negative outlook on the long-term credit ratings of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, meaning that S&PRS (2012Jan13) finds that the ratings of these sovereigns have a chance of at least 1-to-3 of downgrades in 2012 or 2013.
S&PRS (2012Jan13) finds that measures by European policymakers may not be sufficient to contain sovereign risks in the eurozone. The sources of stress according to S&PRS (2012Jan13) are:
1. Worsening credit environment
2. Increases in risk premiums for many eurozone borrowers
3. Simultaneous attempts at reducing debts by both eurozone governments and households
4. More limited perspectives of economic growth
5. Deepening and protracted division among Europe’s policymakers in agreeing to approaches to resolve the European debt crisis
There is now only one major country in the eurozone with AAA rating of its long-term debt by S&PRS (2012Jan13): Germany. IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk analyzes the hurdle of financial bailouts of euro area members by the strength of the credit of Germany alone. The sum of the debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland is abouy $3531.6 billion. There is some simple “unpleasant bond arithmetic.” Suppose the entire debt burdens of the five countries with probability of default were to be guaranteed by France and Germany, which de facto would be required by continuing the euro zone. The sum of the total debt of these five countries and the debt of France and Germany is about $7385.1 billion, which would be equivalent to 126.3 percent of their combined GDP in 2010. Under this arrangement the entire debt of the euro zone including debt of France and Germany would not have nil probability of default. Debt as percent of Germany’s GDP would exceed 224 percent if including debt of France and 165 percent of German GDP if excluding French debt. The unpleasant bond arithmetic illustrates that there is a limit as to how far Germany and France can go in bailing out the countries with unsustainable sovereign debt without incurring severe pains of their own such as downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings. A central bank is not typically engaged in direct credit because of remembrance of inflation and abuse in the past. There is also a limit to operations of the European Central Bank in doubtful credit obligations. Charles Forelle, writing on Jan 14, 2012, on “Downgrade hurts euro rescue fund,” published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204409004577159210191567778.html), analyzes the impact of the downgrades on the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The EFSF is a special purpose vehicle that has not capital but can raise funds to be used in bailouts by issuing AAA-rated debt. S&P may cut the rating of the EFSF to the new lowest rating of the six countries with AAA rating, which are now down to four with the downgrades of France and Austria. The other rating agencies Moody’s and Fitch have not taken similar action. On Jan, S&PRS (2012Jan16) did cut the long-term credit rating of the EFSF to AA+ and affirmed the short-term credit rating at A-+. The decision is derived from the reduction in credit rating of the countries guaranteeing the EFSF. In the view of S&PRS (2012Jan16), there are not sufficient credit enhancements after the reduction in the creditworthiness of the countries guaranteeing the EFSF. The decision could be reversed if credit enhancements were provided.
The flow of cash from safe havens to risk financial assets is processed by carry trades from zero interest rates that are frustrated by episodes of risk aversion or encouraged with return of risk appetite. European sovereign risk crises are closely linked to the exposures of regional banks to government debt. An important form of financial repression consists of changing the proportions of debt held by financial institutions toward higher shares in government debt. The financial history of Latin America, for example, is rich in such policies. Bailouts in the euro zone have sanctioned “bailing in” the private sector, which means that creditors such as banks will participate by “voluntary” reduction of the principal in government debt (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 163-202). David Enrich, Sara Schaeffer Muñoz and Patricia Knowsmann, writing on “European nations pressure own banks for loans,” on Nov 29, 2011, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066431341281676.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_MIDDLETopStories), provide important data and analysis on the role of banks in the European sovereign risk crisis. They assemble data from various sources showing that domestic banks hold 16.2 percent of Italy’s total government securities outstanding of €1,617.4 billion, 22.9 percent of Portugal’s total government securities of €103.9 billion and 12.3 percent of Spain’s total government securities of €535.3 billion. Capital requirements force banks to hold government securities to reduce overall risk exposure in balance sheets. Enrich, Schaeffer Muñoz and Knowsmann find information that governments are setting pressures on banks to acquire more government debt or at least to stop selling their holdings of government debt.
Bond auctions are also critical in episodes of risk aversion. David Oakley, writing on Jan 3, 2012, on “Sovereign issues draw euro to crunch point,” published by the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/63b9d7ca-2bfa-11e1-98bc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1iLNRyEbs), estimates total euro area sovereign issues in 2012 at €794 billion, much higher than the long-term average of €670 billion. Oakley finds that the sovereign issues are: Italy €220 billion, France €197 billion, Germany €178 billion and Spain €81 billion. Bond auctions will test the resilience of the euro. Victor Mallet and Robin Wigglesworth, writing on Jan 12, 2012, on “Spain and Italy raise €22bn in debt sales,” published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e22c4e28-3d05-11e1-ae07-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1j4euflAi), analyze debt auctions during the week. Spain placed €10 billion of new bonds with maturities in 2015 and 2016, which was twice the maximum planned for the auction. Italy placed €8.5 billion of one-year bills at average yield of 2.735 percent, which was less than one-half of the yield of 5.95 percent a month before. Italy also placed €3.5 billion of 136-day bills at 1.64 percent. There may be some hope in the sovereign debt market. The yield of Italy’s 10-year bond dropped from around 7.20 percent on Jan 9 to about 6.70 percent on Jan 13 and then to around 6.30 percent on Jan 20. The yield of Spain’s 10-year bond fell from about 6.60 percent on Jan 9 to around 5.20 percent on Jan 13 and then to 5.50 percent on Jan 20.
A combination of strong economic data in China analyzed in subsection VC and the realization of the widely expected downgrade could explain the strength of the European sovereign debt market. Emese Bartha, Art Patnaude and Nick Cawley, writing on January 17, 2012, on “European T-bills see solid demand,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204555904577166363369792848.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyze successful auctions treasury bills by Spain and Greece. A day after the downgrade, the EFSF found strong demand on Jan 17 for its six-month debt auction at the yield of 0.2664 percent, which is about the same as sovereign bills of France with the same maturity.
There may be some hope in the sovereign debt market. The yield of Italy’s 10-year bond dropped from around 7.20 percent on Jan 9 to about 6.70 percent on Jan 13 and then to around 6.30 percent on Jan 20. The yield of Spain’s 10-year bond fell from about 6.60 percent on Jan 9 to around 5.20 percent on Jan 13 and then to 5.50 percent on Jan 20. Paul Dobson, Emma Charlton and Lucy Meakin, writing on Jan 20, 2012, on “Bonds show return of crisis once ECB loans expire,” published in Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-20/bonds-show-return-of-crisis-once-ecb-loans-expire-euro-credit.html), analyze sovereign debt and analysis of market participants. Large-scale lending of last resort by the European Central Bank, considered in VD Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort, provided ample liquidity in the euro zone for banks to borrow at 1 percent and lend at higher rates, including to government. Dobson, Charlton and Meakin trace the faster decline of yields of short-term sovereign debt relative to decline of yields of long-term sovereign debt. The significant fall of the spread of short relative to long yields could signal concern about the resolution of the sovereign debt while expanding lender of last resort operations have moderated relative short-term sovereign yields. Normal conditions would be attained if there is definitive resolution of long-term sovereign debt that would require fiscal consolidation in an environment of economic growth.
The selloff in world financial market on Fri Jul 20 was largely caused by doubts on the success of Spain resolution of its banks. Ilan Brat, David Román and Charles Forelle, writing on “Spanish worries feed global fears,” on Jul 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444464304577538613391486808.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyze the selloff in financial markets by the warning by the Spanish government of prolonged weak economic conditions with decline of GDP of 0.5 percent in 2013 while the government of the province of Valencia will require €18 billion from the central government. Other provincial governments are in need of cash. Spain intends to lower its deficit from 8.9 percent of GDP in 2011 to 2.8 percent by 2014. The yield of the ten-year government bond of Spain rose sharply to 7.224 percent on Fri Jul 20 while the yield of the ten-year government bond of Italy increased to 6.158 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). The FTSE MIB index of Italian equities dropped 4.38 percent on Fri Jul 20 while the IBEX 35 index of Spanish equities fell 5.82 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).
Charles Forelle and David Enrich, writing on “Euro-zone banks cut back lending,” on Jul 13, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303919504577524482252510066.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyze the new mechanics of interbank lending in the euro zone. In the older regime, the deficits of households, corporations and governments of highly-indebted members of the euro zone were financed by banks in their jurisdictions that received interbank loans from banks in the less indebted or financially-stronger countries. The increase of perceptions of default risk in counterparties in transactions among financial institutions constituted an important disruption of the international financial system during the financial crisis (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-24, 60, Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 155-7). Counterparty risk perceptions rose significantly in sale and repurchase agreements (SRP) in which the financing counterparty doubted the credit quality of the collateral and of the financed counterparty to repurchase the security. Another form of counterparty risk was the sharp increase in the LIBOR-OIS in which lending banks doubted the balance sheet of borrowing counterparty banks in uncollateralized interbank loans. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone caused sharp increases in the perception of counterparty risk evaluation by lending banks in financially-stronger jurisdictions of balance sheets and repayment capacity of borrowing banks in highly-indebted countries. Forelle and Enrich, “Euro zone banks cut back lending,” use central bank information showing that long-term financing by the European Central Bank (ECB) is filling the financing gap of banks in highly indebted countries with significant part of ECB lending simply returning as deposits in countries in stronger jurisdictions and also as deposits at the ECB. As a result, risk spreads of interest rates in highly indebted countries have increased relative to interest rates in stronger countries, which is a movement in opposite direction of what would be desired to resolve the euro zone financial crisis. Crisis resolution has moved to preventing banking instability that could accentuate the financial crisis and fiscal standing of highly-indebted countries.
Current financial risk is dominated by interest rate decisions of major central banks and the new program of rescue of banks and countries in the sovereign risk event in the euro zone. At the meeting of its Governing Council on Jul 5, 2010, the European Central Bank took the following policy measures (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120705.en.html):
“5 July 2012 - Monetary policy decisions
At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:
1. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.75%, starting from the operation to be settled on 11 July 2012.
2. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 25 basis points to 1.50%, with effect from 11 July 2012.
3. The interest rate on the deposit facility will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.00%, with effect from 11 July 2012.
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press conference starting at 2.30 p.m. CET today.”
The President of the ECB Mario Draghi summarized the reasons for the policy measures as follows (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120705.en.html):
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to cut the key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. Inflationary pressure over the policy-relevant horizon has been dampened further as some of the previously identified downside risks to the euro area growth outlook have materialised. Consistent with this picture, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains subdued. Inflation expectations for the euro area economy continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. At the same time, economic growth in the euro area continues to remain weak, with heightened uncertainty weighing on confidence and sentiment.”
The Bank of England decided on Jul 5, 2012 to increase its policy of quantitative easing (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2012/066.aspx ):
“The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee today voted to maintain the official Bank Rate paid on commercial bank reserves at 0.5%. The Committee also voted to increase the size of its asset purchase programme, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, by £50 billion to a total of £375 billion.
UK output has barely grown for a year and a half and is estimated to have fallen in both of the past two quarters. The pace of expansion in most of the United Kingdom’s main export markets also appears to have slowed. Business indicators point to a continuation of that weakness in the near term, both at home and abroad. In spite of the progress made at the latest European Council, concerns remain about the indebtedness and competitiveness of several euro-area economies, and that is weighing on confidence here. The correspondingly weaker outlook for UK output growth means that the margin of economic slack is likely to be greater and more persistent.”
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) also cut interest rates simultaneously with the other major central banks (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2012/20120608171005950734495/20120608171005950734495_.html):
“The PBC has decided to cut RMB benchmark deposit and loan interest rates for financial institutions as of June 8, 2012. The one-year RMB benchmark deposit and loan interest rates will be lowered both by 0.25 percentage points. Adjustments are made correspondingly to benchmark interest rates on deposits and loans of other maturities and to deposit and loan interest rates on personal housing provident fund.”
Monetary authorities worldwide are assessing higher risks to the economy.
The key decisions of the summit of European Leaders with regards to resolving the sovereign debt issues are (http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/summit-impact-on-the-eurozone?lang=en):
“Euro area summit statement
Eurozone heads of state or government decided:
- to establish a single banking supervisory mechanism run the by the ECB, and, once this mechanism has been created,
- to provide the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with the possibility to inject funds into banks directly.
Spain's bank recapitalisation will begin under current rules, i.e. with assistance provided by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) until the ESM becomes available. The funds will then be transferred to the ESM without gaining seniority status.
It was also agreed that EFSF/ESM funds can be used flexibly to buy bonds for member states that comply with common rules, recommendations and timetables.
The Eurogroup has been asked to implement these decisions by 9 July 2012.”
Valuations of risk financial assets increased sharply after the announcement of these decisions. The details will be crafted at a meeting on finance ministries of the European Union on Jul 9, 2012.
The definition of “banking panic” by Calomiris and Gorton (1991, 112) during the Great Depression in the US is:
“A banking panic occurs when bank debt holders at all or many banks in the banking system suddenly demand that banks convert their debt claims into cash (at par) to such an extent that the banks suspend convertibility of their debt into cash, or in the case of the United States, act collectively to avoid suspension of convertibility by issuing clearing house loan certificates.”
The financial panic during the credit crisis and global recession consisted of a run on the sale and repurchase agreements (SRP) of structured investment products (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Cochrane and Zingales (2009) argue that the initial proposal for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) instead of the failure of Lehman Bros caused the flight into the dollar and Treasury securities. Washington Mutual experienced a silent run in the form of internet withdrawals. The current silent run in the euro area is from banks with challenged balance sheets in highly indebted member countries to banks and government securities in countries with stronger fiscal affairs. The analysis of the IMF 2012 Article IV Consultation focuses on this key policy priority of reversing the silent run on challenged euro area banks.
Jonathan House, writing on “Spanish banks need as much as €62 billion in new capital,” on Jun 21, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304765304577480062972372858.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), informs that two independent studies estimate the needs new capital of Spain’s banks at €62, billion, around $78.8 billion, which will be used by the government of Spain in the request for financial assistance from the European Union during the meeting with finance ministers.
The European Central Bank (ECB) announced changes in acceptable collateral for refinancing (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120622.en.html):
“On 20 June 2012 the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided on additional measures to improve the access of the banking sector to Eurosystem operations in order to further support the provision of credit to households and non-financial corporations.
The Governing Council has reduced the rating threshold and amended the eligibility requirements for certain asset-backed securities (ABSs). It has thus broadened the scope of the measures to increase collateral availability which were introduced on 8 December 2011 and which remain applicable.
In addition to the ABSs that are already eligible for use as collateral in Eurosystem operations, the Eurosystem will consider the following ABSs as eligible:
1. Auto loan, leasing and consumer finance ABSs and ABSs backed by commercial mortgages (CMBSs) which have a second-best rating of at least “single A” in the Eurosystem’s harmonised credit scale, at issuance and at all times subsequently. These ABSs will be subject to a valuation haircut of 16%.
2. Residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), securities backed by loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), auto loan, leasing and consumer finance ABSs and CMBSs which have a second-best rating of at least “triple B” in the Eurosystem’s harmonised credit scale, at issuance and at all times subsequently. RMBSs, securities backed by loans to SMEs, and auto loan, leasing and consumer finance ABSs would be subject to a valuation haircut of 26%, while CMBSs would be subject to a valuation haircut of 32%.
The risk control framework with higher haircuts applicable to the newly eligible ABS aims at ensuring risk equalisation across asset classes and maintaining the risk profile of the Eurosystem.
The newly eligible ABSs must also satisfy additional requirements which will be specified in the legal act to be adopted Thursday, 28 June 2012. The measures will take effect as soon as the relevant legal act enters into force.”
Charles Forelle and Stephen Fidler, writing on Dec 10, 2011, on “Questions place EU pact,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203413304577087562993283958.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories#project%3DEUSUMMIT121011%26articleTabs%3Darticle), provide data, information and analysis of the agreement of Dec 9. There are multiple issues centering on whether investors will be reassured that the measures have reduced the risks of European sovereign obligations. While the European Central Bank has welcomed the measures, it is not yet clear of its future role in preventing erosion of sovereign debt values.
Another complicating factor is whether there will be further actions on sovereign debt ratings. On Dec 5, 2011, four days before the conclusion of the meeting of European leaders, Standard & Poor’s (2011Dec5) placed the sovereign ratings of 15 members of the euro zone on “CreditWatch with negative implications.” S&P finds five conditions that trigger the action: (1) worsening credit conditions in the euro area; (2) differences among member states on how to manage the debt crisis in the short run and on measures to move toward enhanced fiscal convergence; (3) household and government debt at high levels throughout large parts of the euro area; (4) increasing risk spreads on euro area sovereigns, including those with AAA ratings; and (5) increasing risks of recession in the euro zone. S&P also placed the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in CreditWatch with negative implications (http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245325307963). On Dec 9, 2011, Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the ratings of the three largest French banks (http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-BNP-Paribass-long-term-ratings-to-Aa3-concluding--PR_232989 http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Credit-Agricole-SAs-long-term-ratings-to-Aa3--PR_233004 http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Socit-Gnrales-long-term-ratings-to-A1--PR_232986 ).
Improving equity markets and strength of the euro appear related to developments in sovereign debt negotiations and markets. Alkman Granitsas and Costas Paris, writing on Jan 29, 2012, on “Greek debt deal, new loan agreement to finish next week,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204573704577189021923288392.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), inform that Greece and its private creditors were near finishing a deal of writing off €100 billion, about $132 billion, of Greece’s debt depending on the conversations between Greece, the euro area and the IMF on the new bailout. An agreement had been reached in Oct 2011 for a new package of fresh money in the amount of €130 billion to fill needs through 2015 but was contingent on haircuts reducing Greece’s debt from 160 percent of GDP to 120 percent of GDP. The new bailout would be required to prevent default by Greece of €14.4 billion maturing on Mar 20, 2012. There has been increasing improvement of sovereign bond yields. Italy’s ten-year bond yield fell from over 6.30 percent on Jan 20, 2012 to slightly above 5.90 percent on Jan 27. Spain’s ten-year bond yield fell from slightly above 5.50 percent on Jan 20 to just below 5 percent on Jan 27.
An important difference, according to Beim (2011Oct9), between large-scale buying of bonds by the central bank between the Federal Reserve of the US and the European Central Bank (ECB) is that the Fed and most banks do not buy local and state government obligations with lower creditworthiness. The European Monetary Union (EMU) that created the euro and the ECB did not include common fiscal policy and affairs. Thus, EMU cannot issue its own treasury obligations. The line “Reserve bank credit” in the Fed balance sheet for Jan 25, 2012, is $2902 billion of which $2570 billion consisting of $1565 billion US Treasury notes and bonds, $68 billion inflation-indexed bonds and notes, $101 billion Federal agency debt securities and $836 billion mortgage-backed securities (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). The Fed has been careful in avoiding credit risk in its portfolio of securities. The 11 exceptional liquidity facilities of several trillion dollars created during the financial crisis (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-62) have not resulted in any losses. The Fed has used unconventional monetary policy without credit risk as in classical central banking.
Beim (2011Oct9, 6) argues:
“In short, the ECB system holds more than €1 trillion of debt of the banks and governments of the 17 member states. The state-by-state composition of this debt is not disclosed, but the events of the past year suggest that a disproportionate fraction of these assets are likely obligations of stressed countries. If a significant fraction of the €1 trillion were to be restructured at 40-60% discounts, the ECB would have a massive problem: who would bail out the ECB?
This is surely why the ECB has been so shrill in its antagonism to the slightest mention of default and restructuring. They need to maintain the illusion of risk-free sovereign debt because confidence in the euro itself is built upon it.”
Table III-2 provides an update of the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem. The balance sheet has swollen with the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs). Line 5 “Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy” increased from €546,747 million on Dec 31, 2010, to €879,130 million on Dec 28, 2011 and €1,150,496 million on Oct 19, 2012. The sum of line 5 and line 7 (“Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro”) has increased to €1,744,580 million in the statement of Oct 19. There is high credit risk in these transactions with capital of only €85,551 million as analyzed by Cochrane (2012Aug31).
This sum is roughly what concerns Beim (2012Oct9) because of the probable exposure relative to capital to institutions and sovereigns with higher default risk. To be sure, there is no precise knowledge of the composition of the ECB portfolio of loans and securities with weights and analysis of the risks of components. Javier E. David, writing on Jan 16, 2012, on “The risks in ECB’s crisis moves,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577158753459542024.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), informs that the estimated debt of weakest euro zone sovereigns held by the ECB is €211 billion, with Greek debt in highest immediate default risk being only 17 percent of the total. Another unknown is whether there is high risk collateral in the €489 billion three-year loans to credit institutions at 1 percent interest rates. The potential risk is the need for recapitalization of the ECB that could find similar political hurdles as the bailout fund EFSF. There is a recurring issue of whether the ECB should accept a haircut on its portfolio of Greek bonds of €40 billion acquired at discounts from face value. An article on “Haircut for the ECB? Not so fast,” published by the Wall Street Journal on Jan 28, 2012 (http://blogs.wsj.com/davos/2012/01/28/haircut-for-the-ecb-not-so-fast/), informs of the remarks by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada and President of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm), expressing what appears to be correct doctrine that there could conceivably be haircuts for official debt but that such a decision should be taken by governments and not by central banks.
Table III-2, Consolidated Financial Statement of the Eurosystem, Million EUR
| Dec 31, 2010 | Dec 28, 2011 | Oct 19, 2012 | |
| 1 Gold and other Receivables | 367,402 | 419,822 | 479,107 |
| 2 Claims on Non Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency | 223,995 | 236,826 | 258,859 |
| 3 Claims on Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency | 26,941 | 95,355 | 37,971 |
| 4 Claims on Non-Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro | 22,592 | 25,982 | 17,133 |
| 5 Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy Operations Denominated in Euro | 546,747 | 879,130 | 1,150,496 |
| 6 Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions Denominated in Euro | 45,654 | 94,989 | 214,553 |
| 7 Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro | 457,427 | 610,629 | 594,084 |
| 8 General Government Debt Denominated in Euro | 34,954 | 33,928 | 30,010 |
| 9 Other Assets | 278,719 | 336,574 | 264,356 |
| TOTAL ASSETS | 2,004, 432 | 2,733,235 | 3,046,569 |
| Memo Items | |||
| Sum of 5 and 7 | 1,004,174 | 1,489,759 | 1,744,580 |
| Capital and Reserves | 78,143 | 85,748 | 85,551 |
Source: European Central Bank
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs110105.en.html
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs111228.en.html
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2012/html/fs121023.en.html
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis. This section is divided into two subsections. Subsection IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth analyzes proposals to promote economic growth with government deficits financed by monetary policy. Subsection IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s provides the routes of adjustment of Brazil during the debt crisis after 1983.
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth. The advice of Bernanke (2000, 159-161, 165) to the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to reignite growth and employment in the economy consisted of zero interest rates and commitment to a high inflation target as proposed by Krugman (1999):
“I agree that this approach would be helpful, in that it would give private decision makers more information about the objectives of monetary policy. In particular, a target in the 3-4 percent range for inflation to be maintained for a number of years, would confirm not only that the BOJ is intent on moving safely away from a deflationary regime but also that it intends to make up some of the ‘price-level gap’ created by 8 years of zero or negative inflation. In stating an inflation target of, say, 3-4 percent, the BOJ would be giving the direction in which it will attempt to move the economy. The important question, of course, is whether a determined Bank of Japan would be able to depreciate the yen. I am not aware of any previous historical episode, including the period of very low interest rates in the 1930s, in which a central bank has been unable to devaluate its currency. There is strong presumption that vigorous intervention by the BOJ, together with appropriate announcements to influence market expectations, could drive down the value of the yen significantly. Further, there seems little reason not to try this strategy. The ‘worst’ that could happen would be that the BOJ would greatly increase its holdings of reserve assets. Perhaps not all of those who cite the beggar-thy-neighbor thesis are aware that it had its origins in the Great Depression, when it was used as an argument against the very devaluations that ultimately proved crucial to world economic recovery. Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected president of the United States in 1932 with the mandate to get the country out of the Depression. In the end, his most effective actions were the same ones that Japan needs to take—namely, rehabilitation of the banking system and devaluation of the currency.”
Bernanke (2002) also finds devaluation to be a powerful policy instrument to move the economy away from deflation and weak economic and financial conditions:
“Although a policy of intervening to affect the exchange value of the dollar is nowhere on the horizon today, it's worth noting that there have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from U.S. history is Franklin Roosevelt's 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the U.S. deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934.17 The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market. If nothing else, the episode illustrates that monetary actions can have powerful effects on the economy, even when the nominal interest rate is at or near zero, as was the case at the time of Roosevelt's devaluation.”
Krugman (2012Apr24) finds that this advice of then Professor Bernanke (2000) is relevant to current monetary policy in the US. The relevance would be in a target of inflation in the US of 4 percent, which was the rate prevailing in the late years of the Reagan Administration. The liquidity trap is defined by Krugman (1998, 141) “as a situation in which conventional monetary policies have become impotent, because nominal interest rates are at or near zero: injecting monetary base into the economy has no effect, because base and bonds are viewed by the private sector as perfect substitutes.” The adversity of the liquidity trap in terms of weakness in output and employment can be viewed as an economy experiencing deflation that cannot be contained by increases in the monetary base, or currency held by the public plus reserves held by banks at the central bank. The argument of monetary neutrality is that an increase in money throughout all future periods will increase prices by the same proportion. According to Krugman (1998, 142), the liquidity trap occurs because the public does not expect that the central bank will continue the monetary expansion once inflation returns to a certain level. Expectations are critical in explaining the liquidity trap and have been shaped by the continued fight against inflation by central banks during several decades with the possible exception of Japan beginning with the lost decade when deflation became the relevant policy concern. In this framework, monetary policy is ineffectual if perceived by the public as temporary. Credible monetary policy is perceived by the public as permanent deliberate increase in prices or output: “if the central bank can credibly promise to be irresponsible—that is, convince the market that it will in fact allow prices to rise sufficiently—it can bootstrap the economy out of the trap” (Krugman 1998, 161).
Fed Chairman Bernanke (2012Apr25, 7-8) argues that there is no conflict between his advice to the Bank of Japan as Princeton Professor Bernanke (2000) and current monetary policy by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC):
“So there’s this view circulating [Princeton Professor Paul Krugman at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/chairman-bernanke-should-listen-to-professor-bernanke.html?pagewanted=all] that the views I expressed about 15 years ago on the Bank of Japan are somehow inconsistent with our current policies. That is absolutely incorrect. Our—my views and our policies today are completely consistent with the views that I held at that time. I made two points at that time to the Bank of Japan. The first was that I believe that a determined central bank could and should work to eliminate deflation—that is, falling prices. The second point that I made was that when short-term interest rates hit zero, the tools of a central bank are no longer—are not exhausted, there are still other things that the central bank can do to create additional accommodation. Now, looking at the current situation in United States, we are not in deflation. When deflation became a significant risk in late 2010, or at least a modest risk in late 2010, we used additional balance sheet tools to help return inflation close to the 2 percent target. Likewise, we have been aggressive and creative in using non-federal-funds-rate-centered tools to achieve additional accommodation for the U.S. economy. So the very critical difference between the Japanese situation 15 years ago and the U.S. situation today is that Japan was in deflation, and, clearly, when you’re in deflation and in recession, then both sides of your mandates, so to speak, are demanding additional accommodation. In this case, it’s—we are not in deflation, we have an inflation rate that’s close to our objective. Now, why don’t we do more? Well, first I would again reiterate that we are doing a great deal; policy is extraordinarily accommodative. We—and I won’t go through the list again, but you know all the things that we have done to try to provide support to the economy. I guess the question is, does it make sense to actively seek a higher inflation rate in order to achieve a slightly increased reduction—a slightly increased pace of reduction in the unemployment rate? The view of the Committee is that that would be very reckless. We have—we, the Federal Reserve, have spent 30 years building up credibility for low and stable inflation, which has proved extremely valuable in that we’ve been be able to take strong accommodative actions in the last four or five years to support the economy without leading to an unanchoring of inflation expectations or a destabilization of inflation. To risk that asset for what I think would be quite tentative and perhaps doubtful gains on the real side would be, I think, an unwise thing to do.”
Chairman Bernanke (2012Apr 25, 10-11) explains current FOMC policy:
“So it’s not a ceiling, it’s a symmetric objective, and we attempt to bring inflation close to 2 percent. And in particular, if inflation were to jump for whatever reason—and we don’t have, obviously don’t have perfect control of inflation—we’ll try to return inflation to 2 percent at a pace which takes into account the situation with respect to unemployment. The risk of higher inflation—you say 2½ percent; well, 2½ percent expected change might involve a distribution of outcomes, some of which might be much higher than 2½ percent. And the concern we have is that if inflation were to run well above 2 percent for a protracted period, that the credibility and the well-anchored inflation expectations, which are such a valuable asset of the Federal Reserve, might become eroded, in which case we would in fact have less rather than more flexibility to use accommodative monetary policy to achieve our employment goals. I would cite to you, just as an example, if you look at Vice Chair Yellen’s paper, which she gave—or speech, which she gave a couple of weeks ago, where she described a number of ways of looking at the late 2014 guidance. She showed there some so-called optimal policy rules that come from trying to get the best possible outcomes from our quantitative econometric models, and what you see, if you look at that, is that the best possible outcomes, assuming perfect certainty, assuming perfect foresight—very unrealistic assumptions—still involve inflation staying quite close to 2 percent. So there is no presumption even in our econometric models that you need inflation well above target in order to make progress on unemployment.”
In perceptive analysis of growth and macroeconomics in the past six decades, Rajan (2012FA) argues that “the West can’t borrow and spend its way to recovery.” The Keynesian paradigm is not applicable in current conditions. Advanced economies in the West could be divided into those that reformed regulatory structures to encourage productivity and others that retained older structures. In the period from 1950 to 2000, Cobet and Wilson (2002) find that US productivity, measured as output/hour, grew at the average yearly rate of 2.9 percent while Japan grew at 6.3 percent and Germany at 4.7 percent (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). In the period from 1995 to 2000, output/hour grew at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US but at lower rates of 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in the US. Rajan (2012FA) argues that the differential in productivity growth was accomplished by deregulation in the US at the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s. In contrast, Europe did not engage in reform with the exception of Germany in the early 2000s that empowered the German economy with significant productivity advantage. At the same time, technology and globalization increased relative remunerations in highly-skilled, educated workers relative to those without skills for the new economy. It was then politically appealing to improve the fortunes of those left behind by the technological revolution by means of increasing cheap credit. As Rajan (2012FA) argues:
“In 1992, Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, partly to gain more control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant private mortgage agencies, and partly to promote affordable homeownership for low-income groups. Such policies helped money flow to lower-middle-class households and raised their spending—so much so that consumption inequality rose much less than income inequality in the years before the crisis. These policies were also politically popular. Unlike when it came to an expansion in government welfare transfers, few groups opposed expanding credit to the lower-middle class—not the politicians who wanted more growth and happy constituents, not the bankers and brokers who profited from the mortgage fees, not the borrowers who could now buy their dream houses with virtually no money down, and not the laissez-faire bank regulators who thought they could pick up the pieces if the housing market collapsed. The Federal Reserve abetted these shortsighted policies. In 2001, in response to the dot-com bust, the Fed cut short-term interest rates to the bone. Even though the overstretched corporations that were meant to be stimulated were not interested in investing, artificially low interest rates acted as a tremendous subsidy to the parts of the economy that relied on debt, such as housing and finance. This led to an expansion in housing construction (and related services, such as real estate brokerage and mortgage lending), which created jobs, especially for the unskilled. Progressive economists applauded this process, arguing that the housing boom would lift the economy out of the doldrums. But the Fed-supported bubble proved unsustainable. Many construction workers have lost their jobs and are now in deeper trouble than before, having also borrowed to buy unaffordable houses. Bankers obviously deserve a large share of the blame for the crisis. Some of the financial sector’s activities were clearly predatory, if not outright criminal. But the role that the politically induced expansion of credit played cannot be ignored; it is the main reason the usual checks and balances on financial risk taking broke down.”
In fact, Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) anticipated low liquidity in financial markets resulting from low interest rates before the financial crisis that caused distortions of risk/return decisions provoking the credit/dollar crisis and global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Near zero interest rates of unconventional monetary policy induced excessive risks and low liquidity in financial decisions that were critical as a cause of the credit/dollar crisis after 2007. Rajan (2012FA) argues that it is not feasible to return to the employment and income levels before the credit/dollar crisis because of the bloated construction sector, financial system and government budgets.
Proposals for higher inflation target of 4 percent for FOMC monetary policy are based on the view that interest rates are too high in real terms because the nominal rate is already at zero and cannot be lowered further. Rajan (2012May8) argues that higher inflation targets by the FOMC need not increase aggregate demand as proposed in those policies because of various factors:
· Pension Crisis. Baby boomers close to retirement calculate that their savings are not enough at current interest rates and may simply save more. Many potential retirees are delaying retirement in order to save what is required to provide for comfortable retirement.
· Regional Income and Debt Disparities. Unemployment, indebtedness and income growth differ by regions in the US. It is not feasible to relocate demand around the country such that decreases in real interest rates may not have aggregate demand effects.
· Inflation Expectations. Rajan (2012May) argues that there is not much knowledge about how people form expectations. Increasing the FOMC target to 4 percent could erode control of monetary policy by the central bank. More technical analysis of this issue, which could be merely repetition of inflation surprise in the US Great Inflation of the 1970s, is presented in Appendix IIA.
· Frictions. Keynesian economics is based on rigidities of wages and benefits in economic activities but there may be even more important current inflexibilities such as moving when it is not possible to sell and buy a house.
Thomas J. Sargent and William L. Silber, writing on “The challenges of the Fed’s bid for transparency,” on Mar 20, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/778eb1ce-7288-11e1-9c23-00144feab49a.html#axzz1pexRlsiQ), analyze the costs and benefits of transparency by the Fed. In the analysis of Sargent and Silber (2012Mar20), benefits of transparency by the Fed will exceed costs if the Fed is successful in conveying to the public what policies would be implemented and how forcibly in the presence of unforeseen economic events. History has been unkind to policy commitments. The risk in this case is if the Fed would postpone adjustment because of political pressures as has occurred in the past or because of errors of evaluation and forecasting of economic and financial conditions. Both political pressures and errors abounded in the unhappy stagflation of the 1970s also known as the US Great Inflation (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB). The challenge of the Fed, in the view of Sargent and Silber 2012Mar20), is to convey to the public the need to deviate from the commitment to interest rates of zero to ¼ percent because conditions have changed instead of unwarranted inaction or policy changes. Errors have abounded such as a critical cause of the global recession pointed by Sargent and Silber (2012Mar20): “While no president is known to have explicitly pressurized Mr. Bernanke’s predecessor, Alan Greenspan, he found it easy to maintain low interest rates for too long, fuelling the credit boom and housing bubble that led to the financial crisis in 2008.” Sargent and Silber (2012Mar20) also find need of commitment of fiscal authorities to consolidation needed to attain sustainable path of debt. Further analysis is provided in Appendix IIA Inflation Surprise and Appendix IIB Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html.
According to an influential school of thought, the interrelation of growth and inflation in Latin America is complex, preventing analysis of whether inflation promotes or restricts economic growth (Seers 1962, 191). In this view, there are multiple structural factors of inflation. Successful economic policy requires a development program that ameliorates structural weaknesses. Policy measures in developed countries are not transferable to developing economies.
In extensive research and analysis, Kahil (1973) finds no evidence of the role of structural factors in Brazilian inflation from 1947 to 1963. In fact, Kahil (1973, 329) concludes:
“The immediate causes of the persistent and often violent rise in prices, with which Brazil was plagued from the last month of 1948 to the early months of 1964, are pretty obvious: large and generally growing public deficits, together with too rapid an expansion of bank credit in the first years and, later, exaggerated and more and more frequent increases in the legal minimum wages.”
Kahil (1973, 334) analyzes the impact of inflation on the economy and society of Brazil:
“The real incomes of the various social classes alternately suffered increasingly frequent and sharp fluctuations: no sooner had a group succeeded in its struggle to restore its real income to some previous peak than it witnessed its erosion with accelerated speed; and it soon became apparent to all that the success of any important group in raising its real income, through government actions or by other means, was achieved only by reducing theirs. Social harmony, the general climate of euphoria, and also enthusiasm for government policies, which had tended to prevail until the last months of 1958, gave way in the following years of galloping inflation to intense political and social conflict and to profound disillusionment with public policies. By 1963 when inflation reached its runaway stage, the economy had ceased to grow, industry and transport were convulsed by innumerable strikes, and peasants were invading land in the countryside; and the situation further worsened in the first months of 1964.”
Professor Nathiel H. Leff (1975) at Columbia University identified another important contribution of Kahil (1975, Chapter IV“The supply of capital,” 127-185) of key current relevance to current proposals to promote economic growth and employment by raising inflation targets:
“Contrary to the assertions of some earlier writers on this topic, Kahil concludes that inflation did not lead to accelerated capital formation in Brazil.”
In econometric analysis of Brazil’s inflation from 1947 to 1980, Barbosa (1987) concludes:
“The most important result, based on the empirical evidence presented here, is that in the long run inflation is a monetary phenomenon. It follows that the most challenging task for Brazilian society in the near future is to shape a monetary-fiscal constitution that precludes financing much of the budget deficits through the inflation tax.”
Experience with continuing fiscal deficits and money creation tend to show accelerating inflation. Table III-10 provides average yearly rates of growth of two definitions of the money stock, M1, and M2 that adds also interest-paying deposits. The data were part of a research project on the monetary history of Brazil using the NBER framework of Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 1970) and Cagan (1965) as well as the institutional framework of Rondo E. Cameron (1967, 1972) who inspired the research (Pelaez 1974, 1975, 1976a,b, 1977, 1979, Pelaez and Suzigan 1978, 1981). The data were also used to test the correct specification of money and income following Sims (1972; see also Williams et al. 1976) as well as another test of orthogonality of money demand and supply using covariance analysis. The average yearly rates of inflation are high for almost any period in 1861-1970, even when prices were declining at 1 percent in 19th century England, and accelerated to 27.1 percent in 1945-1970. There may be concern in an uncontrolled deficit monetized by sharp increases in base money. The Fed may have desired to control inflation at 2 percent after lowering the fed funds rate to 1 percent in 2003 but inflation rose to 4.1 percent in 2007. There is not “one hundred percent” confidence in controlling inflation because of the lags in effects of monetary policy impulses and the equally important lags in realization of the need for action and taking of action and also the inability to forecast any economic variable. Romer and Romer (2004) find that a one percentage point tightening of monetary policy is associated with a 4.3 percent decline in industrial production. There is no change in inflation in the first 22 months after monetary policy tightening when it begins to decline steadily, with decrease by 6 percent after 48 months (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 102). Even if there were one hundred percent confidence in reducing inflation by monetary policy, it could take a prolonged period with adverse effects on economic activity. Certainty does not occur in economic policy, which is characterized by costs that cannot be anticipated.
Table III-10, Brazil, Yearly Growth Rates of M1, M2, Nominal Income (Y), Real Income (y), Real Income per Capita (y/n) and Prices (P)
| M1 | M2 | Y | y | y/N | P | |
| 1861-1970 | 9.3 | 6.2 | 10.2 | 4.6 | 2.4 | 5.8 |
| 1861-1900 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 4.4 | 2.6 | 1.6 |
| 1861-1913 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 4.4 | 2.4 | 0.1 |
| 1861-1929 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 4.3 | 2.3 | 2.1 |
| 1900-1970 | 13.9 | 13.9 | 15.2 | 4.9 | 2.6 | 10.3 |
| 1900-1929 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 10.8 | 4.2 | 2.1 | 6.6 |
| 1900-1945 | 8.6 | 9.1 | 9.2 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 4.9 |
| 1920-1970 | 17.8 | 17.3 | 19.4 | 5.3 | 2.8 | 14.1 |
| 1920-1945 | 8.3 | 8.7 | 7.5 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 3.2 |
| 1920-1929 | 5.4 | 6.9 | 11.1 | 5.3 | 3.3 | 5.8 |
| 1929-1939 | 8.9 | 8.1 | 11.7 | 6.3 | 4.1 | 5.4 |
| 1945-1970 | 30.3 | 29.2 | 33.2 | 6.1 | 3.1 | 27.1 |
Note: growth rates are obtained by regressions of the natural logarithms on time. M1 and M2 definitions of the money stock; Y nominal GDP; y real GDP; y/N real GDP per capita; P prices.
Source: See Pelaez and Suzigan (1978), 143; M1 and M2 from Pelaez and Suzigan (1981); money income and real income from Contador and Haddad (1975) and Haddad (1974); prices by the exchange rate adjusted by British wholesale prices until 1906 and then from Villela and Suzigan (1973); national accounts after 1947 from Fundação Getúlio Vargas.
Chart III-1 shows in semi-logarithmic scale from 1861 to 1970 in descending order two definitions of income velocity, money income, M1, M2, an indicator of prices and real income.
Chart III-1, Brazil, Money, Income and Prices 1861-1970.
Source: © Carlos Manuel Pelaez and Wilson Suzigan. 1981. História Monetária do Brasil Segunda Edição. Coleção Temas Brasileiros. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 21.
Table III-11 provides yearly percentage changes of GDP, GDP per capita, base money, prices and the current account in millions of dollars during the acceleration of inflation after 1947. There was an explosion of base money or the issue of money and three waves of inflation identified by Kahil (1973). Inflation accelerated together with issue of money and political instability from 1960 to 1964. There must be a role for expectations in inflation but there is not much sound knowledge and measurement as Rajan (2012May8) argues. There have been inflation waves documented in periodic comments in this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/mediocre-recovery-without-jobs.html) . The risk is ignition of adverse expectations at the crest of one of worldwide inflation waves. Lack of credibility of the commitment by the FOMC to contain inflation could ignite such perverse expectations. Deficit financing of economic growth can lead to inflation and financial instability.
Table III-11, Brazil, GDP, GDP per Capita, Base Money, Prices and Current Account of the Balance of Payments, ∆% and USD Millions, 1947-1971
| GDP ∆% | GDP per Capita ∆% | Base Money ∆% | Prices ∆% | Current USD Millions | |
| 1947 | 2.4 | 0.1 | -1.4 | 14.0 | 162 |
| 1948 | 7.4 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 7.6 | -24 |
| 1949 | 6.6 | 4.2 | 14.5 | 4.0 | -74 |
| 1950 | 6.5 | 4.0 | 23.0 | 10.0 | 52 |
| 1951 | 5.9 | 2.9 | 15.3 | 21.9 | -291 |
| 1952 | 8.7 | 5.6 | 17.7 | 10.2 | -615 |
| 1953 | 2.5 | -0.5 | 15.5 | 12.1 | 16 |
| 1954 | 10.1 | 6.9 | 23.4 | 31.0 | -203 |
| 1955 | 6.9 | 3.8 | 18.0 | 14.0 | 17 |
| 1956 | 3.2 | 0.2 | 16.9 | 21.6 | 194 |
| 1957 | 8.1 | 4.9 | 30.5 | 13.9 | -180 |
| 1958 | 7.7 | 4.6 | 26.1 | 10.4 | -253 |
| 1959 | 5.6 | 2.5 | 32.3 | 37.7 | -154 |
| 1960 | 9.7 | 6.5 | 42.4 | 27.6 | -410 |
| 1961 | 10.3 | 7.1 | 54.4 | 36.1 | 115 |
| 1962 | 5.3 | 2.2 | 66.4 | 54.1 | -346 |
| 1963 | 1.6 | -1.4 | 78.4 | 75.2 | -244 |
| 1964 | 2.9 | -0.1 | 82.5 | 89.7 | 40 |
| 1965 | 2.7 | -0.6 | 67.6 | 62.0 | 331 |
| 1966 | 4.4 | 1.5 | 25.8 | 37.9 | 153 |
| 1967 | 4.9 | 2.0 | 33.9 | 28.7 | -245 |
| 1968 | 11.2 | 8.1 | 31.4 | 25.2 | 32 |
| 1969 | 9.9 | 6.9 | 22.4 | 18.2 | 549 |
| 1970 | 8.9 | 5.8 | 20.2 | 20.7 | 545 |
| 1971 | 13.3 | 10.2 | 29.8 | 22.0 | 530 |
Sources: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Banco Central do Brasil and Pelaez and Suzigan (1981). Carlos Manuel Pelaez, História Econômica do Brasil: Um Elo entre a Teoria e a Realidade Econômica. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1979, 94.
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s. Economic and financial risks in the euro area are increasingly being dominated by analytical and political disagreement on conflicts of fiscal adjustment, financial stability, economic growth and employment. Political development is beginning to push for alternative paths of policy. Blanchard (2012WEOApr) and Draghi (2012May3) provide analysis of appropriate directions of policy.
Blanchard (2012WEOApr) finds that interest rates close to zero in advanced economies have not induced higher economic growth because of two main factors—fiscal consolidation and deleveraging—that restrict economic growth in the short-term. First, Blanchard (2012WEOApr, XIII) finds that assuming a multiplier of unity of the fiscal deficit on GDP, decrease of the cyclically-adjusted deficit of advanced economies by 1 percent would reduce economic growth by one percentage point. Second, deleveraging by banks, occurring mainly in Europe, tightens credit supply with similar reduction of euro area economic growth by one percentage point in 2012. The baseline of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the IMF (2012WEOApr) for Apr 2012 incorporates both effects, which results in weak economic growth, in particular in Europe, and prolonged unemployment. An important analysis by Blanchard (2012WEOApr, XIII) is that “financial uncertainty, together with sharp shifts in risk appetite, has led to volatile capital flows.” Blanchard (2012WEOApr) still finds that the greatest vulnerability is another profound crisis in Europe (ECB). Crisis prevention should buttress the resilience of affected countries during those shifts in risk appetite. The role of the enhanced firewall of the IMF, European Union (EU) and European Central Bank is gaining time during which countries could engage in fiscal consolidation and structural reforms that would diminish the shifts in risk appetite, preventing devastating effects of financial crises. Volatility in capital flows is equivalent to volatility of valuations of risk financial assets. The challenge to the policy mix consists in balancing the adverse short-term effects of fiscal consolidation and deleveraging with the beneficial long-term effects of eliminating the vulnerability to shocks of risk aversion. Blanchard (2012WEOApr) finds that policy should seek short-term credibility while implementing measures that restrict the path of expenditures together with simultaneous development of institutions and rules that constrain deficits and spending in the future. There is similar policy challenge in deleveraging banks, which is required for sound lending institutions, but without causing an adverse credit crunch. Advanced economies face a tough policy challenge of increasing demand and potential growth.
The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi (2012May3) also outlines the appropriate policy mix for successful adjustment:
“It is of utmost importance to ensure fiscal sustainability and sustainable growth in the euro area. Most euro area countries made good progress in terms of fiscal consolidation in 2011. While the necessary comprehensive fiscal adjustment is weighing on near-term economic growth, its successful implementation will contribute to the sustainability of public finances and thereby to the lowering of sovereign risk premia. In an environment of enhanced confidence in fiscal balances, private sector activity should also be fostered, supporting private investment and medium-term growth.
At the same time, together with fiscal consolidation, growth and growth potential in the euro area need to be enhanced by decisive structural reforms. In this context, facilitating entrepreneurial activities, the start-up of new firms and job creation is crucial. Policies aimed at enhancing competition in product markets and increasing the wage and employment adjustment capacity of firms will foster innovation, promote job creation and boost longer-term growth prospects. Reforms in these areas are particularly important for countries which have suffered significant losses in cost competitiveness and need to stimulate productivity and improve trade performance.
In this context, let me make a few remarks on the adjustment process within the euro area. As we know from the experience of other large currency areas, regional divergences in economic developments are a normal feature. However, considerable imbalances have accumulated in the last decade in several euro area countries and they are now in the process of being corrected.
As concerns the monetary policy stance of the ECB, it has to be focused on the euro area. Our primary objective remains to maintain price stability over the medium term. This is the best contribution of monetary policy to fostering growth and job creation in the euro area.
Addressing divergences among individual euro area countries is the task of national governments. They must undertake determined policy actions to address major imbalances and vulnerabilities in the fiscal, financial and structural domains. We note that progress is being made in many countries, but several governments need to be more ambitious. Ensuring sound fiscal balances, financial stability and competitiveness in all euro area countries is in our common interest.”
Economic policy during the debt crisis of 1983 may be useful in analyzing the options of the euro area. Brazil successfully combined fiscal consolidation, structural reforms to eliminate subsidies and devaluation to parity. Brazil’s terms of trade, or export prices relative to import prices, deteriorated by 47 percent from 1977 to 1983 (Pelaez 1986, 46). Table III-12 provides selected economic indicators of the economy of Brazil from 1970 to 1985. In 1983, Brazil’s inflation was 164.9 percent, GDP fell 3.2 percent, idle capacity in manufacturing reached 24.0 percent and Brazil had an unsustainable foreign debt. US money center banks would have had negative capital if loans to emerging countries could have been marked according to loss given default and probability of default (for credit risk models see Pelaez and Pelaez (2005), International Financial Architecture, 134-54). Brazil’s current account of the balance of payments shrank from $16,310 million in 1982 to $6,837 million in 1983 because of the abrupt cessation of foreign capital inflows with resulting contraction of Brazil’s GDP by 3.2 percent. An important part of adjustment consisted of agile coordination of domestic production to cushion the impact of drastic reduction in imports. In 1984, Brazil had a surplus of $45 million in current account, the economy grew at 4.5 percent and inflation was stabilized at 232.9 percent.
Table III-12, Brazil, Selected Economic Indicators 1970-1985
| Inflation ∆% | GDP Growth ∆% | Idle Capacity in MFG % | BOP Current Account USD MM | |
| 1985 | 223.4 | 7.4 | 19.8 | -630 |
| 1984 | 232.9 | 4.5 | 22.6 | 45 |
| 1983 | 164.9 | -3.2 | 24.0 | -6,837 |
| 1982 | 94.0 | 0.9 | 15.2 | -16,310 |
| 1981 | 113.0 | -1.6 | 12.3 | -11,374 |
| 1980 | 109.2 | 7.2 | 3.5 | -12,886 |
| 1979 | 55.4 | 6.4 | 4.1 | -10,742 |
| 1978 | 38.9 | 5.0 | 3.3 | -6,990 |
| 1977 | 40.6 | 5.7 | 3.2 | -4,037 |
| 1976 | 40.4 | 9.7 | 0.0 | -6,013 |
| 1975 | 27.8 | 5.4 | 3.0 | -6,711 |
| 1974 | 29.1 | 9.7 | 0.1 | -7,122 |
| 1973 | 15.4 | 13.6 | 0.3 | -1,688 |
| 1972 | 17.7 | 11.1 | 6.5 | -1,489 |
| 1971 | 21.5 | 12.0 | 9.8 | -1,307 |
| 1970 | 19.3 | 8.8 | 12.2 | -562 |
Source: Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo, Editora Atlas, 1986, 86.
Chart III-2 provides the tortuous Phillips Circuit of Brazil from 1963 to 1987. There were no reliable consumer price index and unemployment data in Brazil for that period. Chart III-2 used the more reliable indicator of inflation, the wholesale price index, and idle capacity of manufacturing as a proxy of unemployment in large urban centers.
Chart III-2, Brazil, Phillips Circuit 1963-1987
Source:
©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.
A key to success in stabilizing an economy with significant risk aversion is finding parity of internal and external interest rates. Brazil implemented fiscal consolidation and reforms that are advisable in explosive foreign debt environments. In addition, Brazil had the capacity to find parity in external and internal interest rates to prevent capital flight and disruption of balance sheets (for analysis of balance sheets, interest rates, indexing, devaluation, financial instruments and asset/liability management in that period see Pelaez and Pelaez (2007), The Global Recession Risk: Dollar Devaluation and the World Economy, 178-87). Table III-13 provides monthly percentage changes of inflation, devaluation and indexing and the monthly percent overnight interest rate. Parity was attained by means of a simple inequality:
Cost of Domestic Loan ≥ Cost of Foreign Loan
This ordering was attained in practice by setting the domestic interest rate of the overnight interest rate plus spread higher than indexing of government securities with lower spread than loans in turn higher than devaluation plus spread of foreign loans. Interest parity required equality of inflation, devaluation and indexing. Brazil devalued the cruzeiro by 30 percent in 1983 because the depreciation of the German mark DM relative to the USD had eroded the competitiveness of Brazil’s products in Germany and in competition with German goods worldwide. The database of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System quotes DM 1.7829/USD on Mar 3 1980 and DM 2.4425/USD on Mar 15, 1983 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat89_ge.htm) for devaluation of 37.0 percent. Parity of costs and rates of domestic and foreign loans and assets required ensuring that there would not be appreciation of the exchange rate, inducing capital flight in expectation of future devaluation that would have reversed stabilization. One of the main problems of adjustment of members of the euro area with high debts is that they cannot adjust the exchange rate because of the common euro currency. This is not an argument in favor of breaking the euro area because there would be also major problems of adjustment such as exiting the euro in favor of a new Drachma in the case of Greece. Another hurdle of adjustment in the euro area is that Brazil could have moved swiftly to adjust its economy in 1983 but the euro area has major sovereignty and distribution of taxation hurdles in moving rapidly.
Table III-13, Brazil, Inflation, Devaluation, Overnight Interest Rate and Indexing, Percent per Month, 1984
| 1984 | Inflation IGP ∆% | Devaluation ∆% | Overnight Interest Rate % | Indexing ∆% |
| Jan | 9.8 | 9.8 | 10.0 | 9.8 |
| Feb | 12.3 | 12.3 | 12.2 | 12.3 |
| Mar | 10.0 | 10.1 | 11.3 | 10.0 |
| Apr | 8.9 | 8.8 | 10.1 | 8.9 |
| May | 8.9 | 8.9 | 9.8 | 8.9 |
| Jun | 9.2 | 9.2 | 10.2 | 9.2 |
| Jul | 10.3 | 10.2 | 11.9 | 10.3 |
| Aug | 10.6 | 10.6 | 11.0 | 10.6 |
| Sep | 10.5 | 10.5 | 11.9 | 10.5 |
| Oct | 12.6 | 12.6 | 12.9 | 12.6 |
| Nov | 9.9 | 9.9 | 10.9 | 9.9 |
| Dec | 10.5 | 10.5 | 11.5 | 10.5 |
Source: Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo, Editora Atlas, 1986, 86.
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012
